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Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
During the past decades, international equity markets have been fundamentally al-
tered due to the intensiﬁcation of the globalization process (market interconnected-
ness) and vast increase in trading speed (emergence of low-latency trading). Re-
searchers and industry pundits have paid increasing attention to these changes and
the threats that they may pose to the international ﬁnancial markets. Speciﬁcally,
researchers in the ﬁeld of market microstructure analyse how the trading process
was aﬀected by the above mentioned changes. In this dissertation, I investigate
the consequences of these two changes with respect to price discovery and liquidity
provision.
First, I investigate linkages across international equity markets with an emphasis
on the role of liquidity and trading activity in the transmission of shocks to prices
(see Chapter 2)1. Second, I examine how price discovery and liquidity provision were
altered due to the emergence of algorithmic (low-latency) trading (see Chapters 3
and 4)2.
1Chapter 2 is based on the paper entitled “The Propagation of Shocks across International Equity
Markets: A Microstructure Perspective,” which is a joint work with Dion Bongaerts, Richard Roll,
Dominik Rösch, and Mathijs van Dijk (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475518). I was
actively involved in developing the conceptual framework, hypotheses, and methodology used in
this paper. I was also responsible for conducting the majority of the data analyses and writing
substantial parts of the paper.
2Chapter 3 is based on the paper entitled “Intraday Return Predictability, Informed Limit
Orders, and Algorithmic Trading,” which is my single-authored job market paper (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686082).
Chapter 4 is based on the paper entitled “Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery without
Trading: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange in the Pre-Opening Period and the Opening
Batch Auction,” which is joint work with Mario Bellia, Loriana Pelizzon, Marti Subrahmanyam, and
Jun Uno (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705962). I was actively involved in developing
the conceptual framework, hypotheses, and methodology used in this paper. I was also responsible
for conducting the majority of the data analyses.
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Interconnectedness of ﬁnancial markets
Despite the general awareness of market interconnectedness (see Karolyi (2003) for
review of the literature on shock propagation across ﬁnancial markets), before the
recent ﬁnancial crisis occurred, few people recognized how strong the links between
the diﬀerent markets actually were. This global crisis shed light on the interconnect-
edness and interdependence between ﬁnancial markets that diﬀer both in terms of
instruments traded and geographical location. The crisis is believed to have started
in the U.S. housing market, in particular in the mortgage-backed securities market,
and quickly spread to the other markets in the U.S. and then across borders. Soon
the whole world suﬀered from a severe global ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., Longstaﬀ (2010);
Rose and Spiegel (2010); Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, and Sarno (2012); Bekaert,
Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014)).
Furthermore, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity,
since part of the ﬁnancial distress during the sub-prime crisis was liquidity-induced
(e.g., Brunnermeier (2008); Gorton (2009a,b)). Previous research shows that liquidity
is priced both as a characteristic (Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Amihud (2002))
and a risk factor (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Acharya and Pedersen (2005)).
Recent studies also propose that liquidity dry-ups may be related to the extreme price
movements (e.g., Bernardo and Welch (2004); Morris and Shin (2004); Gârleanu and
Pedersen (2007); Huang and Wang (2009); Cespa and Foucault (2014)).
For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose a well-known mechanism
that may lead to market crashes during the crisis: liquidity spirals. According to
their model, there can be two types of mutually reinforcing spirals: margin spirals
and loss spirals. Suppose a speculator receives an external funding shock and hits his
funding constraint; in other words, he does not have enough capital to cover margin
requirements. This forces him to sell the assets from his inventory position as soon as
possible, even at ﬁre sale prices, which lowers the market price of the asset. As prices
are driven away from fundamentals, speculators will incur losses on their inventory
positions (loss spiral) and be subject to higher margins (margin spiral). As a result,
liquidity in the market evaporates and prices drop rapidly.
10A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
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If shocks in low-liquidity environments can induce crises, or amplify crises, the
damage to the real economy can be substantial. For example, according to Getter,
Jickling, Labonte, and Murphy (2007), GDP growth can be damaged by a ﬁnancial
crisis through two channels: consumption and investment. Because of the crisis, the
wealth of individual households declines, leading to a decrease in their consumption.
Increased borrowing costs as well as limited access to capital markets will impact
companies’ investments in physical capital. In sum, it is important to understand
what role market microstructure variables, such as liquidity and trading activity, play
in the origination of ﬁnancial shocks. Detailed understanding of how shocks originate
and propagate is crucial in developing regulatory policies that decrease the fragility
of ﬁnancial system.
Motivated by the recent ﬁnancial crisis, Chapter 2 of this dissertation investi-
gates the intraday propagation of shocks to prices, liquidity, and trading activity
across 12 equity markets around the world for the 1996 – 2010 period. We use
the non-parametric approach proposed in Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) to
identify jumps in prices, liquidity (as measured by proportional quoted and eﬀective
spreads), and trading activity (as measured by turnover and market order imbalance)
employing a 5-minute frequency. The ﬁndings show that shocks to prices and trading
activity regularly spillover across equity markets within the same 5-minute interval.
The results suggest that these shocks are driven by information rather than liquidity
as they do not revert and are related to macroeconomic news announcements as well.
On the contrary, shocks to liquidity are rare and tend to be isolated events. In other
words, shocks to liquidity seem to be unrelated to shocks to prices and/or trading ac-
tivity in the same market, as well as to shocks to liquidity in other markets. In sum,
the results do not conﬁrm the role of liquidity in the origination and propagation of
ﬁnancial shocks.
After the recent ﬁnancial crisis, several regulatory measures were undertaken to
decrease the vulnerability of ﬁnancial markets (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act in the U.S.). This act, among other changes,
forbids proprietary trading by commercial banks to avoid unnecessary risk taking
10B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
(Volcker Rule) and disruptive trading practices such as “spooﬁng” (submitting or-
ders without any intention to execute them in order to manipulate the price) — a
technique actively used by algorithmic (low-latency) traders. The consequences of
algorithmic (low-latency) trading are the focus of Chapters 3 and 4 of this disserta-
tion.
Low-latency trading
One can argue that speed diﬀerentials were always present in the ﬁnancial markets
and, hence, no changes to price discovery and/or liquidity provision are expected.
Indeed, ﬁnancial historians can provide such examples dating back to 18th century.
For example, Dempster, Wells, and Wills (2000) analyze trading and information
dissemination on London and Amsterdam exchanges around that period: “During
the 1700’s the distance between London and Amsterdam was three days travel....
Wilson [1941, 104] relates the story of small ﬁshing smacks that were supposed to
meet the English ships and speed back to Amsterdam with the latest news related
to the Bubble.”
Although speed diﬀerentials clearly are not a new phenomenon, there are several
reasons the emergence of low-latency trading may have altered ﬁnancial markets
signiﬁcantly. First, the speed at which algorithmic traders operate is far beyond
the human ability. For instance, in 2010 NASDAQ upgraded its system to allow
operations at the nanosecond level. Second, algorithmic traders and speciﬁcally their
subset high-frequency traders (HFTs) are nowadays responsible for the majority of
equity turnover. Agarwal (2012) shows that in 2005 HFTs were responsible for only
20% of the U.S. equity turnover, but in 2010 their share increased to 50%-60%.
Biais and Foucault (2014) and O’Hara (2015) review the recent literature on
the advantages and disadvantages of low-latency trading. First, algorithmic traders
have crowded out traditional market makers and, thus, represent the majority of
intermediaries in the modern equity markets (e.g., Menkveld (2013); Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2015)). Contrary to traditional market makers, algorithmic traders are
not required to make the market (provide liquidity) when necessary. Thus, fast liq-
uidity providers may disappear from the market at a moment when they are needed
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most (e.g., during turmoil times), which in turn may lead to market fragility (Bon-
gaerts and Van Achter (2016)). Second, algorithmic traders are likely to be informed
traders given that they have superior technology to process information from the or-
der ﬂow and to trade on it (Cespa and Foucault (2011); Scholtus, van Dijk, and Frijns
(2014); Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015); Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016);
Menkveld and Zoican (2015)). Therefore, algorithmic traders may make prices more
eﬃcient and impose adverse selection costs on other market participants. The aggre-
gate impact of low-latency traders on the welfare still remains unclear as the arms
race between traders may lead to overinvestment in speed compared to social opti-
mum (e.g., Ye, Yao, and Gai (2013); Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015); Pagnotta
and Philippon (2015); Bongaerts, Kong, and Van Achter (2016)).
To sum up, algorithmic (low-latency) traders are a very controversial group of
market participants who have provoked a lot of discussion by regulatory bodies (see
SEC (2010); SEC (2014)), as well as academics, and industry pundits.3 For instance,
low-latency traders are blamed for the origination and ampliﬁcation of the Flash
Crash on May 6, 2010, when the U.S. market dropped by approximately 9% and
rebounded back within 30-minutes. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) pro-
vide empirical evidence that although low-latency traders did not directly instigate
the Flash Crash, they certainly ampliﬁed it.
Despite the fact that low-latency traders have been present in the market for
more than a decade, they still attract a lot of regulatory attention. In particular, on
November 24, 2015, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission unanimously
approves Regulation on Automated Trading (Reg AT). As part of the proposed rules,
algorithmic traders should open their source code to regulators in order to ensure
that their algorithms do not make markets more vulnerable. In Chapters 3 and 4, I
analyze the role of algorithmic (low-latency) trading in price discovery and liquidity
provision.
In Chapter 3, I examine how information is incorporated into prices in the limit
order book markets and what role algorithmic traders play in this process. This re-
3Lewis (2014) presents a popular although one-sided view on low-latency traders.
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search question is motivated by the following facts. First, the limit order book is the
dominant market design for equity exchanges around the world (see Swan and West-
erholm (2006)). Second, the traditional view in the market microstructure literature
used to be that informed traders use only market orders (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom
(1985); Kyle (1985); Glosten (1994)). Third, the emergence of algorithmic traders
could alter the price discovery process substantially. I examine the strategic choice
of informed traders for market versus limit orders for all NYSE-listed common stocks
for the 2002 – 2010 period by analyzing intraday (one-minute) return predictability
from market and limit order ﬂows. My ﬁrst ﬁnding indicates that informed limit
(not market) orders are the dominant source of intraday return predictability. In
order to establish causal relations between algorithmic trading and informational
content of limit and market orders, I focus on the period surrounding permanent ex-
ogenous shock to algorithmic trading — NYSE Hybrid Market introduction, which
is a technological change in market design that resulted in an increase in speed and
automation. My second ﬁnding shows that the increase in algorithmic trading is as-
sociated with more informed trading through both market and limit orders. Overall,
my results suggest that widely-used measures of informed trading/adverse selection
neglect the lion’s share of informed trading — informed trading through limit orders.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation focuses on the role of low-latency traders in the
price discovery process during the pre-opening period, the ﬁrst time of the day when
prices could incorporate overnight information. For investors who want to execute
their orders at the opening call, it is important to know whether under the pres-
ence of algorithmic traders pre-opening quotes are good predictors of the opening
prices.4 To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that sheds light on the
role of low-latency traders in the pre-opening period. In this chapter, we analyze
whether low-latency traders participate in the market and whether they contribute
to price discovery in the absence of trading. We use account level data for TOPIX100
constituents during April and May 2013 provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to
answer these questions. First, we develop a new classiﬁcation of traders, which is
4For studies on price discovery during pre-opening period, see Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999);
Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000); and Barclay and Hendershott (2003).
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more comprehensive than what has been used in the prior literature. Second, we
show that although low-latency traders participate less in the pre-opening period
than in the continuous trading session, they actively contribute to price discovery:
largely via new limit orders and price revisions. Third, stocks in which low-latency
traders are dominant are those for which pre-opening mid-quotes converge faster to
the opening price and are less biased. In sum, low-latency traders are the dominant
contributors to price discovery during the pre-opening period.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the area of market microstructure, broadly
deﬁned. Prior studies have mainly focused on the U.S. equity market. An important
advantage of studying international equity markets is the prospect of drawing pol-
icy lessons from variations in the ways these markets are organized and regulated.
Several open questions in terms of the regulation of low-latency trading and optimal
market design in the presence of low-latency traders remain. For example, Budish,
Cramton, and Shim (2015) question whether continuous trading or periodic batch
auctions are a better market design in the presence of low-latency traders. Another
issue which remains unanswered was raised by SEC (2014) with respect to the deﬁ-
nition of a high-frequency trader. SEC (2014) argues that current metrics that use
account level data and are based on the high-frequency traders’ characteristics out-
lined in SEC (2010) may be too narrow to capture the true range of high-frequency
activity. At the same time, proxies for high-frequency trading calculated from pub-
licly available data sources may be too broad and include activity that should not be
classiﬁed as high-frequency trading. My future research agenda is related to the two
questions highlighted above. In sum, I aim to derive policy implications for the reg-
ulation of low-latency trading activity in order to improve such functions of ﬁnancial
markets as price discovery and liquidity provision.
12B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
13A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 2. The Propagation of Shocks across Equity Markets 9
Chapter 2
The Propagation of Shocks Across International Eq-
uity Markets: A Microstructure Perspective∗
2.1 Introduction
Since at least the stock market crash of October 1987, investors, policy makers,
and researchers have been interested in whether and how shocks to one ﬁnancial
market spread to other markets. The Mexican, Asian, and LTCM crises in the 1990s
were accompanied by the emergence of a large literature on international ﬁnancial
market linkages and ﬁnancial contagion. The recent global ﬁnancial crisis has further
highlighted how shocks to certain ﬁnancial markets can rapidly spread to markets
for other asset classes and to markets in other countries. Yet, the channels through
which ﬁnancial market shocks originate and propagate across markets are not well
understood.1
A growing body of theoretical research points at an important role for market
∗This chapter is based on Bongaerts, Roll, Rösch, van Dijk, and Yuferova (2016) “The Propa-
gation of Shocks Across International Equity Markets: A Microstructure Perspective” (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475518). We are grateful to Yakov Amihud, Torben Andersen, Joachim
Grammig, Charles-Albert Lehalle, Francis Longstaﬀ, Albert Menkveld, Asani Sarkar, Ramabhadran
Thirumalai, Michel van der Wel, Christian Voight, Avi Wohl, seminar participants at Erasmus Uni-
versity, and conference participants at the 5th Emerging Markets Finance Conference in Bombay,
the 2014 Extreme Events in Finance conference in Royaumont, the 8th Financial Risks Interna-
tional Forum in Paris, the 2014 German Finance Association meeting in Karlsruhe, and the 2014
INFER workshop in Bordeaux for helpful comments. We thank Michel van der Wel for sharing the
U.S. macro news announcements data. Van Dijk gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from
the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and from the Netherlands Organisa-
tion for Scientiﬁc Research through a “Vidi” grant. This work was carried out on the National
e-infrastructure with the support of SURF Foundation. We thank OneMarket Data for the use of
their OneTick software.
1See, among others, Eun and Shim (1989), Roll (1989), Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), and Lin,
Engle, and Ito (1994) for early research on the propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks; Reinhart
and Calvo (1996), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), and Hartmann,
Straetmans, and De Vries (2004) for studies on contagion; Karolyi (2003) for a literature review; and
Longstaﬀ (2010) and Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014) for analyses of the propagation
of shocks across, respectively, markets for diﬀerent asset classes and international equity markets
during the recent crisis.
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liquidity. In particular, recent theories feature “sudden liquidity dry-ups,” “liquidity
crashes,” or “liquidity black holes” that arise through channels related to the supply of
and/or demand for liquidity; in turn, these liquidity shocks induce shocks to security
prices and spillovers to other markets.2 Prominent accounts of the recent crisis (e.g.,
Brunnermeier (2008); Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009);
Gorton (2009a,b)) emphasize the importance of these liquidity channels, but direct
empirical evidence is limited.
In this paper, we aim to test the relevance of the liquidity channel for the orig-
ination and propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks by taking a microstructure per-
spective. Speciﬁcally, we analyze why shocks to equity prices occur and whether
and how they spread across markets by investigating their relation with shocks to
market liquidity and trading activity, using microstructure data for 12 developed
and emerging equity markets around the world over the period 1996-2011. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to study cross-market linkages of stock prices
jointly with liquidity and trading activity.3 Our main alternative hypothesis to the
liquidity explanation is that shocks are driven by information; i.e., shocks to prices
may reﬂect economic news that could also be relevant for securities traded on other
markets (e.g., King and Wadhwani (1990)).
Our microstructure perspective also involves analyzing the origination and prop-
agation of shocks at a much higher frequency than prior work: 5-minute intervals
within the trading day. Most studies to date study the interconnectedness of ﬁnancial
markets at the daily or even lower frequency (e.g., Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003);
Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2004); Longstaﬀ (2010); Bekaert, Ehrmann,
Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014); Pukthuanthong and Roll (2015)). However, a rela-
tively low-frequency approach could miss spillovers at higher frequencies and fail to
2Recent theoretical studies on such liquidity channels include Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb
and Vayanos (2002), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Bernardo and Welch (2004), Morris and Shin
(2004), Yuan (2005); Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007), Pasquariello (2007), Andrade, Chang, and
Seasholes (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Huang and Wang (2009), and Cespa and
Foucault (2014).
3 Several papers examine co-movement in liquidity within and across equity markets (e.g., Chor-
dia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000); Brockman, Chung, and Pérignon (2009); Zhang, Cai, and
Cheung (2009); Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012)) and co-movement in the turnover of individual
U.S. stocks (e.g., Lo and Wang (2000) and Cremers and Mei (2007)), but none of these papers also
studies stock price linkages.
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uncover patterns in liquidity and/or trading activity that could help to explain the
occurrence and propagation of shocks to prices within and across markets.4 We note
that for developed markets in recent years, the 5-minute frequency might no longer
be perceived as high-frequency. But for emerging markets and for our full sample
period 1996-2011, this seems a reasonable frequency to ensure suﬃcient trading in
each interval as well as suﬃcient time for shocks to propagate to other markets.
Using global tick-by-tick trade and quote data from the Thomson Reuters Tick
History (TRTH) database, we construct time-series at the 5-minute frequency of
market-wide stock returns (based on midquotes), liquidity (quoted and eﬀective
spreads), and trading activity (turnover and order imbalance) for 12 equity mar-
kets over the period 1996-2011. We include both developed and emerging equity
markets within three regions: America (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.), Asia
(Hong Kong, India, Japan, and Malaysia), and Europe/Africa (France, Germany,
South Africa, and the U.K.).
We identify shocks to prices, liquidity, and trading activity in each country using
the jump measure of Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2006), which is a statistical
non-parametric method to test for jumps in a time-series. We propose a reﬁnement
of their method so that we are not only able to infer whether a jump occurred on a
certain day, but also in which exact 5-minute interval. This approach allows us to
create time-series of jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity at the 5-minute
frequency for each equity market over the period 1996-2011 (based on data on over
5 billion transactions in total).
We ﬁrst study the origination of shocks on the 12 equity markets in our sample.
We ﬁnd that 5-minute jumps in prices, quoted spreads, and order imbalance are
frequent, while jumps in eﬀective spreads and turnover are rare for most markets.
The magnitudes of typical jumps in prices, quoted spreads, and order imbalance are
large, at around 4 to 6 jump-free standard deviations.
4Some prior work does study intraday spillover eﬀects of returns and/or volatility across markets
(e.g., Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990); King and Wadhwani (1990); Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994);
Susmel and Engle (1994); Ramchand and Susmel (1998); Connolly and Wang (2003)), but these
studies generally measure returns and/or volatility over intervals of 15 minutes or one hour, look at
a more limited sample of markets, and do not consider these variables jointly with liquidity and/or
trading activity.
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We ﬁnd little evidence that jumps in prices are accompanied by jumps in liquidity,
as measured by quoted spreads. This constitutes initial evidence that liquidity may
not play a central role in the origination of price jumps. We do ﬁnd a relation between
jumps in prices and jumps in trading activity, as measured by order imbalance.
Around 20% of the jumps in prices in our sample are accompanied by jumps in order
imbalance on the same day, which is far more than expected if jumps in prices and
order imbalance were independent. Close to 8% of price jumps happen simultaneously
with order imbalance jumps in the same 5-minute interval, and almost all of these
involve jumps in prices and order imbalance of the same sign. This ﬁnding could be
an indication that at least some of the price jumps are driven by temporary price
pressure eﬀects (i.e., a liquidity demand channel), but could also be consistent with
speculative trading around or portfolio rebalancing in response to the arrival of news
(i.e., an information channel).
We carry out two speciﬁc tests to distinguish the liquidity and information hy-
potheses. First, we investigate whether there are reversals after jumps in prices (and
after simultaneous jumps in prices and order imbalance). We ﬁnd that, whether ac-
companied by jumps in order imbalance or not, price jumps represent sudden and
permanent shocks to prices; there is no evidence of subsequent price reversals. Sec-
ond, we examine whether jumps in prices (and simultaneous jumps in prices and
order imbalance) occur around macroeconomic news announcements stemming from
one of the countries in our sample. We ﬁnd that a substantial fraction of the jumps
in prices (and of the simultaneous jumps in prices and order imbalance) occur around
such announcements. For example, in developed Europe, almost 40% of the jumps in
prices and around 50% of the simultaneous jumps in prices and order imbalance hap-
pen within one hour after a macroeconomic news announcement.5 The evidence that
price jumps do not revert and often occur around macroeconomic news announce-
ments is most consistent with the information channel.
We then investigate within-region and across-region spillover eﬀects of jumps in
5These fractions are lower for other countries, primarily because U.S. macroeconomic news an-
nouncements yield the strongest results, and the most important U.S. announcements (e.g., GDP,
nonfarm payroll employment) fall outside of the opening hours of the American and Asian markets.
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prices, quoted spreads, and order imbalance. We document signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects
at the 5-minute frequency for jumps in prices as well as for jumps in trading activity,
based on correlations of the time-series of jumps in prices and order imbalance,
taking into account the magnitude of the jump. These correlations are especially
strong within Europe and between Europe and the U.S. However, jumps in quoted
spreads are not correlated across diﬀerent markets, which suggests that liquidity
shocks do not propagate across markets and “sudden liquidity dry-ups” are mainly
local phenomena.
We further estimate logit regressions with the jumps in prices on a particular mar-
ket as the dependent variable to distinguish between same-country, within-region, and
across-region spillover eﬀects of jumps in prices and order imbalance. This analysis
conﬁrms our ﬁndings based on the correlations and furthermore provides evidence
of the existence of spillover eﬀects between jumps in prices and order imbalance not
only within the same country but also within and across regions.
Overall, this paper ﬁnds little empirical support for theories in which liquidity
plays a key role in the origination and propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks. Jumps
in equity prices are prevalent and large, and regularly coincide with jumps in order
imbalance and with price jumps in other markets. However, price jumps do not
revert and often happen around macroeconomic news announcements. Jumps in
quoted spreads tend to be isolated events that are neither associated with jumps in
prices nor with jumps in quoted spreads on other markets.
Of course, there are limitations to our analysis. Our focus is on the high-
frequency origination and propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks, so we may miss
lower-frequency shocks to prices, liquidity, and trading activity. Nevertheless, our
results also hold at the 15-minute and 1-hour frequencies (instead of the 5-minute
frequency). Our evidence based on intraday data seems to at least challenge the
widely held view that ﬁnancial market liquidity can suddenly evaporate and thereby
cause precipitous price drops and spillover eﬀects to other markets. In fact, by an-
alyzing shocks at relatively high frequencies, we stack the cards in favor of ﬁnding
supportive evidence of a liquidity channel, since our approach allows us to identify
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price jumps that revert within the day, which lower frequency analyses might miss.
Notwithstanding, our results indicate that sudden price shocks are predominantly
driven by information.
Also, our liquidity measures are limited to quoted and eﬀective spreads, which
may not cover all relevant aspects of market liquidity. However, price impact mea-
sures estimated at the 5-minute frequency are extremely noisy and may be mechani-
cally related to price changes. We do obtain similar results using a liquidity measure
based on the number of stocks trading in an interval. In separate tests, we also ﬁnd
little evidence that shocks to a variety of proxies for funding liquidity (a potential
liquidity supply channel) are associated with a relatively greater prevalence of jumps
in prices, liquidity, or trading activity. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that a true
liquidity crash would not show up in quoted spreads.
Our primary contribution is to the literature on international ﬁnancial market
linkages and ﬁnancial contagion. We add to this line of research by analyzing such
linkages across international equity markets at the 5-minute frequency, and by of-
fering a detailed analysis of the dynamics of liquidity and trading activity around
shocks to equity prices. We thereby investigate the prediction of a number of recent
theoretical studies that channels related to the supply of and/or demand for mar-
ket liquidity play an important role in the propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature on commonality in liquidity and trading ac-
tivity by studying the degree of cross-market co-movement in large, sudden changes
in liquidity and trading activity.
We believe that our paper sheds new light on a number of important issues. In
today’s complex, dynamic, and interconnected global ﬁnancial system, it is impor-
tant for investors, exchanges, and regulators to understand whether and how shocks
are propagated from one ﬁnancial market to another at high speed, what the role
of liquidity and trading activity is in the occurrence and propagation of shocks to
prices, and how strong cross-market linkages are within and across diﬀerent regions.
Our results may help investors to make better decisions regarding optimal portfolio
diversiﬁcation, ﬁnancial institutions to develop better risk management policies, and
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exchange oﬃcials and regulators to develop better policies to reduce international
ﬁnancial fragility.
2.2 Data and methods
This section describes the data, variable deﬁnitions, and methods used in the paper.
We obtain intraday data on trades and quotes (and their respective sizes) from the
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. TRTH is provided by Securities
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Paciﬁc (SIRCA) and includes tick-by-tick data
for trades and best bid-oﬀer quotes stamped to the millisecond. The database is
organized by Reuters Instrumental Codes (RICs), spans diﬀerent asset classes, and
covers more than 400 exchanges since 1996.6
To obtain a sample that is representative of global equity markets but still man-
ageable in light of the vast size of the global tick-by-tick data, we pick four countries
(with diﬀerent levels of development) from each of three regions classiﬁed based on
their time zone: America, Asia, and Europe/Africa.7 In particular, we select Brazil,
Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. from the American region; Hong Kong, India, Japan,
and Malaysia from the Asian region; and France, Germany, South Africa, and the
U.K. from the European/African region. We obtain the RICs for all common stocks
that are traded on the major stock exchange (deﬁned as the exchange that handles
the majority of trading volume) in each of these countries from Datastream and
then collect the RICs for all of these stocks that were part of the main local market
index at some point during the sample period from 1996 till 2011 from the TRTH
Speedguide (see Appendix A.1.1). Following Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk
(2015), we apply extensive data ﬁlters to deal with outliers and trades and quotes
outside of the daily trading hours (details are in Appendix A.1.2).
6Recent papers that use the TRTH database include Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2012), Lau, Ng,
and Zhang (2012), Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti (2012), Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltana-
choti (2013a,b), Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015), Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2014), Frino, Mollica,
and Zhou (2014), Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014), and Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015).
7We note that even within these regions there are small diﬀerences in time zones and trading
hours.
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2.2.1 Variable deﬁnitions
Our primary goal is to provide a microstructure perspective on the propagation of
shocks across international equity markets and to test the liquidity vs. information
explanations for why such shocks occur and spillover to other markets. Therefore,
we focus on intraday data for returns, liquidity, and trading activity at the market-
level. Speciﬁcally, we choose 5-minute intervals as our unit of observation, which
seems to be a reasonable compromise between intervals that are suﬃciently ﬁne-
grained to study the high-frequency propagation of price shocks and their relation
to liquidity and trading activity on the one hand, and intervals that have enough
trades to adequately measure trading activity and eﬀective spreads (especially in
the beginning of our sample period and for the emerging markets in our sample)
and that are long enough to capture spillovers to other markets on the other hand.
Our choice of 5-minute intervals is also motivated by Tauchen and Zhou (2011),
who use the same frequency to analyze jumps in the S&P500 index (1986-2005), 10-
year Treasury bonds (1991-2005) and the dollar/yen exchange rate (1997-2004). We
discard overnight changes in prices, liquidity, and trading activity. In supplementary
tests, we rerun all of our analyses at the 15-minute and 1-hour frequencies.
We ﬁrst measure variables at the individual stock-level and then aggregate to
the market-level. Following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008), log returns
are computed over 5-minute intervals based on midpoints between the quoted bid
and ask prices (rather than based on the trade prices or on midquotes matched with
the last trade in the interval) of individual stocks. Using midquote returns has two
advantages. First, it avoids the bid-ask bounce problem that is inherent in returns
based on trade prices. Second, it ensures that returns for every stock are computed
over the same 5-minute interval despite diﬀerences in trading frequency across stocks.
We use proportional quoted spreads and proportional eﬀective spreads (PQSPR
and PESPR) as measures of liquidity. While the former measures transaction costs
only if the trade does not exceed the depth at the best bid-oﬀer (BBO), the latter
measures the actual transaction costs when a trade takes place. We compute PQSPR
based on quote data only, for the last BBO available for a given stock in a particular
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5-minute interval. For PESPR, we ﬁrst match trade and quote data and then compute
the eﬀective spread based on the last trade within a particular 5-minute interval as the
diﬀerence between the trade price and the prevailing midquote. PESPR is thus only
available for 5-minute intervals with at least one trade. This restriction is not very
onerous as in total there are more than 5 billion trades in our sample. We stay away
from estimating price impact measures at the 5-minute frequency, since they tend to
be very noisy and may be mechanically related to price changes. As a further test, we
redo all of our analyses based on the number of stocks trading in a speciﬁc interval as
an alternative market-wide liquidity measure. Motivated by the emerging literature
on the link between market liquidity and funding liquidity (e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009)), we also examine whether shocks to various measures of funding
liquidity are associated with shocks to prices, liquidity, and trading activity.
We use turnover and order imbalance (OIB) to measure trading activity. We
compute turnover as the total trading volume (in local currency) of a stock during
the 5-minute interval, and scale this number by the aggregate market capitalization
at the end of the previous year. To compute OIB, we need to determine whether a
trade is buyer- or seller-initiated. We use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign
trades. We then compute the OIB of a given stock as the diﬀerence between buyer-
and seller-initiated trading volume (in local currency) during the 5-minute interval,
scaled by the aggregate market capitalization at the end of the previous year. We
obtain data on aggregate market capitalization (in USD) and exchange rates from
the World Bank website.
We aggregate our ﬁve main variables (returns, quoted and eﬀective spreads,
turnover, and order imbalance) to the market-level by taking an equally-weighted
average of the stock-level variables for returns and spreads, and by summing up the
scaled stock-level variables for turnover and order imbalance. To reduce the impact
of stock-level noise and to secure a certain level of representativeness, we discard
5-minute intervals for a given market when there are fewer than ten stocks with a
trade.
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2.2.2 Jump measure (BNS)
There is a vast literature that studies spillover eﬀects from one market to another as
well as a plethora of diﬀerent methods. For example, Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003)
deﬁne “coexceedances” as the simultaneous incidence of extreme returns (identiﬁed
as those in the top or bottom 5% of the return distribution by country over the whole
sample period) and model the determinants of such coexceedances using multinomial
logit models. Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2004) use extreme value the-
ory to show that the actual probability of a simultaneous crash on two markets is
much higher than the expected probability under the assumption that extreme events
are independent across markets. Chiang, Jeon, and Li (2007) use a dynamic condi-
tional correlation (DCC) model, while Rodriguez (2007) employs a switching copula
approach to document spillover eﬀects.
In this paper, we follow Pukthuanthong and Roll (2015) and use a statistical
jump measure to identify a shock.8 Advantages of this method are that it adheres
closely to the intuitive view of a shock to ﬁnancial markets as a discontinuous event
in an otherwise continuous time-series, that it does not require arbitrary deﬁnitions
of extreme events, and that it is easy to compute and does not require the estimation
of a large number of parameters. Furthermore, it can pinpoint the particular interval
when the shock occurs and it can detect both country-speciﬁc shocks and shocks that
are transmitted to other markets, without a need to make assumptions regarding the
joint distribution of variables across multiple markets. Potential disadvantages are
that on days with many observations in the tail of the full-sample distribution, it
may not classify observations as jumps that could be regarded as extreme under
diﬀerent methods and, similarly, it may not identify “clumps” (series of changes in
the variables of interest that may accumulate to a large change but do not constitute
discontinuous jumps). To mitigate the latter concern, we also measure jumps at the
15-minute and 1-hour frequencies.
In this paper, we use the jump measure proposed by Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shep-
8Various jump measures include those devised by Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2006), Jiang
and Oomen (2008), Lee and Mykland (2008), and Jacod and Todorov (2009).
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hard (2006) [BNS] which is based on the ratio of scaled bipower (continuous) variation
to squared variation and which is “by far the most developed and widely applied of the
diﬀerent [jump] methods” (Bollerslev, Law, and Tauchen (2008), p. 239) and the best
jump measure in the simulations of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2015). The squared
variation is obtained by summing up the squared 5-minute observations during a day,
while the bipower variation is based on the scaled summation of the products of the
absolute values of the current and lagged 5-minute observations. The bipower and
squared variations on a particular day are similar in the absence of jumps, while the
bipower variation is signiﬁcantly smaller than the squared variation if the time-series
has a jump on that day.
Under the null hypothesis of no jumps, the BNS measure follows a standard
normal distribution, so statistical signiﬁcance can be determined based on standard
normal critical values. Since the time-series of jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading
activity form the inputs of our subsequent analyses, the usual tradeoﬀ between type I
and type II errors is especially relevant in our setting. In particular, we are concerned
about incorrectly classifying “normal” observations as jumps. To limit the type I
error, we use a 0.1% signiﬁcance level (instead of the common 10%, 5%, or 1%
thresholds). Our time-series based on 5-minute intraday intervals over 1996-2011
contain suﬃcient observations (up to around 370,000) to still have the potential to
detect a substantial number of jumps based on this strict statistical criterion.
For each day, we can thus identify whether there was a jump in any of these
variables on any market. A drawback of the standard application of the BNS method
is that it cannot pinpoint the exact 5-minute interval when the jump occurs. We thus
propose a reﬁnement of the BNS approach in the form of an algorithm that allows
us to infer the exact interval in which the jump occurs. In short, for each day with
a signiﬁcant jump statistic for a certain variable, we identify the 5-minute return
interval with the observation that has the greatest eﬀect on the jump statistic and
is greater in absolute terms than 1.96 jump-free standard deviations (i.e., the square
root of the scaled bipower variation for that variable on that day). We classify such
observations as jumps. It turns out that on all days in our sample for which the
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BNS statistic is signiﬁcant, there is at least one such observation. Subsequently, we
remove it from the time-series of that variable on that day and again test for the
occurrence of a jump on that day, repeating the procedure until no further jumps are
detected. Appendix A.2 presents a more detailed description of this algorithm.9
2.3 Empirical results
This section ﬁrst presents summary statistics for the returns, liquidity, and trading
activity at the market-level (Section 2.3.1), followed by summary statistics of the
BNS jump measures for each of these variables (Section 2.3.2). Subsequently, we in-
vestigate the link between jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity within each
market (Section 2.3.3) and whether any such link is driven by liquidity or information
(Section 2.3.4). Then, we study the propagation of shocks to prices, liquidity, and
trading activity across equity markets within the same region and also across regions,
for the same variable and across diﬀerent variables (Section 2.3.5). We conclude this
section with a discussion of a number of supplementary tests (Section 2.3.6).
2.3.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the 5-minute equally-
weighted market returns, equally-weighted proportional quoted spreads (PQSPR)
and eﬀective spreads (PESPR), aggregate market turnover, and aggregate market
order imbalance scaled by aggregate market capitalization (OIB) for each of the 12
markets.
Averaged across the 12 markets in our sample, the mean 5-minute return equals
-0.1 basis points per 5-minute interval, with an average standard deviation of around
10 basis points. Average returns are slightly negative for 9 out of 12 countries,
primarily because we include the recent crisis in our sample period and exclude
overnight returns (Berkman, Koch, Tuttle, and Zhang (2012) show that intraday
returns tend to be lower than overnight returns). The average mean PQSPR (PESPR)
across markets is equal to 0.49% (0.36%), with an average standard deviation of
0.34% (0.24%). As a comparison, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) report
9We thank Torben Andersen for his advice on this approach.
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an average PESPR of 0.0223% for NYSE stocks over 2001-2008, which is of roughly
the same order of magnitude as the number of 0.088% reported for the U.S. in Table
2.1, especially when taking into account that spreads were considerably higher over
the period 1996-2000. Averaged across markets, scaled turnover (OIB) is equal to
0.19 (0.003) basis points, with a standard deviation of 0.17 (0.08) basis points.
The ﬁnal row of Table 2.1 shows the number of 5-minute intervals for which
the various variables can be computed for each market; this number varies across
markets according to the sample period available in TRTH, the opening hours, and
the intensity of trading activity (since we discard 5-minute intervals during which
fewer than ten stocks are traded). The average number of 5-minute intervals across
all markets is 236,775. We transform the stock variables PQSPR and PESPR to a
ﬂow variable by taking 5-minute log-changes (in line with Pukthuanthong and Roll
(2015), who compute shocks to prices based on the return series). We also take
log-changes of turnover to construct a variable with a mean close to zero. We then
compute the daily BNS jump measure for the ﬁve key variables of interest and use
the algorithm described in Appendix A.2 to identify the exact 5-minute interval when
a jump occurs in case the daily BNS statistic is statistically signiﬁcant.
2.3.2 Frequency and magnitude of jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading
activity
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the total number of 5-minute intervals with jumps across
variables and markets. Positive (“POS”) and negative (“NEG”) jumps are reported
separately. We observe a substantial number of jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB.
Averaged across all 12 markets, there are 196 (210) positive (negative) jumps in prices;
117 (65) positive (negative) jumps in PQSPR; and 256 (242) positive (negative) jumps
in OIB. Jumps in these variables occur much more often than under the no jumps
assumption. We reject the null hypothesis of no jumps if the BNS statistic for a
particular day is below the 0.1% percentile of the standard normal distribution (one-
sided test). Thus, the type I error (erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis of no
jumps) is 0.1% of the total number of days in our sample. Put diﬀerently, over the
entire 1996-2011 sample period we would expect to see four days being classiﬁed
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as days with jumps under the null hypothesis of no jumps. However, the numbers
of jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB are much higher. For example, in Germany
there are 205 5-minute intervals with a negative jump in prices, which occur on 178
diﬀerent days (compared to four days under the null hypothesis) or approximately
5.1% (compared to 0.1% under the null hypothesis) of all 3,523 trading days from
1999 to 2011 for which jumps could be estimated for Germany. The ﬁnding that
jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB occur much more frequently than under the no
jumps assumption is obtained for all markets in the sample. While positive and
negative jumps in prices and order imbalance are equally likely, we identify almost
twice as many positive as negative jumps in PQSPR. Intuitively, sudden evaporations
of liquidity are more common than sudden liquidity improvements.
Jumps in PESPR and turnover are considerably less prevalent than jumps in
prices, PQSPR, and OIB. In fact, PESPR (11 positive and 7 negative jumps on
average across markets) and turnover (14 positive and 19 negative jumps on average
across markets) almost never jump. With the notable exceptions of PESPR for
Japan and turnover for India, the number of days on which we identify jumps in
PESPR and turnover is only slightly greater than the type I error of our test. A
potential explanation for the low number of jumps in PESPR (as compared to jumps
in PQSPR) is that PESPR can only be measured when a trade occurs; rational
investors observing a jump in quoted spreads could abandon the market and return
when liquidity improves. Based on the results in Panel A of Table 2.2, we exclude
the time-series of jumps in PESPR and turnover from the remainder of our analyses.
Although these empirical patterns of jumps in the diﬀerent variables are overall
quite similar across markets, there is also considerable cross-market variation in the
number of jumps for individual variables. For example, the number of positive (nega-
tive) 5-minute jumps in prices varies from 19 to 500 (from 39 to 637) across diﬀerent
markets; the number of positive (negative) jumps in PQSPR varies from 6 to 278
(from 7 to 154); and the number of positive (negative) jumps in OIB varies from
54 to 590 (from 25 to 560). There is no clear pattern across developed and emerg-
ing markets. In unreported analyses (available from the authors), we also study the
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time-series development of the number of jumps by country and by variable and ﬁnd
little evidence of consistent patterns (e.g., trends or clustering).10
The jumps documented in Panel A of Table 2.2 are all statistically signiﬁcant
at a very high conﬁdence level. However, market participants not only care about
the frequency and statistical signiﬁcance of shocks to ﬁnancial markets, but also
about their economic magnitude. Therefore, in Panel B of Table 2.2, we present
summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of the magnitudes of the 5-
minute market-wide jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB. To obtain a consistent
measure of the magnitude of jumps across the diﬀerent variables and markets, we
assess the magnitude in terms of the number of “jump-free standard deviations” or
the square root of the scaled bipower variation (since the bipower variation measures
the variation of the continuous, i.e., non-jump, part of the process only).
It is clear from Panel B of Table 2.2 that the magnitudes of the jumps in prices,
PQSPR, and OIB we detect using the BNS approach are large for all markets in
the sample. The average jump magnitude for both negative and positive jumps in
prices, PQSPR, and OIB is around ﬁve jump-free standard deviations, with a range
in absolute terms from 3.85 (negative PQSPR jumps in Hong Kong) to 7.61 (negative
PQSPR jumps in France) jump-free standard deviations.11
For jumps in prices, ﬁve jump-free standard deviations correspond to a 5-minute
market-wide shock to equity prices of around 40 basis points, which signiﬁes an
economically large market-wide price shock over such a short interval (40 basis points
is 400 times greater than the absolute value of the average 5-minute market return
across markets). Jumps in PQSPR of ﬁve jump-free standard deviations amount to
a market-wide shock to quoted spreads of 42%, which is 83 times greater than the
absolute value of the average 5-minute change in market-wide quoted spreads.
10We also ﬁnd only limited evidence that jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity cluster
during a trading day on a speciﬁc market. For example, averaged across the 12 markets, 89% of
the days with a signiﬁcant BNS statistic for the time-series of aggregate equity prices have only one
price jump, 9% have two price jumps, and 2% have three or more price jumps.
11The theoretical probability of observing a ﬁve standard deviation shock to a normally distributed
variable is 0.006 basis points. This probability corresponds to one 5-minute interval out of 1,744,277,
or one 5-minute interval every 96 years (assuming six-hour trading days and 252 trading days per
year). In other words, the observed frequency of such substantial shocks is much higher than the
expected frequency under the assumption of normally distributed variables.
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The results in Table 2.2 thus indicate that jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB are
prevalent and large. In the next subsection, we examine the relation between jumps
in prices, liquidity, and trading activity within each market.
2.3.3 Coinciding jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity within a
market
Recent theoretical studies (referenced in footnote 2) suggest an important role for
channels related to the supply of and/or demand for liquidity in the origination and
propagation of price shocks. A common thread in these theories is that shocks to
prices are accompanied by shocks to liquidity and/or trading activity. For example,
price shocks can arise because ﬁnancial intermediaries reduce the supply of liquidity
in the face of funding constraints (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002); Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)) or because of a surge in the demand for liquidity when wealth
eﬀects, loss limits, or hedging desires induce traders to sell (e.g., Kyle and Xiong
(2001); Morris and Shin (2004); Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008)). In several
of these models, feedback loops (e.g., “liquidity black holes” or “liquidity spirals”)
can arise in which deteriorating market liquidity, tightening funding constraints, and
selling reinforce each other, causing the decline in liquidity and prices to worsen over
time.
As a ﬁrst assessment of the importance of the liquidity channel for the origination
and propagation of price shocks, we are therefore interested in whether price shocks
tend to be accompanied by shocks to liquidity and/or trading activity.
We start by documenting the links among jumps in the diﬀerent variables within
each market. To that end, we treat a jump in prices (or in one of the other variables)
as an event and examine whether there are jumps in liquidity and/or trading activity
at the same time as the event (i.e., in the same 5-minute interval), before the event
(from the beginning of the same trading day – or from the previous price jump on
the same day – until the event), or after the event (from the event until the end of
the same trading day – or until the next price jump on the same day). We refer
to co-jumps on the same day as “coinciding” and to co-jumps in the same 5-minute
interval as “simultaneous.”
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The results are in Table 2.3. Panels A and B assess whether price jumps (the
event) are accompanied by jumps in, respectively, PQSPR and OIB on the same
market on the same day. Panel C assesses whether OIB jumps (the event) are ac-
companied by jumps in PQSPR on the same market on the same day. The ﬁrst two
columns of each panel show the signs of the jumps in the variables under consider-
ation. For example, in Panel A, the ﬁrst column shows the sign of the price jump
events (“POS” or “NEG”). The ﬁrst two rows of Panel A show the number of pos-
itive or negative price jumps that are not associated with a jump in PQSPR on the
same market on the same day. The next four rows show the number of positive or
negative price jumps that are accompanied by a “simultaneous” positive or negative
jump in PQSPR on the same market. The following four rows show the number of
positive or negative price jumps that were preceded by a positive or negative jump in
PQSPR on the same market on the same day. The ﬁnal four rows show the number
of positive or negative price jumps that were followed by a positive or negative jump
in PQSPR on the same market on the same day. The structure of Panels B and C is
the same.12
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows no consistent pattern in the coincidence of jumps
in prices and jumps in PQSPR. Very few price jumps are accompanied by jumps
in PQSPR, either in the same 5-minute interval or before or after the price jump
on the same trading day. And even for markets for which prices and proportional
quoted spreads regularly jump on the same day (such as Japan), there is no consistent
pattern in the direction of the jumps. As an example, although all of the 19 PQSPR
jumps in Japan that accompany a negative price jump in the same 5-minute interval
are of positive sign (in line with the prediction of the liquidity hypothesis that a price
decline is associated with a sudden deterioration in liquidity), we also observe that 13
of the 16 PQSPR jumps in Japan that accompany a positive price jump in the same
5-minute interval are positive, which is hard to reconcile with a liquidity story. Only
12We note that the sum of the numbers of price jumps in the columns of Panel A of Table 2.3
sometimes slightly exceeds the total number of price jumps for the respective market reported in
Table 2.2 in case some price jumps are accompanied by more than one jump in PQSPR on the
same day. The fractions of coinciding jumps reported in this subsection are corrected for any such
double counting.
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6.9% of all price jumps in the sample are accompanied by a jump in PQSPR on the
same day, and this fraction drops to 2.2% for the same 5-minute interval. Moreover,
only about half of the coinciding jumps in prices and PQSPR are of opposite sign, as
predicted by the liquidity hypothesis.13
Panel B of Table 2.3 shows a considerably stronger relation between jumps in
prices and jumps in OIB. Not only do we observe a greater incidence of coinciding
jumps in prices and OIB, these coinciding jumps also more often have the sign pre-
dicted by price pressure eﬀects (a liquidity demand channel). In particular, Panel B
shows that positive (negative) jumps in prices are regularly associated with positive
(negative) jumps in OIB, especially when prices and OIB jump in the same 5-minute
interval (as indicated by the higher numbers in the ﬁrst and the last rows of the
“Simultaneous jumps” section in Panel B). Across the whole sample, 19.3% of the
jumps in prices are accompanied by a jump in OIB on the same day. Approximately
8% of all price jumps in the sample are accompanied by an OIB jump in the same
5-minute interval, and almost all of these involve same-sign jumps. The ﬁnding of
regular co-jumps in prices and OIB of the same sign is consistent with the view
that prices jump in part because of sudden shifts in the demand for liquidity, but it
could also arise as a result of speculative trading around or portfolio rebalancing in
response to the arrival of new information.
Panel C of Table 2.3 shows that the pattern of coincidences of jumps in PQSPR
and jumps in OIB is about as weak as in Panel A. In short, there is little evidence
that jumps in OIB are related to jumps in PQSPR. Only 5.1% (0.28%) of the OIB
jumps are accompanied by a PQSPR jump on the same day (in the same 5-minute
interval).
Overall, the results in Table 2.3 indicate that a non-trivial fraction of the 5-minute
jumps in prices are accompanied by same-sign jumps in order imbalance, even within
the same 5-minute interval. We ﬁnd little evidence of such links between jumps in
prices and jumps in PQSPR and between jumps in PQSPR and jumps in OIB.
To fully understand the strength of the relation between jumps in prices and
13This ﬁnding contrasts the results of Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011), who show that market
liquidity shocks have signiﬁcant predictive power for jumps in U.S. Treasury-bond prices.
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jumps in OIB, we need to examine how likely simultaneous jumps in these variables
are given the total number of jumps in prices and OIB. As an example, in Germany
28 out of the 205 negative price jumps are accompanied by jumps in OIB of the
same sign in the same 5-minute interval. Put diﬀerently, approximately 14% of
the negative jumps in prices on the German equity market are accompanied by a
simultaneous negative jump in OIB. We need a metric to judge whether 14% is
abnormally high relative to the benchmark where jumps in prices and jumps in OIB
are completely independent. To construct such a metric, we conduct a statistical test
to compare the empirically observed frequency of simultaneous jumps in prices and
OIB to the theoretical frequency that we would observe if jumps in prices and OIB
were independent. The test is based on the comparison of two binomial distributions.
The ﬁrst distribution has a probability of success equal to the empirically observed
frequency of simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB. The second distribution has a
probability of success equal to the theoretical frequency of such simultaneous jumps
under the assumption of independence. We test whether these two probabilities are
the same, against the alternative hypothesis that the empirical probability is greater
than the theoretical probability.
Table 2.4 shows the number of simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB in the
same 5-minute interval by market, as well as the associated empirical probability
of simultaneous jumps, the theoretical probability of simultaneous jumps under the
independence assumption, and a one-sided p-value of the binomial test described
above. For example, for Germany the empirical probability of a jump in prices equals
11.36 basis points and of a jump in OIB equals 14.55 basis points (based on Table
2.2). Thus, under the assumption that jumps in prices and OIB are independent, the
probability of observing a simultaneous jump in prices and OIB in the same 5-minute
interval is 0.02 basis points (11.36 basis points × 14.55 basis points). However, Table
2.3 shows that simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB are observed in 59 5-minute
intervals, which corresponds to an empirical probability of simultaneous jumps of
1.83 basis points. The ﬁnal row of Table 2.4 shows that the p-value of the test that
the empirical probability of simultaneous jumps (1.83 basis points) is equal to the
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theoretical probability (0.02 basis points) is <0.001, which implies a clear rejection
of the null hypothesis that jumps in prices and OIB on the German equity market
are independent.
For all countries except South Africa, we reject the null hypotheses that jumps
in prices occur independently from jumps in OIB at the 1% level or better. On
some markets (Brazil and Mexico), the number of simultaneous jumps in prices and
OIB is quite small, but on many other markets we document frequent simultaneous
jumps in prices and OIB in the same 5-minute interval (most notably Japan, with
100 such cases). In other words, a signiﬁcant fraction of price jumps is associated
with simultaneous jumps in OIB, which suggests that studying such co-jumps can
help us to understand why price jumps occur.
The evidence in this subsection suggests that price jumps occur independently of
PQSPR jumps, but not of OIB jumps. Although we thus ﬁnd little support for the
main prediction of the liquidity hypothesis that shocks to prices are accompanied
by shocks to liquidity, the ﬁnding that a subset (around 8%) of price jumps occur
simultaneously with OIB jumps could be consistent with a liquidity demand channel
at least for this subset of price jumps. In the next subsection, we present two speciﬁc
tests of the predictions of the liquidity and information hypotheses.
2.3.4 Jumps in prices and OIB Liquidity vs. information
The liquidity and information hypotheses oﬀer competing explanations for why price
jumps occur, and why they occur simultaneously with jumps in order imbalance. On
the one hand, jumps in prices can occur as the result of the price pressure associated
with large one-directional uninformed order ﬂow when markets are less than perfectly
resilient. On the other hand, a sudden and permanent price adjustment can occur
as a result of new information arriving on the market that may also give rise to
market-wide order imbalances – for example due to speculative trading or large-scale
portfolio rebalancing. (We note that given the fact that many co-jumps in prices and
OIB occur within the same 5-minute interval, it is hard to pin down causality or the
exact sequence of these jump events.)
We conduct two empirical tests to distinguish between these hypotheses. First,
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we investigate whether prices exhibit a reversal after a price jump (and after a si-
multaneous jump in prices and OIB) in Section 2.3.4.1. The liquidity hypothesis
predicts that price pressure is temporary and prices should revert, while the infor-
mation hypothesis predicts that price adjustments are permanent and no reversal
should be observed. Then, we examine whether jumps in prices (and OIB) are as-
sociated with macroeconomic news announcements, which represent the arrival of
important information on the market (Section 2.3.4.2).
2.3.4.1 Price reversals after jumps in prices (and OIB)
Figure 2.1 presents graphs of the cumulative market return in 5-minute intervals
from one hour before (t = −12) until one hour after jumps (t = +12) in prices
(positive jumps in Panel A and negative jumps in Panel B) and jumps in prices that
are accompanied by jumps in OIB of the same sign in the same 5-minute interval
(positive co-jumps in Panel C and negative co-jumps in Panel D), aggregated across
all jumps on the 12 markets in our sample and measured in basis points.14 The
total number of jumps underlying Panels A and B is 2,348 and 2,521, respectively
(obtained by aggregating the number of positive and negative jumps in prices across
all markets from Table 2.2). The total number of jumps underlying Panels C and
D is 184 and 185, respectively (obtained by aggregating the number of positive and
negative simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB across all markets from Table 2.3).
As also shown in Table 2.2, Figure 2.1 indicates that the average price jump is around
40-50 basis points, which is a substantial market-wide return over a 5-minute interval.
Negative price jumps tend to be slightly larger than positive price jumps, but there
is little indication that price jumps that are accompanied by same-sign jumps in OIB
are of a diﬀerent magnitude than price jumps in isolation.
The graphs in the four panels of Figure 2.1 also show that price jumps are truly
sudden: there is a clear discontinuity relative to cumulative returns before the 5-
minute interval of the jump – although there is some indication of a slight run-up in
the same direction in the hour before the jump (the run-up is statistically signiﬁcant
14We substitute missing data with zeroes in case of jumps for which we do not have data for the
complete period from one hour before to one hour after the jump.
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at the 5% level or better starting at t = −8, possibly suggesting a slight amount of
information leakage). These patterns indicate that our identiﬁcation of price jumps
is quite clean; unreported results show that jumps in PQSPR and in OIB represent
similarly sudden and discontinuous changes in the variable of interest.
More importantly from the perspective of distinguishing the liquidity and infor-
mation channels, there is little evidence of any reversal following either price jumps or
simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB. If anything, there is some slight return con-
tinuation, especially after positive price jumps. In other words, price jumps tend to
constitute permanent price changes, consistent with the hypothesis that price jumps
(as well as simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) occur due to the arrival of new
information on the market rather than due to price pressure eﬀects or other liquidity
channels.
2.3.4.2 Macroeconomic news announcements and jumps in prices (and
OIB)
The second test of the liquidity vs. information hypotheses aims to examine more di-
rectly whether price jumps (and simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) are related to
information events. In particular, we investigate whether jumps in prices (and OIB)
are associated with macroeconomic news announcements from a number of diﬀer-
ent countries in our sample over the period 2001-2011, obtained from the Econoday
database (the data on macroeconomic news announcements includes scheduled an-
nouncements regarding GDP, nonfarm payroll employment, producer and consumer
price indices, etc.).15 We manually select similar categories of macroeconomic news
announcements as used in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Op-
schoor, Taylor, Van der Wel, and van Dijk (2014) based on the description of the
announcement. We only include announcements that fall within the opening hours
15We are grateful to Michel van der Wel for providing the data on U.S. macroeconomic news
announcements over 2004-2009, as used in Opschoor, Taylor, Van der Wel, and van Dijk (2014),
and for his advice on obtaining and ﬁltering the data for the other years and for several of the other
countries in our sample. We note that the Econoday database does not cover our full sample period
1996-2011, but starts in 2001. For some countries, coverage starts even later (for example, coverage
of macroeconomic news announcements in China – which we include because of their relevance for
Hong Kong – starts in 2007) and some of the other countries in our sample are not covered at all
during our sample period.
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of at least one of the markets in our sample. In total, we analyze 6,037 diﬀerent
macroeconomic news announcements from Canada, China, the European Monetary
Union (EMU), France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., out of which 1,921
occur within the opening hours of the American markets, 2,304 occur within the
opening hours of the Asian markets, and 4,751 occur within the opening hours of the
European/African markets in our sample.16
We examine how many of the jumps in prices (and OIB) in our sample occur
within a short window (from ﬁve minutes before till one hour after the event) around
the release time of any of the macroeconomic news announcements we collected.
We use a one-hour window after the announcements to allow for some time for the
news to be incorporated in prices. One hour may seem like a long period of time to
capture the response of U.S. markets to U.S. macroeconomic news announcements
in recent years. However, for other markets, for the earlier years in our sample, and
for news from other countries/regions, it may take more than a few minutes for the
news to be fully incorporated into local prices. As a comparison, Lee (2012) uses a
30-minute post-announcement window in her analysis of jumps in market-wide and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc U.S. equity prices around U.S. macroeconomic news announcements in
the period 1993-2008.
Table 2.5 presents the results. The ﬁrst line in the table shows the total number
of macroeconomic news announcements we collected from around the globe that
occurred within the opening hours of each of the 12 markets in our sample. The other
four lines in the table show the total number of price jumps on each market over the
period 2001-2011, the number of price jumps that occur within the event window
around the macroeconomic news announcements, the total number of simultaneous
jumps in prices and OIB on each market over the period 2001-2011, and the number
of simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB that occur within the event window around
the news announcements.
For all of the markets in our sample except Japan, our sample includes at least 500
16We aggregate multiple macroeconomic announcements with the same release time to one event,
so the numbers of announcements reported in the text and in Table 2.5 refer to the number of
unique release times.
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news announcements from diﬀerent countries that occur within the market’s opening
hours over the period 2001-2011. For most markets, a considerable fraction of the
price jumps (and simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) occur within one hour of
a macroeconomic news announcement. Around 17% of the price jumps (and 31% of
the simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) on the American markets are associated
with a macroeconomic news announcement. These news announcements are mainly
European and U.S. announcements, though we note that the most important U.S.
announcements (e.g., nonfarm payroll, employment, producer and consumer price
indices) fall outside the opening hours of the American markets. For Asia, we ﬁnd
that 6% of the price jumps (and 7% of the simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB)
occur within the event window. However, none of the U.S. macroeconomic news
announcements and very few of the news announcements from China and Japan
take place within the opening hours of the Asian markets. In other words, the
vast majority of the macroeconomic news announcements reported in Table 2.5 for
markets in Asia are announcements from Europe, which may be of comparatively
little relevance for Asian markets.
For European markets, we ﬁnd strong evidence that jumps in prices (and OIB)
are related to macroeconomic news announcements. For example, for Germany, we
document 303 5-minute intervals with price jumps over 2001-2011, of which 119
(or 40%) occur around one of the news announcements in our sample. Over the
same period, we observe 54 5-minute intervals with simultaneous jumps in prices and
OIB in Germany, of which 29 (or 54%) are in the event window surrounding one of
the announcements. Across the three European markets in our sample, 37% of the
price jumps and 52% of the simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB occur around an
announcement. The relative strength of the results for European markets is likely
driven by the fact that many of the U.S. macroeconomic news announcements –
arguably the most inﬂuential in the world – fall within the opening hours of the
European markets.17
17In an unreported analysis, we examine whether jumps in prices (and simultaneous jumps in
prices and OIB) in Europe tend to occur around particular categories of U.S. macroeconomic news
announcements. We ﬁnd that especially nonfarm payroll employment, producer and consumer price
indices, and initial unemployment claims announcements are often accompanied by jumps in prices
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Across all 12 markets in the sample, 15% of the price jumps (and 30% of the
simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) are associated with a macroeconomic news
announcement. We interpret this as evidence that a considerable fraction of the
jumps in prices (and OIB) in our sample are associated with the arrival of important
economic news, consistent with the information hypothesis. Of course, our results do
not imply that we can trace each price jump to one of the many macroeconomic news
announcements in our sample. However, we would like to point out that these an-
nouncements often involve relatively minor news events or news that was anticipated,
and that many of the most important (notably U.S.) announcements do not occur
within the trading hours of most markets in our sample. For European markets,
which do tend to be open during U.S. macroeconomic news announcements, we ﬁnd
a much stronger association between price jumps and economic news. Furthermore,
there is a host of other news events (e.g., unscheduled news announcements, policy
speeches, industry news, local or global political news, acts of terrorism, natural
or nuclear disasters) that could cause sudden shocks to equity prices but that are
hard to measure in a consistent way. Our estimates are therefore likely to heavily
underestimate the fraction of price jumps associated with news events.
Nonetheless, to examine whether there is stronger evidence in favor of the liq-
uidity hypothesis for the jumps in prices (and OIB) that we are unable to relate
to macroeconomic news, we repeat the price reversal analysis from Section 2.3.4.1
for the subsets of jumps in prices (and OIB) that do and that do not occur within
the event window around one of the macroeconomic news announcements over 2001-
2011. The results, which are unreported but available from the authors, show that
the graphs of the cumulative market return from one hour before until one hour after
price jumps are very similar for jumps in prices (and OIB) that are and that are
not associated with macroeconomic news; there is no evidence of price reversals in
either case. This ﬁnding suggests that even price jumps outside of the event window
around the macroeconomic news announcements in our sample are mainly driven by
information rather than liquidity.
(and OIB) in Europe.
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Taken together, the evidence in this subsection based on return reversals sur-
rounding price jumps (and simultaneous jumps in prices and OIB) and based on
the occurrence of jumps in prices (and OIB) around macroeconomic news announce-
ments is most consistent with the information hypothesis. In the next subsection,
we assess whether and why jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity spill over
across markets.
2.3.5 Spillovers in jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity across
markets
So far, we have provided evidence on the prevalence of jumps in prices, liquidity,
and trading activity, on coinciding jumps in diﬀerent variables within one market,
and on the main channel through which jumps in prices (and OIB) arise. We now
turn to one of the main further goals of the paper: to analyze the role of liquidity
and trading activity in the within-region and across-region propagation of shocks to
ﬁnancial markets. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to study high-
frequency spillover eﬀects of shocks to liquidity and trading activity across equity
markets, and to link these to spillovers of price shocks.
We start with presenting summary statistics for coinciding jumps in price, PQSPR,
and OIB across markets within each of the three regions, followed by an examina-
tion of spillover eﬀects within and across regions for each of the variables separately
(Section 2.3.5.1). In Section 2.3.5.2, we aim to explain price jumps on one market
based on variables from the same market, the same region, and other regions.
2.3.5.1 Coinciding jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity across
markets
Table 2.6 reports the number of days on which one, two, or three or more markets
within the same region exhibit a positive/negative jump in prices, PQSPR, or OIB.
Here, we only analyze co-jumps by region since, for example, there is no overlap in
trading hours between markets in America and in Asia and we exclude overnight
changes in our variables.
In most instances, there is at most one market that has a jump in prices, PQSPR,
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or OIB during a particular day in a particular region, but there are also a considerable
number of cases of two or more countries having a jump in the same variable of the
same sign on the same day. For example, in the European/African region, we observe
566 days over our sample period on which at least one of the four markets in that
region experiences a negative price jump. Out of those 566 days, 489 (86.4%) are
days on which only one of the four markets faces a negative price jump, on 56 days
(9.9%) two markets face a negative price jump, and on 21 days (3.7%) at least 3
markets face a negative price jump.
Similar results are obtained for positive price jumps and for negative and positive
OIB jumps in Europe/Africa and for negative and positive jumps in prices and in
OIB in Asia. Co-jumps in the same variable of the same sign on diﬀerent markets
within a region are much less likely in America. Across all 12 markets in the sample,
11.3% (8.7%) of all days with price (OIB) jumps exhibit same-sign price (OIB) jumps
in at least two diﬀerent markets within the same region. In contrast, we ﬁnd very few
occasions of co-jumps in PQSPR on diﬀerent markets within the same region. Across
all markets, only 2.0% of the days with PQSPR jumps exhibit same-sign PQSPR
jumps in more than one market. This ﬁnding suggests that shocks to liquidity do
not tend to occur on multiple markets in the same time frame.
Overall, the results in Table 2.6 indicate that although the majority of jumps in
prices, PQSPR, or OIB are market-speciﬁc, we regularly observe co-jumps in prices
and OIB of the same sign on the same day across multiple markets in the Asian and
European/African regions. However, jumps in PQSPR on a given day are almost
always contained to a single market.
In Table 2.7, we extend the analysis in Table 2.6 by presenting correlations of
jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB at the 5-minute (instead of daily) frequency and
not only across individual markets within each region, but also across markets in
diﬀerent regions. Table 2.7 shows contemporaneous spearman rank correlations for
the 5-minute time-series of jumps in prices (Panel A), PQSPR (Panel B), and OIB
(Panel C) across diﬀerent markets (during overlapping trading hours only). We
take into account the sign, magnitude, and signiﬁcance of the jumps by setting our
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jump variables equal to zero in 5-minute intervals without a signiﬁcant jump in the
respective variable, and to the signed magnitude of the jump (measured in jump-
free standard deviations) in 5-minute intervals with a jump. Bold correlations are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. We do not report 5-minute correlations across
markets in America and Asia since trading hours do not overlap.
The table shows that the time-series of signed price jumps are signiﬁcantly corre-
lated at the 5-minute frequency within the European/African region, and in partic-
ular within developed Europe. For example, the correlation between price jumps in
Germany and the U.K. is equal to 15.71%. The correlations between price jumps on
developed markets in Europe and South Africa are considerably smaller (around 2%)
but still statistically signiﬁcant. We note that since the vast majority of the obser-
vations of the 5-minute time-series of jumps are zero, high correlations are not to be
expected and even very small correlations can be viewed as economically meaningful.
Price jumps on European markets are also signiﬁcantly correlated with price
jumps on American markets, especially with the U.S. (correlations around 7.5%), but
also with Brazil, Canada, and Mexico (correlations in the range of 1-7%). Within
the American region, we also observe several signiﬁcant correlations in price jumps
across diﬀerent markets, though the economic magnitude of the correlations is more
modest (up to 4%). Co-jumps in prices across markets in Asia are not a prominent
phenomenon, with the notable exception of Hong Kong and Malaysia, which exhibit
a signiﬁcant correlation in price jumps of almost 10%. There is little evidence of
co-jumps in prices across markets in Europe and Asia.
All in all, we ﬁnd that 21 out of the 46 market-pairs in our sample exhibit signiﬁ-
cantly (at the 1% level) positive correlations in price jumps at the 5-minute frequency.
We view this as evidence that, even at a very high-frequency, shocks to prices show
economically meaningful spillover eﬀects across equity markets around the world.
In contrast, Panel B of Table 2.7 shows almost no signiﬁcant correlations in 5-
minute jumps in PQSPR across individual markets within and across regions. The
exceptions are the correlations between PQSPR jumps in Canada and the U.S. and
between PQSPR jumps in France and the U.K.. Both of these correlations are sta-
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tistically signiﬁcant, but at around 1% they are considerably smaller than the price
jumps correlations in Panel A. These results conﬁrm the conclusion from Table 2.6
that “sudden liquidity dry-ups” or “liquidity black holes” are mainly local phenomena
that do not tend to spill over to other markets within or across regions.
The correlations between jumps in OIB across diﬀerent markets presented in
Panel C of Table 2.7 show a similar pattern as the price jump correlations in Panel
A, although both economic and statistical signiﬁcance are somewhat weaker. 14
out of the 46 market-pairs in our sample show signiﬁcantly positive correlations.
Jumps in OIB are signiﬁcantly correlated within the European/African region and
between developed Europe and the U.S., while – like price jumps – OIB jumps are
only weakly correlated within the Asian region and across Europe/Africa and Asia.
Although prior studies have identiﬁed links between shocks to prices on diﬀerent
equity markets, we believe we are the ﬁrst to document that shocks to order imbalance
can also be propagated across international equity markets at a high-frequency.
2.3.5.2 Coinciding jumps in prices, liquidity, and trading activity across
markets and variables
We now build upon the analyses in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 by not only studying coinciding
jumps in the same variable within and across regions, but also examining whether
the likelihood of a price jump on a particular market can be explained by jumps in
other variables on the same market and on diﬀerent markets in the same region as
well as in other regions. In other words, we attempt to answer the question of how
price shocks are propagated from one market to another, with a speciﬁc focus on
microstructure variables.
We adopt the method proposed by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) and estimate
logit models to explain the occurrence of price jumps on each individual market at
the 5- minute frequency. The results are in Table 2.8. As dependent variable, we use
an indicator variable of whether there was a price jump on a particular market i in
a particular 5-minute interval. All of our logits are estimated separately for negative
and positive price jumps, to allow for asymmetric eﬀects depending on the sign of
the jumps. As independent variables, we use an indicator variable of same-sign OIB
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jumps on market i in the same 5-minute interval, indicator variables of whether at
least one other market in the same region (labeled “not i” in Table 2.8) has a same-
sign jump in prices or in OIB in the same 5-minute interval, and indicator variables
of whether at least one market in a diﬀerent region has a same-sign jump in prices
or in OIB in the same 5-minute interval. Since the independent variables based on
diﬀerent markets than market i are only deﬁned during overlapping trading hours,
we only include indicator variables of jumps in prices and OIB in Europe/Africa in
the logits explaining price jumps on American markets and on Asian markets, while
jumps in prices and OIB in both America and Asia serve as independent variables
in the logits for price jumps on European markets. Since our results so far indicate
little role for liquidity in the occurrence and spillovers of price jumps, we exclude
PQSPR jumps from the logit models.18
Table 2.8 presents the marginal eﬀects (in %) of the logit models, organized by
region (Panel A: America; Panel B: Asia; Panel C: Europe/Africa) and by the sign
of the price jumps within each panel (Part I: positive; Part II: negative). Bold
numbers are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better. For each market in each region,
we estimate one, two, or three logit models, depending on the number of regions
with overlapping trading hours with that market. The ﬁrst model includes only
independent variables from the same region. The second and third models also
include independent variables from one or two other regions – if there is any overlap
in the trading hours. We note that the number of observations available for the
estimation of the second and third models is substantially reduced relative to the
ﬁrst model.19
We hypothesize that the probability of negative (positive) price jumps on market
18In reported tests, we do include PQSPR jumps in the logit models, but ﬁnd that they can often
not be estimated because of “separation problems” in the estimation. Put diﬀerently, if one of the
independent variables could almost perfectly explain jumps in prices on market i, then numerically
we observe ﬁtted probabilities equal to either 0 or 1, which results in unreliable model estimation.
For instance, if positive jumps in prices on market i never coincide during the same 5-minute interval
with positive jumps in PQSPR from another region, then having an indicator variable for positive
jumps in PQSPR from another region equal to 1 guarantees no positive jumps in prices on market
i during that interval.
19We generally estimate two models for markets in America, one model for markets in Asia,
and three models for markets in Europe/Africa, but have to discard some individual models for
individual markets in case there is a separation problem in the estimation.
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i increases with negative (positive) jumps in OIB on the same market and with
negative (positive) jumps in prices and OIB on other markets in the same and in
other regions. In other words, the marginal eﬀects in Table 2.8 are all expected to
be positive.
The results of the logit models in Table 2.8 are consistent with our ﬁndings in
Table 2.3 that price jumps on a particular market are linked to OIB jumps of the
same sign on the same market in the same 5-minute interval. For 12 out of the
24 cases (negative and positive price jumps on 12 markets), we ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect of OIB jumps on market i (based on the ﬁrst logit model
for each market). These eﬀects are often economically substantial, especially for
markets in Asia and Europe: they vary from 6.10% (positive price jumps in Hong
Kong) to 41.64% (negative price jumps in Japan) in Asia and from 0.53% (negative
price jumps in the U.K.) to 3.10% (positive price jumps in the U.K.) in Europe. In
only two cases (Brazil and South Africa) do we observe signiﬁcantly negative marginal
eﬀects of OIB jumps on the same market, but, at -0.03% and -0.04%, their economic
magnitude is small.
Table 2.8 also conﬁrms the results of the correlation analysis in Table 2.7. In
particular, price jumps on other markets in the same region signiﬁcantly increase the
probability of a price jump on market i in 11 out of the 24 cases (based on the ﬁrst
logit model for each country). These eﬀects are observed in all regions. For instance,
price jumps on the other markets within the Europe/Africa region have positive and
signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects on price jumps on market i varying from 2.25% to 3.58%.
Only in two cases (Mexico and Japan) do we observe signiﬁcantly negative marginal
eﬀects of jumps in prices on the other markets within the same region, but their
economic magnitude is relatively small.
The results on the eﬀect of OIB jumps on other markets in the same region on
price jumps on market i are mixed for America and Asia. If anything, the signiﬁcant
marginal eﬀects for this variable in Panels A and B suggest that price jumps on
a particular market are associated with OIB jumps of the opposite sign on other
markets in the same region. In contrast, for the three European markets in our
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sample, there is consistent evidence that the probability of price jumps on one market
is positively related to same-sign OIB jumps on other markets in the same 5-minute
interval. These marginal eﬀects are all positive and signiﬁcant within developed
Europe, but are relatively modest, ranging from 0.29% to 0.60%.
The second and third logit models for each market in Table 2.8 assess cross-region
spillovers of jumps in prices and OIB. Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence for
cross-region spillovers of price jumps is weaker and less consistent than for within-
region spillovers. The marginal eﬀect of price jumps in other regions is positive
and signiﬁcant only in few cases: for negative price jumps in the U.S. vis-à-vis the
European/African region (marginal eﬀect of 0.63%, see Panel A), for positive price
jumps in the U.K. vis-à-vis the American region (0.81%, Panel C), and for negative
price jumps in Germany vis-à-vis the American region (0.95%, Panel C). Similarly,
in most cases, the eﬀect of OIB jumps in other regions on price jumps on market i
is not signiﬁcant either in statistical or in economic terms, except for price jumps in
Canada and the U.S. vis-à-vis OIB jumps in the European/African region (marginal
eﬀect between 0.82% and 1.84%, see Panel A) and for positive price jumps in France
vis-à-vis OIB jumps in America (eﬀect of 0.82%, Panel C). Some of the marginal
eﬀects in Table 2.8 are not in line with expectations. For example, the marginal
eﬀect of OIB jumps in Asia on the likelihood of positive price jumps in Germany
is -0.05% (Panel C). Although some of these exceptions are statistically signiﬁcant,
their economic magnitude is small.
In sum, the results in Table 2.8 highlight that shocks to prices can be propagated
from one market to another within a 5-minute horizon. Such propagation is especially
strong across markets within the same region, although some cross-region eﬀects are
also observed. Furthermore, price jumps are regularly linked to same-sign OIB jumps
on the same market, and, for Europe, also to same-sign OIB jumps on other markets
in the same region.
To address the question whether the high-frequency propagation of shocks to
equity prices across markets is driven by liquidity or by information, we repeat the
price reversal analysis from Section 2.3.4.1 for the subsets of jumps in prices that
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only occur on one market and that occur simultaneously on at least two of the
markets in our sample. Of the 2348 (2521) positive (negative) price jumps in our
sample, 200 (253) occur simultaneously with a price jump on at least one other
market. Unreported results show that the price reversal graphs are very similar for
both subsets of price jumps. In other words, there is no evidence that price jumps
that occur simultaneously in multiple markets exhibit reversals, consistent with the
hypothesis that these jumps are primarily driven by information rather than liquidity.
2.3.6 Supplementary tests
Our analyses so far suggest that shocks to equity prices are prevalent and large, are
linked to shocks to order imbalance, exhibit regular high-frequency spillovers across
international markets, and are mainly driven by information rather than liquidity.
In this section, we discuss the results of a number of supplementary tests that we
carried out to evaluate the robustness of these conclusions.
2.3.6.1 Alternative frequencies
One potential limitation of our study is that we measure jumps in prices, liquidity,
and trading activity at a relatively high frequency: 5-minute intervals within the
trading day. Our choice for this frequency was motivated by our aim of a detailed,
intraday analysis of the dynamics of liquidity and trading activity around ﬁnancial
market shocks and by issues concerning non-overlapping trading hours, overnight
returns, and special features of the opening session that arise in analyses of cross-
market spillovers at the daily frequency. Nonetheless, we repeat all of our analyses at
the 15-minute and 1-hour frequencies to assess whether we may have missed lower-
frequency shocks, or lower-frequency relations between shocks to prices, liquidity, and
trading activity (results available from the authors). At these lower frequencies, the
number of jumps is naturally smaller, but we still ﬁnd quite frequent jumps in prices,
quoted spreads, and order imbalance, while jumps in eﬀective spreads are rare; we
do now also observe regular jumps in turnover. The economic magnitudes of the
jumps are still around ﬁve jump-free standard deviations. Similar to Table 2.3, we
ﬁnd virtually no evidence that price jumps are associated with PQSPR jumps (nor
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with turnover jumps). In contrast to Table 2.3, we no longer observe a signiﬁcant
relation between price jumps and same-sign OIB jumps in the same interval at the
15-minute and 1-hour frequencies, which underlines the value of using a relatively
high frequency to study the role of liquidity and trading activity around ﬁnancial
market shocks. Similar to Figure 2.1 and Table 2.5, we ﬁnd that price jumps are
not followed by reversals, and that a substantial fraction of price jumps occur around
macroeconomic news announcements. Both pieces of evidence suggest that 15-minute
and 1-hour price jumps are also primarily driven by information rather than liquidity.
These price jumps also regularly spill over across markets, consistent with Tables 2.6
and 2.7. There is no evidence of spillovers in PQSPR jumps to other markets, but
both jumps in OIB and in turnover exhibit signiﬁcant correlations across markets,
especially for Europe. In short, we conclude that our inferences are not materially
aﬀected by redoing our analyses at a lower frequency within the trading day.
2.3.6.2 The dynamics of liquidity and trading activity around price jumps
Table 2.3 shows that price jumps are regularly associated with same-sign jumps
in OIB in the same 5-minute interval, but not with PQSPR jumps. However, it is
possible that this result is aﬀected by our approach to identify shocks to liquidity and
order imbalance as discontinuous jumps. To obtain a broader picture of the behavior
of liquidity and trading activity around price jumps, Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative
change in PQSPR (Panels A and B; in %) as well as the dynamics of OIB (Panels C
and D; in basis points) from one hour before until one hour after positive and negative
jumps in prices, aggregated across all jumps on the 12 markets in our sample. Panels
A and B show that liquidity does ﬂuctuate around price jumps; quoted spreads tend
to fall slightly in the hour before a price jump, followed by a small upward blip in
the 5-10 minutes before the price jump, and a more pronounced decline after the
price jump. Nonetheless, the observed patterns seem hard to square with theories
that propose a key role for liquidity in the origination of price shocks. First, the
quoted spread eﬀects are small. The blip in PQSPR just before the price jump has a
magnitude of 4-5 percentage points, which is much smaller than the average PQSPR
jump of around 42%. Second, liquidity tends to improve following a price jump, but
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Figure 2.1 shows no evidence of any accompanying price reversal. Third, the liquidity
patterns around price jumps are very similar for positive and negative price jumps.
Fourth, there is little indication of “liquidity black holes” or “liquidity spirals” in
the sense that feedback eﬀects cause liquidity crashes to worsen over time. Rather,
the observed patterns in quoted spreads in Figure 2.2 seem to accord well with an
increase in adverse selection costs just before the arrival of economic news, and the
resolution of asymmetric information following the news arrival.20 Panels C and D of
Figure 2.2 show a clear, once-oﬀ spike in OIB in the same direction as the price jump,
in the same interval. Given the absence of reversals after price jumps, this pattern
seems more consistent with speculative trading or portfolio rebalancing around the
arrival of news than with temporary price pressure eﬀects or with feedback loops in
which initial price drops induce further selling.
2.3.6.3 Alternative liquidity measures
Liquidity is a multi-faceted concept and the liquidity measures used in this paper
(PQSPR and PESPR) may not cover all relevant aspects of liquidity. However, we
would expect signiﬁcant shocks to liquidity to also be reﬂected in quoted or eﬀective
spreads. Moreover, price impact measures suﬀer from large estimation errors at
high frequencies and could be mechanically linked to price changes. In unreported
analyses, we redo all of our analyses with an alternative liquidity measure based on
the number of diﬀerent stocks that traded on a speciﬁc market in a speciﬁc interval.
This trade-based liquidity measure builds on the premise that stocks may not trade
in a certain interval in part because of high trading costs. The trade-based measure
should thus be positively associated with the level of market liquidity. Indeed, this
measure is highly, but not perfectly, correlated with the illiquidity measures PQSPR
and PESPR; for most markets, these correlations roughly range from -0.4 to -0.7. On
20To the extent that the PQSPR patterns in Panels A and B of Figure 2.2 are driven by macroeco-
nomic news announcements, one might wonder about the scope for asymmetric information around
such announcements. However, we note that Boudt and Petitjean (2014) document signiﬁcant in-
creases in trading costs and the demand for immediacy around macroeconomic news releases and
price jumps in Dow Jones stocks. And Jiang, Lo, and Valente (2014) ﬁnd that high-frequency trad-
ing adversely aﬀects liquidity around macroeconomic news announcements. Alternatively, the blip
in quoted spreads in Figure 2.2 could be due to concerns about inventory risk instead of adverse
selection.
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average, jumps in the trade-based measures are about as frequent as PQSPR jumps,
and are also of similar magnitude. Similar to Table 2.3, we ﬁnd little evidence that
price jumps coincide with jumps in the trade-based liquidity measure. Similar to
Tables 2.6 and 2.7, jumps in the trade-based measure are almost always isolated
events that do not spillover to other markets. Our conclusion that liquidity does not
play more than a minor role the origination and propagation of prices shocks is thus
not sensitive to the use of this alternative liquidity measure.
Several studies that model liquidity supply channels for the origination and prop-
agation of ﬁnancial market shocks feature an important role of funding liquidity. For
example, in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), “liquidity spirals” arise when ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries reduce the supply of liquidity in response to worsening funding
liquidity (e.g., increasing margins) and when funding liquidity, in turn, is decreasing
in market illiquidity. To more speciﬁcally test the implications of these liquidity
supply channels, in Table 2.9, we examine whether shocks to prices, liquidity, and
trading activity are associated with shocks to funding liquidity. This table assesses
whether jumps in prices, PQSPR, and OIB are more likely to occur on days with
a jump in the TED spread (the diﬀerence between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-
month T-bill rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), which is
a common proxy for funding liquidity.21 TED spread jumps are measured at the
daily frequency, since funding liquidity may not be likely to exhibit sudden intraday
changes, since one component of the TED spread (the LIBOR) is determined only
once per day, and since we lack intraday data on the other component (the T-bill).
Panels A and B of Table 2.9 document the number and empirical frequency of
days with negative price jumps, positive PQSPR jumps, negative OIB jumps, and
positive TED spread jumps for each of the 12 markets. We focus on jumps with these
signs since theories on funding liquidity primarily associate a drop in funding liquidity
with a drop in prices, a worsening of liquidity, and securities sales. The TED spread
exhibits a positive jump on only 9 days over the entire sample period 1996-2011.
21We obtain similar results when, instead of the TED spread, we use the U.S. default spread (Baa-
Aaa), the LIBOR, country-speciﬁc short-term interest rates, or country-speciﬁc banking industry
index returns as proxies for funding liquidity.
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We note that the number of TED spread jumps reported in the table diﬀers across
countries because not all of these jumps occur within the available sample period for
all countries, as the TRTH data coverage for some countries starts later than 1996 (see
Appendix A.1.1). Panel C shows that negative price jumps, positive PQSPR jumps,
and negative OIB jumps almost never coincide with positive TED spread jumps
on the same day. Panel D presents the results of a test of whether the empirical
probability of such coinciding jumps is greater than the theoretical probability under
the assumption that the jumps in the individual variables are independent (similar
to Table 2.4). The results in this panel indicate very little evidence that shocks to
prices, liquidity, and trading activity are associated with shocks to funding liquidity.
2.4 Conclusion
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the importance of global systemic risk in
the current environment of globally integrated ﬁnancial markets and fast trading
technology. We conduct a study of the intraday propagation of shocks across 12
equity markets around the world at the 5-minute frequency over 1996-2011 – with a
particular focus not only on shocks to prices, but also on shocks to liquidity (quoted
and eﬀective spreads) and trading activity (turnover and order imbalance). Our
main purpose is to test the liquidity vs. information channels for the origination and
propagation of ﬁnancial market shocks.
Our ﬁndings are based on jump statistics in these ﬁve variables at the 5-minute
frequency and can be summarized as follows. First, jumps in prices, quoted spreads,
and order imbalance are large and occur much more often than jumps in eﬀective
spreads and turnover. Second, we document a signiﬁcant association between jumps
in prices and in order imbalance, while jumps in quoted spreads are independent from
jumps in the other variables. Third, we show that jumps in prices and simultaneous
jumps in prices and order imbalance are primarily driven by information rather than
liquidity. Fourth, jumps in prices and order imbalance exhibit signiﬁcant spillover
eﬀects across markets (even in the same 5-minute interval and especially for markets
in Europe and the U.S.), but spillovers of jumps in quoted spreads to other markets
are rare.
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To sum up, our study provides evidence that the propagation speed of shocks
across international equity markets is very high. In designing optimal ﬁnancial reg-
ulation and risk management, policy makers and investors should not neglect mi-
crostructure eﬀects related to the occurrence of price shocks. In particular, price
shocks should not be viewed independently from shocks to trading activity. Shocks
to liquidity, however, seem to play a less central role in the origination and propaga-
tion of price shocks than previously thought.
We leave further analyses of the speed and mechanism of the propagation of price
shocks across markets for future research. In particular, recent advances in trading
technology suggest that, in the later years of our sample period, the propagation
of shocks across markets may take place at an even higher frequency than the one
studied in this paper. Moving to a higher frequency of analysis would also allow for
the estimation of daily vector autoregressions to get a better handle on causality,
but will likely limit the sample to developed markets in recent years in order to
construct meaningful measures of trading activity over such ultra-short horizons.
Another potential extension would be to broaden the scope of the analysis beyond
the 12 markets in our sample, which would enable an analysis of the determinants
of the speed and the strength of the propagation of stocks across diﬀerent (pairs of)
markets.
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Chapter 3
Intraday Return Predictability, Informed Limit Or-
ders, and Algorithmic Trading∗
3.1 Introduction
The limit order book is the dominant market design in equity exchanges around
the world.1 The prevalence of limit order book markets calls for a detailed un-
derstanding of how such markets function. In particular, understanding the price
discovery process on these markets required a detailed study of the trader’s choice
between submissions of market and limit orders. The conventional wisdom in the
microstructure literature used to be that informed traders use only market orders,
while uninformed traders use both market and limit orders (for theoretical work see
Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Kyle (1985); Glosten (1994); Seppi (1997)). Only recent
studies explicitly consider the choice of informed traders for market or limit orders.2
∗This chapter is based on Yuferova (2016) “Intraday Return Predictability, Informed Limit Or-
ders, and Algorithmic Trading” (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686082). I am grateful
to Dion Bongaerts, Mathijs Cosemans, Sarah Draus, Thierry Foucault, Wenqian Huang, Ling-
tian Kong, Albert Menkveld, Marco Pagano, Christine Parlour, Loriana Pelizzon, Dominik Rösch,
Stephen Rush, Asani Sarkar, Elvira Sojli, Mark Van Achter, Mathijs van Dijk, Wolf Wagner, Jun
Uno, Marius Zoican, participants of the FMA 2015 Doctoral Consortium, participants of the PhD
course on “Market Liquidity” in Brussels, and seminar participants at Erasmus University, NYU
Stern, and Tinbergen Insitute for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from
the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. I am also grateful for the hospitality
of NYU Stern, where some work on this paper was carried out. This work was carried out on the
National e-infrastructure with the support of SURF Foundation. I thank OneMarket Data for the
use of their OneTick software.
1According to Swan and Westerholm (2006), 48% of the largest equity markets are organized as
pure limit order book markets (e.g., Australian Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, Tokyo
Stock Exchange), 39% are organized as limit order books with designated market makers (e.g.,
New York Stock Exchange, Borsa Italiana), and the remaining 12% are organized as hybrid dealer
markets (e.g., NASDAQ, Sao Paulo Stock Exchange) as of the beginning of 2000.
2For theoretical studies on the choice of uninformed traders between market and limit orders,
see Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Handa and
Schwartz (1996), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005), Goettler,
Parlour, and Rajan (2005), and Roşu (2009); for theoretical studies on the choice of informed traders
between market and limit orders see, Liu and Kaniel (2006), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009),
and Roşu (2016); for empirical studies on the choice between market and limit orders on equity
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Informed traders can submit a market order and experience immediate execution
at the expense of the bid-ask spread (consume liquidity). Alternatively, informed
traders can submit a limit order and thus bear the risk of non-execution, as well as
the risk of being picked-oﬀ, but earn the bid-ask spread (provide liquidity).
The importance of the informed trader’s choice between market and limit orders
is emphasized by a heated public debate about whether one group of market par-
ticipants poses negative externalities to another group of market participants due to
informational asymmetries. This informational advantage is especially pronounced
for traders with superior technologies for the collection and processing of informa-
tion. Another feature that enhances informational inequality in the market is the
ability to continuously monitor and respond to market conditions. Both character-
istics are distinct characteristics of high-frequency traders (a subset of algorithmic
traders). Consistently, several papers identify algorithmic traders’ strategies that
are disadvantageous for retail investors.3 Previous research has focused on informed
algorithmic trading via market orders with only one exception.4 In sum, understand-
ing how informed trading takes place and what role algorithmic traders play in this
process are important questions to explore in modern market microstructure.
In this paper, I address these questions by studying intraday return predictability.
Naturally, orders submitted by informed traders contain information about future
price movements. If an informed trader actively uses market orders, an imbalance
between buyer- and seller-initiated volume may be informative about future price
movements. If an informed trader actively uses limit orders, the limit order book
may contain information that is not yet incorporated into the price. Therefore,
strategies employed by informed traders may induce intraday return predictability
markets see, Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), Anand, Chakravarty, and Martell (2005), Bloomﬁeld,
O’Hara, and Saar (2005), and Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2016); for empirical studies
on the choice between market and limit orders on foreign exchange markets see, Menkhoﬀ, Osler,
and Schmeling (2010), Kozhan and Salmon (2012), and Kozhan, Moore, and Payne (2014).
3See for theoretical work, e.g., Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015); Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham
(2015); Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015); Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016); see for empirical
work, e.g., Hirschey (2013); McInish and Upson (2013); Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014);
Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015).
4Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2015) examine informed trading via both market and
limit orders by high-frequency traders for the sample of 15 Canadian stocks from October 2012 to
June 2013.
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from market and limit order ﬂows alike.
My main contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I contribute to the liter-
ature on intraday return predictability. I distinguish between two sources of intraday
return predictability (inventory management and private information). My ﬁndings
indicate that the main source of the intraday return predictability is private infor-
mation embedded in limit orders. Furthermore, I show that this result holds for a
wide cross-section of stocks and through a prolonged time period.5 Second, my pa-
per contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of algorithmic traders (especially it
subset, high-frequency traders) in informed trading activity (see Biais and Foucault
(2014) for review on high-frequency trading activity and market quality). My evi-
dence suggests that an increased degree of algorithmic trading activity leads to an
increased usage of both informed limit and informed market orders (with the main
eﬀect concentrated in market orders). Informed limit orders still remain the main
source of the intraday return predictability even after increased degree of algorithmic
trading activity.
The analysis is organized in two stages. First, I analyze intraday return pre-
dictability from market and limit order ﬂows and separate the eﬀect of informed
trading from the eﬀect of inventory management. Second, I analyze the impact of
algorithmic trading on the choice between market and limit orders made by an in-
formed trader. In particular, I exploit a quasi-natural experiment to establish a
causal inference between algorithmic trading and intraday return predictability from
market and limit order ﬂows. I also test recent theories of the choice between in-
formed trading through market versus limit orders by exploiting their predictions
regarding diﬀerences between low and high volatility stocks.
Using tick-by-tick trade data and data on the ﬁrst 10 best levels of the con-
solidated limit order book for the NYSE from the Thomson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH) database, I construct a time series of mid-quote returns, market order im-
5For papers studying intraday return predictability from the limit order book in equity markets
see Irvine, Benston, and Kandel (2000), Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004), Harris and Panchapage-
san (2005), Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009), Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2013), and Cenesizoglu,
Dionne, and Zhou (2014). However, none of these papers uses such comprehensive data as used in
this paper.
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balance, and snapshots of the ﬁrst 10 best levels of the U.S. consolidated limit order
book at the one-minute frequency at the individual stock level. The sample covers
all NYSE-listed common stocks for the years 2002-2010. TRTH data used in this
paper are very comprehensive. In particular, for the stocks under consideration, I
have information for 1.36 billion trades and 8.54 billion limit order book updates.
Intraday return predictability from limit order book data can arise from two
sources. First, inventory management (Hypothesis 1) may induce intraday return
predictability by generating price pressure as a result of limited risk-bearing capacity
of risk-averse liquidity providers (e.g., Stoll (1978); Menkveld (2013); Hendershott
and Menkveld (2014)). Second, private information (Hypothesis 2) may also induce
intraday return predictability (see Liu and Kaniel (2006); Goettler, Parlour, and
Rajan (2009); Roşu (2016)). The latter source of return predictability is the main
focus of this paper. I approach the problem of isolating private information source of
intraday return predictability from two angles. First, inventory management should
result in temporary price eﬀects, while private information should result in permanent
price eﬀects. Therefore, controlling for lagged returns in predictive regressions allows
me to separate inventory management eﬀects from the eﬀects of private information.
Second, I run a VAR model and decompose market and limit order ﬂows into
two components: inventory-related (ﬁtted values) and information-related (surprises)
components. The use of surprises as a proxy for informed market and limit order
ﬂows is motivated by the fact that both limit and market order ﬂows are persistent
(e.g., Hasbrouck (1991); Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995); Ellul, Holden, Jain, and
Jennings (2003); Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005)) and that this persis-
tence is attributable to reasons other than information (e.g., Degryse, de Jong, and
van Kervel (2014)). Huang and Stoll (1997), Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans
(1997), and Sadka (2006) also use surprises in market order imbalance to isolate the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.
Combining these two approaches, I run the predictive regressions with lagged
surprises in returns, lagged surprises in market order imbalance, and lagged surprises
in depth concentration at the inner and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the
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limit order book. In this speciﬁcation any remaining inventory management eﬀects
should be captured by the coeﬃcient of lagged surprises in returns. I use both market
order ﬂow and limit order book variables in the predictive regressions to capture the
trader’s choice between market and limit orders. Inclusion of market order imbalance
is also motivated by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005, 2008), who show that
market order imbalance is predictive of future price movements.
The ﬁndings of the ﬁrst part of the analysis indicate that the main source of
intraday return predictability is private information (inventory management (lagged
returns) accounts only for 30% of total predictive power as measured by the average
incremental adjusted R2 from the predictive regressions). In addition, the results in-
dicate that informed trading through the limit order book accounts for 50% of return
predictability that is 30% greater than a fraction of return predictability induced by
informed trading through market orders.
The ﬁndings contradict the traditional view that only market orders are used
for informed trading. Furthermore, the ﬁndings suggest that informed trading via
market orders is of less importance than informed trading via limit orders.
In the second part of the analysis, I investigate how the presence of algorithmic
traders aﬀects the order choices made by informed traders. This is a non-trivial
task as algorithmic traders endogenously determine the extent of their participation
in each stock at each point in time. I follow the approach of Hendershott, Jones,
and Menkveld (2011) and use the NYSE Hybrid Market introduction — a perma-
nent technological change in market design6 — as an instrumental variable to help
determine the causal eﬀects of algorithmic trading activity on intraday return pre-
dictability from informed market and limit order ﬂows. The rollout to the Hybrid
Market was implemented in a staggered way, which helps clean identiﬁcation. I fol-
low Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015)
and use the daily number of best bid-oﬀer quote updates relative to the daily trading
volume (in $10,000) as a proxy for algorithmic trading activity on each stock-day.
I develop two competing hypotheses of the eﬀects of algorithmic trading on in-
6NYSE Hybrid Market introduction allowed market orders to “walk” through the limit order
book automatically and thus, increased automation and speed (Hendershott and Moulton (2011)).
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formed traders’ choices: the eﬃcient technology hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) and the
competition hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). On the one hand, the technological advan-
tage of algorithmic traders makes limit orders more attractive to them as they are
able to reduce pick-oﬀ risks better than the other market participants (the eﬃcient
technology hypothesis). On the other hand, competition between algorithmic traders
for (trading on) the same information makes market orders more attractive to them
as they guarantee immediate execution (the competition hypothesis).
The results show that algorithmic trading activity leads to increased informa-
tional content in both market and limit orders. However, an increase in the predictive
power associated with limit order book variables (the eﬃcient technology hypothesis)
is smaller than the increase in predictive power associated with market order imbal-
ance (the competition hypothesis). Although the evidence is consistent with both
hypotheses, the eﬀects of the competition hypothesis seem to dominate the eﬀects
of the eﬃcient technology hypothesis. In other words, increased algorithmic trading
activity is associated with a relative shift from liquidity provision (limit orders) to
liquidity consumption (market orders) by informed traders.
Overall, my paper provides evidence that informed traders tend to act more often
as liquidity providers (use limit orders), than liquidity demanders (use market orders).
However, with an increased presence of algorithmic traders, the amount of informed
liquidity provision increases less than the amount of informed liquidity consumption.
One important implication of my analysis concerns measures of asymmetric infor-
mation and/or informed trading (e.g., PIN measure by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and
Paperman (1996); adverse selection component of bid-ask spread by Glosten and
Harris (1988) and Huang and Stoll (1997)), which have been used widely in studies
on market microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate ﬁnance.7 These measures are
exclusively based on market orders, and thus neglect the lion’s share of informed
trading on the equity markets — informed trading via limit orders.
7E.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), Vega (2006), Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007),
Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009), and Easley, de Prado, and
O’Hara (2012).
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3.2 Hypotheses
In this section, I develop the hypotheses for the tests of the choice between limit
and market orders by informed traders based on the evidence from intraday return
predictability. In Section 3.2.1, I develop two hypotheses regarding the sources of
intraday return predictability: the inventory management hypothesis and the private
information hypothesis. In Section 3.2.2, I describe the hypotheses regarding the
eﬀect of algorithmic trading activity on the strategies employed by informed traders
(the eﬃcient technology hypothesis and the competition hypothesis). The eﬀect of
the realized volatility is described in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Sources of intraday return predictability
Intraday return predictability from the limit order book can arise from two (not
mutually exclusive) sources: inventory management and private information. Under
the inventory management hypothesis, depth concentration at the inner levels of the
limit order book indicates that a liquidity provider wants to unload inventory. This
situation creates a temporary price impact that is reverted as soon as the inventory
position of the liquidity provider is liquidated (e.g., Stoll (1978); Ho and Stoll (1981);
Menkveld (2013); Hendershott and Menkveld (2014)). Indeed, a liquidity provider
will be hesitant to immediately replenish the ask side of the limit order book as a
large market buy order walks through the limit order book, because she would prefer
to liquidate excessive inventory ﬁrst. It is optimal for her to post aggressive limit
orders on the bid side of the book, while on the ask side she will post a limit order
deep in the limit order book. In this way, she encourages other market participants
to sell her their stocks while discouraging them from buying from her. Therefore, I
formulate the inventory management hypothesis as follows:
H1 (the inventory management hypothesis): Depth concentration at the inner lev-
els of the ask (bid) sides of the limit order book is associated with decrease (increase)
in future stock returns, with depth concentration at the outer levels having virtually
no eﬀect on future stock returns.
Under the traditional approach to the adverse selection problem in equity markets
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only inventory management should drive intraday return predictability from the limit
order book. This approach is built under the assumption of informed traders only
using market orders (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Kyle (1985); Glosten (1994);
Seppi (1997)), which may be an inadequate approximation of reality. Later studies
build upon this initial work and allow both informed and uninformed traders to
choose between the order types (Liu and Kaniel (2006); Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan
(2009); Roşu (2016)).
Based on theoretical predictions from Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), an
informed trader, who receives good news about a stock, has three diﬀerent options to
exploit this information. First, the trader can submit a buy market order. Second,
the trader can submit a limit buy order at the inner level of the bid side of the limit
order book; this limits execution probability, but saves transaction costs. Third, the
trader can also submit a limit sell order at the outer levels of the ask side of the limit
order book in combination with one of the two above mentioned orders to lock-in the
beneﬁt from the price diﬀerence. The opposite is true for the bad news scenario.
In reality, an informed trader’s choice between market and limit orders depends
on the strength of the signal received, the lifespan of the information, the ratio of
informed to uninformed traders, etc. In the case of a weak and very short-lived signal,
the trader is likely to use market orders. In the case of very strong signal that has a
relatively long lifespan, the trader is likely to use limit orders at the inner and outer
levels of the limit order book. In the case of the average signal with a short lifespan
(which I believe is the dominant type of signal), the trader is likely to use a mixture
of market and limit orders (see Table 3.1).
Therefore, I formulate the private information hypothesis as follows:
H2 (the private information hypothesis): Depth concentration at the inner levels
of the ask side of the limit order book is associated with decrease in future stock
returns, while depth concentration at the outer levels of the ask side of the limit order
book is associated with increase in future stock returns. The opposite is true for the
bid side of the limit order book.
The main purpose of this paper is to test the private information hypothesis and
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Table 3.1. Expected signs of the coeﬃcients for two sources of intraday
return predictability
This table shows the expected behavior of informed trader conditional on the type of news received (Panel
A) as well as variables and corresponding expected signs of the coeﬃcients under private information and
inventory management hypotheses in the following predictive regression of one-minute mid-quote return
with lagged return, lagged market order imbalance (MOIB), and lagged depth concentration at the inner
and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book (LOB: Bid Inner, Bid Outer, Ask Inner,
Ask Outer) as explanatory variables, see equation (3.1) (Panel B):
Panel A: Expected behavior of informed trader
Order type Good news Bad news
Market Buy ×Sell ×
Limit Bid Inner levels ×Outer levels ×
Limit Ask Inner levels ×Outer levels ×
Panel B: Expected signs under inventory management and private information hypothesis
Variable Inventory Management Private Information
Rett−1 NEG NA
MOIBt−1 POS POS
Bid Innert−1 POS POS
Bid Outert−1 NA NEG
Ask Innert−1 NEG NEG
Ask Outert−1 NA POS
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investigate the eﬀect of algorithmic traders on the informed trader’s choice between
market and limit orders discussed in the next subsection.
3.2.2 Eﬀect of algorithmic trading activity
During the past decade, a new group of market participants — algorithmic traders
— has emerged and evolved into a dominant player responsible for the majority of
trading volume. Algorithmic trading “is thought to be responsible for as much as
73 percent of trading volume in the United States in 2009” (Hendershott, Jones,
and Menkveld (2011), p. 1). Therefore, it is a natural question to ask what role
algorithmic traders are playing in informed trading process and to what extent their
presence aﬀects the informed trader’s choice between market and limit orders.
Possessing private information is equivalent to having capacity to absorb and
analyze publicly available information (including information from the past order
ﬂow) faster than other market participants (Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015);
Menkveld and Zoican (2015); Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016)). Eﬃcient infor-
mation processing technology is a distinct feature of algorithmic traders, hence they
are more likely to be informed than other market participants. However, ex ante it
is not clear whether algorithmic traders would prefer to use market or limit orders
to proﬁt from their informational advantage.
On the one hand, limit orders are attractive for traders who can accurately pre-
dict execution probabilities, continuously monitor the market, and quickly adapt to
market conditions. Algorithmic traders possess all of these characteristics. Thus,
they may be inclined to use limit orders for informed trading.
On the other hand, competition among informed traders will lead to a faster
price discovery and a shorter lifespan for the information obtained by the informed
trader. Algorithmic traders compete for the same information by processing the
same news releases or by analyzing past order ﬂow patterns as fast as possible. In
a competitive market, a trader must be the ﬁrst in line to trade on information in
order to proﬁt from it. Given that only market orders can guarantee immediate
execution, algorithmic traders may be inclined to use market orders for informed
trading. Therefore, I formulate two competing hypotheses for the strategies employed
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by informed algorithmic traders:
H3 (the eﬃcient technology hypothesis): The predictive power of informed market
orders is lower for stocks subject to high algorithmic trading activity than for stocks
subject to low algorithmic trading activity. On the other hand, the predictive power of
informed limit orders is higher for stocks subject to high algorithmic trading activity
than for stocks subject to low algorithmic trading activity.
H4 (the competition hypothesis): The predictive power of informed market orders
is higher for stocks subject to high algorithmic trading activity than for stocks sub-
ject to low algorithmic trading activity. On the other hand, the predictive power of
informed limit orders is lower for stocks subject to high algorithmic trading activity
than for stocks subject to low algorithmic trading activity.
3.2.3 Eﬀect of realized volatility
According to Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), informed traders may prefer mar-
ket orders to limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book for high volatility
stocks and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book to market orders
for low volatility stocks. The intuition is as follows. Posting a limit order is like
writing an option (e.g., Copeland and Galai (1983); Jarnecic and McInish (1997);
Harris and Panchapagesan (2005)). It is known that the sensitivity of the option
price to the changes in the volatility of the underlying asset, i.e., vega (ν), is positive.
In other words, the option price increases when the volatility of the underlying asset
increases. In this way, the option writer gets compensated for the increased risk of
option execution. Thus, the increased volatility of the stock will make limit orders
riskier and hence, less proﬁtable. In addition, market orders become more proﬁtable
due to picking oﬀ the stale limit orders posted by slow (and most likely uninformed)
traders. And last but not least, in a highly volatile environment it is harder to distin-
guish between informed and uninformed market orders and hence, hiding informed
trading is easier.
Given that on an intraday horizon, realized volatility based on the mid-quote
returns is a good proxy for fundamental volatility, I formulate the realized volatility
hypothesis as follows:
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H5 (the realized volatility hypothesis): The predictive power of informed market
orders is greater for high volatility stocks than for low volatility stocks. On the other
hand,the predictive power of informed limit orders concentrated at the inner levels of
the limit order book is greater for low volatility stocks than for high volatility stocks.
3.3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
In this section, I describe the data, variables, and summary statistics. I obtain
intraday consolidated data on trades and the 10 best levels of the limit order book
for the U.S. market from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. The
TRTH database is provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Paciﬁc
(SIRCA). Data on trades and best bid-oﬀer quotes are available since 1996. Data on
the limit order book levels are available only from 2002 as the NYSE opened its limit
order book to the public on January 24, 2002. The limit order book data provided by
TRTH does not include order level information (e.g., no order submission, revision,
or cancellation details), only the 10 best price levels and the depth on bid and ask
sides of the book that is visible to the public. The data comes from the consolidated
tape. In other words, the best bid-oﬀer reported in the data is the best bid-oﬀer for
any exchange in the U.S. The same applies to the other levels of the limit order book.
TRTH data are organized by Reuters Instrumental Codes (RICs), which are iden-
tical to TICKERs provided by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Merging data from CRSP and TRTH allows me to identify common shares that in-
dicate the NYSE as their primary exchange and to use company speciﬁc-information
(e.g., market capitalization, turnover, etc.). This study is limited to NYSE-listed
stocks only as intraday return predictability from limit order book information as
well as the behavior of the informed traders could be very sensitive to market de-
sign. Hence, it seems inappropriate to put, for example, the NASDAQ (hybrid dealer
market) and NYSE (limit order book with designated market makers) data together.
The available data for the limit order book cover the period from 2002 to 2010.
The joint size of the trade and limit order book data reaches 2.5 terabytes. In order
to make the analysis feasible, I compute one-minute mid-quote returns and market
order imbalances, and take snapshots of the limit order book at the end of each
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one-minute interval. I ﬁlter the data to discard faulty data entries and data entries
outside continuous trading session (see the Appendix B for details).
3.3.1 Variable descriptions
In this section, I describe the variables used to study the choice of informed traders
between market and limit orders by means of intraday return predictability from the
limit order book. In particular, I look at the return predictability one-minute ahead.
Therefore, I need intraday data on returns, market order imbalances (MOIB), and
limit order book data (LOB) at one-minute frequency. For all the variables, I discard
overnight observations.
I follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and compute one-minute log-
returns (Ret) based on the prevailing mid-quotes (average of the bid and ask prices)
at the end of the one-minute interval, rather than the transaction prices or mid-
quotes matched with the last transaction price. In this way I avoid the bid-ask
bounce and ensure that the returns for every stock are indeed computed over a one-
minute interval. I implicitly assume that there are no stale best bid-oﬀer quotes in
the sample, thus I consider a quote to be valid until a new quote arrives or until a
new trading day starts.
To calculate a one-minute MOIB, I match trades with quotes and sign trades using
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. TRTH data are stamped to the millisecond,
therefore the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is quite accurate. In particular, a
trade is considered to be buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if it is closer to the ask
price (bid price) of the prevailing quote. For each one-minute interval, I aggregate
the trading volume in USD for buyer- and seller-initiated trades separately at the
stock level. Thereafter, I subtract seller-initiated dollar volume from buyer-initiated
dollar volume to obtain MOIB.
There are multiple ways to describe the limit order book. Most of the papers that
study intraday return predictability either focus on diﬀerent levels of the limit order
book or on the corresponding ratios of these levels between the ask and bid sides of
the limit order book. For instance, Wuyts (2011), Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009),
and Cenesizoglu, Dionne, and Zhou (2014) use slopes and depth at diﬀerent levels
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of the limit order book to summarize its shape. However, due to variation in the
shape of the limit order book as well as in the number of available levels of the limit
order book (in my sample the daily average number of levels can be as low as just
six levels), I believe that deﬁnition of inner and outer levels by means of a relative
threshold is more suitable than deﬁnition by means of the number of levels in the
limit order book (e.g., levels from 2 to 5 are inner levels and levels from 6 to 10 are
outer levels).
Examples of a relative approach to limit order book description are Cao, Hansch,
and Wang (2009), who also use volume-weighted average price for diﬀerent order
sizes to describe the limit order book, and Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004), who
use a so-called “near-depth” measure, which is a proportion of the depth close to the
best bid-oﬀer level relative to the cumulative depth within a certain price range.
For the purpose of testing the private information hypothesis, I focus on the ratios
within the ask and bid sides separately, rather than across the ask and bid sides of
the limit order book. I use a modiﬁcation of the “near-depth” measure introduced
by Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004). First, I compute a snapshot of the ask and
bid sides of the limit order book at the end of each one-minute interval. Then, I
deﬁne the inner depth concentration as cumulative depth lying between the mid-
quote and one-third of the total distance between the 10th available limit price and
the mid-quote relative to the total cumulative depth of the ask and bid side of the
limit order book separately (Ask Inner and Bid Inner). I deﬁne the outer depth
concentration as cumulative depth lying between one-third and two-thirds of the
total distance between the 10th available limit price and the mid-quote relative to
the total cumulative depth of the ask and bid side of the limit order book separately
(Ask Outer and Bid Outer). Please refer to Table 3.2 for the summary of variables’
descriptions.
My relative approach allows me to deﬁne inner and outer levels of the limit order
book even if not all 10 levels are present for a particular stock at a particular time.
Hence, I can deﬁne in uniﬁed fashion the levels that are close to the best bid-oﬀer
level, as well as the levels that are far away from the best bid-oﬀer level across stocks
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and through time.
3.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for the one-minute mid-quote returns (Ret),
dollar market order imbalance (MOIB), and depth concentration at the inner levels
(Bid Inner and Ask Inner) and outer levels (Bid Outer and Ask Outer) of the ask
and bid sides of the limit order book (LOB), and cutoﬀ points between the inner and
outer levels of the limit order book measured relative to the mid-quote (Bid Cuto f f
and Ask Cuto f f ) at the end of each one-minute interval for the whole period (from
January 2002 to December 2010) and two sub-periods (from January 2002 to June
2006 and from July 2006 to December 2010). I start with winsorizing all variables
at the 1% and 99% levels on a stock-day basis. Then, I compute averages of the
one-minute observations for mid-quote returns (Ret), dollar market order imbalance
(MOIB), and depth concentration at the inner and outer levels of the ask and bid
sides of the limit order book per stock-day. Afterwards, I winsorize stock-day averages
of the variables at the 1% and 99% levels based on the whole sample period or sub-
periods and compute summary statistics.
The mean of the daily average one-minute mid-quote returns is -0.003 basis points
for the whole sample period (see Panel A of Table 3.3). The average negative return
is due to the inclusion of the recent ﬁnancial crisis period in the sample. Indeed, in
the ﬁrst half of the sample period the average returns are 0.014 basis points, while
in the second half of the period the average returns are -0.02 basis points. The mean
of the daily average one-minute dollar market order imbalance is $4,133.34. This
indicates that on average there is more buying than selling pressure in the market.
However, this buying pressure is much more moderate at $840.15 – when I focus on
the second half of the sample period due to the inclusion of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Panel A of Table 3.3 also shows the depth concentration at the inner and outer
levels separately of the ask and bid side of the limit order book for the whole sample
period. The average proportion of the cumulative depth at the inner levels of the
limit order book is 31.49% and 32.19% of the ask and bid side of the limit order book,
respectively. The average proportion of the cumulative depth at the outer levels of
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the limit order book is 31.36% and 31.20% of the ask and bid sides of the limit
order book, respectively. Although the average depth concentration is very similar
for the inner and outer levels for both ask and bid sides of the limit order book, depth
concentration at the inner levels exhibits higher variation than depth concentration
at the outer levels both in terms of within and between standard deviations. Notably,
the ask and bid sides of the limit order book exhibit similar characteristics in terms
of the depth concentration at the inner and outer levels.
Panel A of Table 3.3 also reports the cutoﬀ points between inner and outer levels
of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book measured as a percentage deviation
from the mid-quote. For the whole sample period, the cutoﬀ point (one-third of the
total distance between the 10th available limit price and the mid-quote) is 1.47% and
-1.43% of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book, respectively.
Sub-period analysis (see Panels B and C of Table 3.3) reveals that although on
average through the whole sample period depth concentration at the inner and outer
levels for both sides of the limit order book is similar, depth concentration at the
inner levels tends to decrease over time, while depth concentration at the outer levels
tends to increase over time.
In particular, in the ﬁrst half of the sample period, depth concentration at the
inner levels of the ask (bid) side of the limit order book is 42.66% (45.31%). In the
second half of the sample period, depth concentration at the inner levels of the ask
(bid) side of the limit order book is 21.53% (20.47%). In the ﬁrst half of the sample
period, depth concentration at the outer levels of the limit order book of the ask
(bid) side of the limit order book is 25.49% (24.69%), while in the second half of the
sample period it reaches 36.59% (37.03%).
This trend in the limit order book composition is also reﬂected in the cutoﬀ points
between the inner and outer levels of the limit order book. In particular, in the ﬁrst
half of the sample period, price levels of the limit order book are more dispersed than
in the second half of the sample period. Hence, for the ﬁrst half of the sample period
I deﬁne inner depth as depth concentrated at price levels that do not diﬀer from the
mid-quote more than 2.34% (2.45%) of the ask (bid) side of the limit order book,
49A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 3. Intraday Return Predictability 81
respectively. The cutoﬀ points for the second half of the period are 0.68% (0.51%)
for the ask (bid) side of the limit order book, respectively.
This decreasing (increasing) trend in depth concentration at the inner (outer)
levels of the limit order book can be also observed in Panel A of Figure 3.1. Panel B
of Figure 3.1 shows the trend in cutoﬀ points between the inner and outer levels of
the limit order book.
The composition changes in the limit order book may be attributable to the dif-
ferent structural changes of the NYSE during the sample period such as autoquote
introduction in 2003 (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)), NYSE Hybrid in-
troduction in 2006-2007 (Hendershott and Moulton (2011)), Reg NMS implementa-
tion in 2007, and replacement of the specialist by designated market makers at the
end of 2008.
3.4 Methodology
In this section, I describe the methodology used in the paper in order to investigate
whether market and/or limit orders are used for informed trading. In particular,
I empirically distinguish between two sources of intraday return predictability: in-
ventory management (Hypothesis 1) and private information (Hypothesis 2). Given
that the main goal of this paper is to investigate the informed trader’s choice between
market and limit orders, the latter source of the intraday return predictability is the
one I focus on.
I run stock-day predictive regressions at one-minute frequency using one-minute
mid-quote returns as the dependent variable. As explanatory variables I use lagged
returns, lagged market order imbalance (MOIB), and lagged depth concentration
at the inner and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book. I
include MOIB in the model as I want to show that the LOB variables contain useful
information for intraday return predictability beyond MOIB. Controlling for lagged
returns allows me to diﬀerentiate between temporary eﬀect (inventory management)
and permanent eﬀect (private information). The regression equation is given by:
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Figure 3.1. Limit order book composition
This ﬁgure shows the equally-weighted average of the depth concentration at the inner and outer levels for
the ask and bid sides of the limit order book for the NYSE-listed common stocks during 2002-2010. Please
refer to Table 3.2 for detailed variables description. I use the following procedure to construct time-series
of the equally-weighted averages of the variables. First, I winsorize one-minute observations per stock-day
at the 1% and 99% levels. Second, the average of the one-minute observations per stock-day is calculated
for each variable. Third, I winsorize daily observations at the 1% and 99% levels for the whole sample
period. Then, the summary statistics across all stock-days are computed for each variable. Then, I plot
one-month moving average of each variable. To be included in the sample, a stock should have NYSE
as its primary exchange. Data on common stocks and primary exchange code are obtained from CRSP
database (PRIMEXCH=N, and SHRCD=10 or 11, EXCHCD =1 or 31). Data on consolidated trades,
quotes, and 10 best levels of the limit order book are provided by TRTH.
Panel A: Depth concentration at the inner and outer levels of the limit order book
Panel B: Cutoﬀ point between inner and outer levels of the limit order book
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Rett = α + β1Rett−1 + β2MOIBt−1 + β3Bid Innert−1 + β4Ask Innert−1+ (3.1)
+β5Bid Outert−1 + β6Ask Outert−1 +  t
where Rett is the mid-quote return during the t-th one-minute interval, MOIBt−1 is
the dollar market order imbalance during the (t − 1)-th one-minute interval, LOBt−1:
Bid Innert−1, Ask Innert−1, Bid Outert−1, Ask Outert−1 are the depth concentrations
at the inner and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book at the
end of the (t − 1)-th one-minute interval.
As a next step, I identify the private information component of the market and
limit order ﬂows and enhance the above mentioned methodology. Hasbrouck (1991)
and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) show that MOIB is positively auto-
correlated. Moreover, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) and Ellul, Holden, Jain, and
Jennings (2003) show that order ﬂow is also persistent for limit orders. Biais, Hillion,
and Spatt (1995) argue that there are three possible reasons for the order ﬂow persis-
tence: order splitting, imitation of other traders’ behavior, and reaction to the public
information in a sequential manner (e.g., due to the diﬀerences in trading speed). De-
gryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014) show that order ﬂow persistence is caused by
reasons other than private information. Previous empirical studies (e.g., Huang and
Stoll (1997), Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), Sadka (2006)) use un-
expected changes in the market order ﬂow in order to isolate information-related
component. I extend this approach one step further and apply it to market and limit
order ﬂows. I argue that it is an appropriate extension as both market and limit
order ﬂows are persistent. Therefore, I use unexpected changes in the order ﬂow for
both market and limit orders as a proxy for the private information component of
the order ﬂow.
I obtain the surprises in returns, MOIB, and LOB variables by estimating stock-
day V AR(k) regression (number of lags, k, can take values from 1 to 5 and is selected
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by AIC criteria) and keeping the residual values:
Xt = α +
l=k∑
l=1
βXt−l +  t (3.2)
where Xt is a vector that includes Rett , MOIBt , Bid Innert , Ask Innert , Bid Outert ,
and Ask Outert measured at the t-th one-minute interval;  t is vector of residuals that
includes the RetUt , MOIBUt , Bid InnerUt , Ask InnerUt , Bid OuterUt , and Ask OuterUt .
In the remainder of the paper, the superscript U indicates a residual value from
V AR(k) rather than the variable itself. Misspeciﬁcation of the V AR(k) model may
lead to some inventory eﬀects ending up in the surprises. In order to address this
issue, I include lagged surprises in returns as explanatory variable in the predictive
regressions to capture return reversal, which is a distinct feature of the inventory man-
agement hypothesis. I run predictive regressions per stock-day with lagged surprises
in returns, lagged surprises in MOIB, and lagged surprises in depth concentration
at the inner and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book as
explanatory variables:
Rett = α + β1RetUt−1 + β2MOIB
U
t−1 + β3Bid Inner
U
t−1 + β4Ask Inner
U
t−1+ (3.3)
+β5Bid OuterUt−1 + β6Ask Outer
U
t−1 +  t
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section, I provide empirical evidence for the informed trader’s choice between
market and limit orders by analyzing intraday return predictability from market and
limit order ﬂows (Section 3.5.1). Then, I discuss the role of algorithmic trading
activity in the choice made by informed trader (Section 3.5.2). In Section 3.5.3, I
provide supplementary analysis of the eﬀects of realized volatility on the informed
trader’s choice.
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3.5.1 Intraday return predictability
I start with examining whether limit order book variables are useful in predict-
ing intraday returns without explicitly decomposing order ﬂow into inventory- and
information-related components. Table 3.4 presents estimation results of equation
(3.1): predictive stock-day regressions of one-minute mid-quote returns on one-
minute lagged mid-quote returns, one-minute lagged market order imbalance, and
one-minute lagged depth concentration at the inner and outer levels of the ask and
bid sides of the limit order book.
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports average coeﬃcients with signiﬁcance levels based
on the average Newey-West t-statistics, as well as the proportion of the regressions
that have signiﬁcant individual t-statistics.8 Rett−1 is negatively related to the future
returns. Such return reversals are in line with the inventory management hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1). MOIBt−1 is positively related to future stock returns (in line with,
e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005, 2008)). In particular, the MOIBt−1
coeﬃcient is 4.65 and is positive and signiﬁcant in 26.43% of the stock-day regressions.
These results hold for the whole sample period as well as for the sub-periods.9 The
increase of one within standard deviation in MOIBt−1 is associated with a 0.72 basis
points increase in the future returns, which is equivalent to an increase of 1.24 within
standard deviation for returns.
In line with the inventory management (Hypothesis 1) and informed limit or-
ders (Hypothesis 2) hypotheses, depth concentration at the inner levels of the bid
(ask) sides of the limit order book, Bid Innert−1 (Ask Innert−1) is positively (neg-
atively) related to the future price movements. For the whole sample period, one
within standard deviation increase in Bid Innert−1 (Ask Innert−1) corresponds to an
increase of future returns by 0.35 basis points (decrease of future returns by -0.35
basis points), which is equivalent to an increase of 0.61 within standard deviation for
8To compute average Newey-West t-statistics, I do the following steps (following Rösch, Subrah-
manyam, and van Dijk (2015)). First, I use a time series of the estimated coeﬃcients for each stock
to compute Newey-West t-statistics (Newey and West (1987)). Second, I average the cross-section
of the Newey-West t-statistics to determine the average Newey-West t-statistics estimate.
9As a comparison, Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015) document that coeﬃcient of
MOIBt−1 is 3.79 and is positive and signiﬁcant in 30.07% of the predictive regressions using only
lagged dollar market order imbalance over 1996-2010 for NYSE common stocks.
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returns (decrease of 0.61 within standard deviation for returns).
However, the fact that Bid Outert−1 (Ask Outert−1) is negatively (positively) re-
lated to future price movements in the second half of the period cannot be explained
under the inventory management hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), while it is true under
the private information hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Notably, the sign of Bid Outert−1
(Ask Outert−1) changes from insigniﬁcantly positive (negative) in the ﬁrst half of the
sample period to signiﬁcantly negative (positive) in the second half of the sample
period. In other words, informational content at the outer levels of the limit order
book is lower in the ﬁrst half of the sample period compared to the second half of
the sample period. These results are also in line with increasing depth concentration
at the outer levels of the limit order book and decreasing depth concentration at
the inner levels of the limit order book over the sample period. For the whole sam-
ple period, one within standard deviation increase in Bid Outert−1 (Ask Outert−1)
corresponds to decrease of future returns by -0.017 basis points (increase of future
returns by 0.012 basis points), which is equivalent to decrease of 0.03 within standard
deviation for returns (increase of 0.02 within standard deviation for returns).
Remarkably, the eﬀects of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book are
similar in terms of the absolute size of the coeﬃcients. However, the median of
daily correlation coeﬃcients between Bid Innert−1 and Ask Innert−1 (Bid Outert−1
and Ask Outert−1) is quite low – at only 6.24% (2.21%). Put diﬀerently, the depth
concentration of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book tend to vary largely
independently from each other, thus their eﬀects on future returns should not oﬀset
each other.
At the same time, Panel A of Table 3.4 shows a clear discrepancy in the absolute
size of the coeﬃcients between depth concentration at the inner and outer levels:
1.89 (-2.02) to -0.16 (0.11) of the bid (ask) side during the whole sample period,
respectively.10 This discrepancy could be due to the fact that outer levels are not
10A natural concern is that the inner and outer levels of the limit order book are negatively
correlated by construction. If there is an extremely high correlation between depth concentration
at the inner and outer levels of the limit order book, I can run into a multicollinearity problem.
However, across all stock-days, these correlation coeﬃcients never fall below -70%, and the median
value is around -46% for both ask and bid sides of the limit order book.
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likely to be used for inventory management. In addition, outer levels are used for
informed trading if and only if an informed trader receives a relatively strong signal,
which is unlikely to happen regularly on the market.
In order to measure the relative importance of market and limit order variables,
I look at the R2 decomposition of the predictive regressions. Panel B of Table 3.4
shows that the average adjusted R2 of the predictive regressions is equal to 1.64%
for the whole sample period. Adjusted R2 attributable to MOIBt−1 is 0.34% in
absolute terms, which accounts for 20.66% of the total explanatory power. As a
comparison, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) document an adjusted R2
of 0.51% for predictive regressions using only lagged dollar market order imbalance
for the 1993-2002 period, which is of the same order of magnitude as my estimate.
Lagged return accounts for 32.38% of the total predictive power, while 46.96% of
the total predictive power comes from the limit order book variables (with 27.79%
attributable to the depth concentration at the inner levels of the limit order book
and 19.17% attributable to the depth concentration at the outer levels of the limit
order book).
My results are also consistent with Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009), who document
an increase in adjusted R2 after inclusion of additional levels of the limit order book
with a monotonic decrease of the added value for each additional level. My results
are however at odds with Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2013), who argue that only
imbalances at the BBO level drive intraday return predictability. Despite the fact
that Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) and Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2013) also
investigate intraday return predictability from the limit order book, the data used
in their studies is quite limited. Speciﬁcally, Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) use one
month of data on 100 stocks traded on the Australian Stock Exchange, while Cont,
Kukanov, and Stoikov (2013) use one month of data on 50 stocks from S&P 500
constituents. Overall, my results allow me to draw more generalizable conclusions
regarding intraday return predictability and observed time series and cross-sectional
patterns.
The sub-period analysis yields the following results. Total predictive power of
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the regressions decreases slightly from 1.71% in the ﬁrst half of the sample period
to 1.58% in the second half. This decrease is attributable to the limit order book
(adjusted R2 decreases from 0.85% to 0.71%). The predictive power of the MOIB
increases slightly from 0.33% to 0.35%. This evidence is consistent with the fact that
intraday return predictability from the limit order book is a persistent phenomenon
during 2002-2010 for all NYSE-listed common stocks.
Next, I enrich the analysis discussed above in order to emphasize the importance
of private information source of intraday return predictability. To determine the pure
eﬀect of private information on intraday return predictability from market and limit
order ﬂows, I follow the previous literature (e.g., Huang and Stoll (1997), Madhavan,
Richardson, and Roomans (1997), Sadka (2006)) and use surprises in market and
limit order ﬂows to deﬁne the informational component of the order ﬂows. I calculate
surprises as residual values of the V AR(k) regression on a stock-day basis with the
number of lags determined by AIC criteria (see equation (3.2)). I then repeat the
above-mentioned analysis with these surprises used as explanatory variables (see
equation (3.3)). I use superscript U to refer to surprises in the variables.
Table 3.5 presents the average estimation results of this analysis. The results
in Table 3.5 are similar to the results in Table 3.4, with the only exception of the
depth concentration at the outer levels of the ask side of the limit order book, which
is no longer signiﬁcant during the second half of the period. Nevertheless, all the
signs during the whole sample period and the second half of the sample period are
consistent with the private information hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).
Based on the whole sample period, adjusted R2 attributable to the MOIBU is
0.31% in absolute terms (20.92% in relative terms), while the adjusted R2 attributable
to surprises in LOB variables is 0.71% in absolute terms (47.21% in relative terms).
The inner levels of the limit order book contribute 27.65% and outer levels contribute
19.56% of this predictive power.
All in all, this suggests that private information is the main source of the in-
traday return predictability: roughly 20% of this predictability is attributable to
the informed market orders, roughly 50% is attributable to the informed limit or-
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ders. Remaining 30% are stemming from inventory management concerns (lagged
returns).
Furthermore, the evidence is consistent with the majority of informed trading
taking place via limit orders contrary to the traditional view of informed trading
taking place via market orders only.
3.5.2 Algorithmic trading and informed trader’s choice
To this end, I provide evidence consistent with limit orders being actively used for
informed trading. Furthermore, my ﬁndings suggest that informed limit orders are
a prevalent source of intraday return predictability. I now examine the role of algo-
rithmic trading activity in the choice made by the informed trader.
In particular, I identify the eﬀects of algorithmic trading activity on intraday
return predictability from the limit order book. The results of this section add to the
ongoing debate on whether algorithmic traders improve or decrease market quality.
Identifying the causal eﬀects of the algorithmic trading activity is not a trivial task as
the degree of algorithmic trading activity in each stock on each day is an endogenous
choice made by the algorithmic trader. Therefore, I adopt an instrumental variable
approach following Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) to identify the causal
eﬀects of the algorithmic trading on limit order book informational content.
Since January 2002 when the NYSE opened its limit order book to public, there
were two major technological advances in NYSE equity market design that impacted
algorithmic trading activity: Autoquote in 2003 (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2011)) and NYSE Hybrid Market in 2006-2007 (Hendershott and Moulton (2011)).
After the NYSE Hybrid Market introduction, orders were allowed to “walk” through
the limit order book automatically, before this technological change market orders
were executed automatically at the best bid-oﬀer level only. I use the NYSE Hybrid
Market introduction as an instrument for algorithmic trading activity that allows me
to investigate the role of algorithmic traders in informed trading activity.
I obtain data on the NYSE Hybrid Phase 3 rollout, which was when the actual
increase in the degree of automated execution and speed took place (Hendershott and
Moulton (2011)) from Terrence Hendershott’s website. This rollout was implemented
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in a staggered way from October 2006 until January 2007 (see Figure 3.2), which
allows for a clean identiﬁcation. My analysis is focused on the period around Hybrid
introduction from June 2006 to May 2007. All stocks in the sample have CRSP data
available during the whole period under consideration. I discard stocks with average
monthly price bigger than $1,000 and smaller than $5. I winsorize all the variables
at the 1% and 99% levels.
I consider the following proxy for algorithmic trading activity in the spirit of
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015): AT ,
a daily number of best bid-oﬀer quote updates relative to daily trading volume (in
$10,000).11
I follow Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and estimate the following
IV panel regression with stock and day ﬁxed eﬀects (implicit diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
approach) and double-clustering of the standard errors (Petersen (2009)):
Yi,t = αi+γt+ATi,t+MCAPi,m−1+1/PRCi,m−1+Turnoveri,m−1+Volatilityi,m−1+ i,t (3.4)
where Yi,t is either coeﬃcients estimates from equation (3.3), or incremental adjusted
R2 from equation (3.3) for stock i on day t, and αi and γt are stock and day ﬁxed
eﬀects. ATi,t is a proxy for algorithmic trading activity for stock i on day t . In
addition, I control for daily log of market capitalization in billions (MCAPi,m−1),
inverse of price (1/Pi,m−1), annualized turnover (Turnoveri,m−1), and square root of
high minus low range (Volatilityi,m−1) averaged over the previous month, m − 1. As
a set of instruments, I use all explanatory variables with ATi,t replaced by Hybridi,t ,
a dummy variable that equals one if the stock i on day t is rolled-out to the NYSE
Hybrid Market and 0 otherwise. In other words, I estimate equation (3.4) by means
of 2SLS with an exclusion restriction on the Hybrid Market introduction dummy.
11The results are robust for using a diﬀerent proxy for algorithmic trading activity: a daily
number of limit order book updates relative to daily trading volume (in $10,000). On the one hand,
by construction this is a better proxy for algorithmic trading activity in the limit order book. On
the other hand, my limit order book data is limited as it takes into account only ﬁrst 10 levels of
the limit order book (aggregated depth at ﬁrst 10 price levels). In addition, I do not have order
level data (submission, revision, cancellation). Therefore, the change in this measure due to NYSE
Hybrid Market introduction is bounded from above due to data limitations. Results with this proxy
are available from the author upon a request.
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Figure 3.2. NYSE Hybrid Market introduction
This ﬁgure shows the staggered way of NYSE Hybrid Market introduction for the stocks included in
the analysis from October 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007. To be included in the sample, a stock should
have NYSE as its primary exchange and have CRSP daily data available for the period from June 2006
to May 2007. Data on common stocks and primary exchange code are obtained from CRSP database
(PRIMEXCH=N, and SHRCD=10 or 11, EXCHCD =1 or 31). Data on Hybrid introduction are from
Terrence Hendershott’s website.
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Unreported results of the ﬁrst stage regression show that AT increases signiﬁcantly
with NYSE Hybrid Market introduction (an increase of 1.12 best bid-oﬀer updates
per $10,000 of daily trading volume). The null hypothesis that instrument does not
enter ﬁrst-stage regression is strongly rejected.
The results for the second stage regression for AT are presented in Table 3.6.
In particular, I estimate the eﬀect of algorithmic trading on the coeﬃcients (Panel
A) and incremental adjusted R2 (Panel B) from predictive regressions of one-minute
mid-quote returns on lagged surprises in returns, MOIB, and LOB variables (see
equation (3.3)). I test the eﬃcient technology hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) against the
competition hypothesis (Hypothesis 4).
Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that in line with the competition hypothesis, the coef-
ﬁcients of lagged MOIBU signiﬁcantly increase in an absolute sense with an increase
in algorithmic trading activity. However, there is also an increase in the Bid InnerU
and Ask InnerU coeﬃcients in line with the eﬃcient technology hypothesis. This is
consistent with slow traders, who are likely to be uninformed, moving away from the
inner to outer levels, while fast and potentially informed traders continue operating
at the inner levels of the bid and ask sides of the limit order book. The coeﬃcients
of the lagged returns also increase in an absolute sense, consistent with the fact that
high-frequency traders (subset of algorithmic traders) are known to end their day
with a ﬂat inventory position. Therefore, inventory management concerns should
generate a stronger return reversal in the presence of algorithmic traders.
Panel B of Table 3.6 reports the eﬀect of algorithmic trading on the incremental
adjusted R2 from equation (3.3). Algorithmic trading participation increases the pre-
dictive power of all variables, although the increase in predictive power of the depth
concentration at the outer levels of the bid and ask sides of the limit order book
is marginal. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in AT leads to an in-
crease of 8.2 basis points in the adjusted R2 attributable to lagged surprises returns,
a 5.3 basis points increase in the adjusted R2 attributable to MOIBU , a 2.6 (2.7)
basis points increase in the adjusted R2 attributable to Bid InnerU (Ask InnerU),
and a 0.7 (0.6) basis points increase in the adjusted R2 attributable to Bid OuterU
57A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 3. Intraday Return Predictability 97
Ta
bl
e
3.
6.
Se
co
nd
st
ag
e
re
gr
es
si
on
:
Im
pa
ct
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ty
on
in
tr
ad
ay
re
tu
rn
pr
ed
ic
ta
bi
lit
y
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ty
on
in
tr
ad
ay
re
tu
rn
pr
ed
ic
ta
bi
lit
y
fr
om
th
e
lim
it
or
de
r
bo
ok
,
se
e
eq
ua
ti
on
(3
.4
).
A
s
pr
ox
y
fo
r
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ty
I
us
e
da
ily
nu
m
be
r
of
be
st
bi
d-
oﬀ
er
qu
ot
e
up
da
te
s
pe
r
$1
0,
00
0
of
da
ily
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
(A
T
i,
t
).
In
or
de
r
to
id
en
ti
fy
ca
us
al
eﬀ
ec
t
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ty
,I
in
st
ru
m
en
t
it
w
it
h
st
ag
ge
re
d
in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
of
N
Y
SE
H
yb
ri
d.
T
he
se
t
of
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
in
cl
ud
e
al
le
xp
la
na
to
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s
w
it
h
A
T
i,
t
su
bs
ti
tu
te
d
by
H
y
b
r
id
i,
t
.
I
co
nt
ro
lf
or
da
ily
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n,
pr
ic
e,
tu
rn
ov
er
,a
nd
vo
la
ti
lit
y
av
er
ag
ed
ov
er
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ca
le
nd
ar
m
on
th
.
T
he
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
on
in
cl
ud
es
st
oc
k
(α
i
)
an
d
da
y
(γ
t
)
ﬁx
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
do
ub
le
cl
us
te
ri
ng
.
P
an
el
A
re
po
rt
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
on
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
fr
om
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
P
an
el
B
re
po
rt
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
on
th
e
in
cr
em
en
ta
la
dj
us
te
dR
2
fr
om
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
ro
w
s
in
ea
ch
pa
ne
l
sh
ow
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
st
oc
k-
da
y
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
an
d
th
e
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
r
of
st
oc
ks
pe
r
da
y.
T
he
es
ti
m
at
io
n
pe
ri
od
is
Ju
n-
20
06
un
ti
ll
M
ay
-2
00
7.
T
o
be
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e,
a
st
oc
k
sh
ou
ld
ha
ve
N
Y
SE
as
it
s
pr
im
ar
y
ex
ch
an
ge
an
d
ha
ve
C
R
SP
da
ta
av
ai
la
bl
e
fo
r
al
l
da
ys
un
de
r
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n.
D
at
a
on
co
m
m
on
st
oc
ks
an
d
pr
im
ar
y
ex
ch
an
ge
co
de
ar
e
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
C
R
SP
da
ta
ba
se
(P
R
IM
E
X
C
H
=
N
,
an
d
SH
R
C
D
=
10
or
11
,
E
X
C
H
C
D
=
1
or
31
).
D
at
a
on
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
tr
ad
es
,
qu
ot
es
,
an
d
10
be
st
le
ve
ls
of
th
e
lim
it
or
de
r
bo
ok
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
by
T
R
T
H
.
D
at
a
on
N
Y
SE
H
yb
ri
d
in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
co
m
es
fr
om
T
er
re
nc
e
H
en
de
rs
ho
tt
’s
w
eb
si
te
.
**
*,
**
,*
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
,a
nd
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
P
an
el
A
:E
ﬀe
ct
of
al
go
ri
th
m
ic
tr
ad
in
g
on
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
R
et
U i,t
−1
M
O
IB
U i,t
−1
B
id
In
ne
rU i
,t−
1
A
sk
In
ne
rU i
,t−
1
B
id
O
ut
er
U i,t
−1
A
sk
O
ut
er
U i,t
−1
AT
i,t
-0
.0
04
**
*
0.
09
5*
*
0.
33
7*
**
-0
.2
75
**
*
-0
.0
06
0.
00
1
(-
3.
67
)
(2
.4
0)
(9
.2
1)
(-
6.
66
)
(-
0.
17
)
(0
.0
5)
ln
(M
C
A
P
) i,
m
−1
-0
.0
10
**
*
0.
16
2
1.
15
8*
**
-1
.0
26
**
*
0.
18
2*
-0
.1
53
(-
2.
78
)
(1
.1
3)
(8
.2
8)
(-
7.
19
)
(1
.7
1)
(-
1.
30
)
1/
P
R
C
i,m
−1
-0
.3
21
**
*
54
.7
78
**
*
8.
28
8*
*
-7
.7
82
*
8.
49
0*
*
-4
.4
37
(-
3.
28
)
(1
1.
14
)
(1
.9
7)
(-
1.
82
)
(2
.4
7)
(-
1.
32
)
T
ur
no
v
er
i,m
−1
-0
.0
45
**
*
-1
.5
94
**
*
1.
37
3*
**
-0
.9
52
**
*
0.
02
2
-0
.0
29
(-
8.
02
)
(-
7.
68
)
(6
.7
0)
(-
4.
45
)
(0
.1
2)
(-
0.
18
)
V
ol
at
il
it
y i
,m
−1
0.
74
8*
**
56
.9
01
**
*
-4
.2
18
-0
.3
11
-9
.7
70
**
9.
04
8*
*
(6
.1
3)
(1
0.
24
)
(-
0.
80
)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
2.
45
)
(2
.3
1)
St
oc
k
FE
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
D
ay
FE
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
D
ou
bl
e
cl
us
te
rin
g
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
R
2
0.
14
0.
35
0.
06
0.
06
0.
01
0.
01
#
of
st
oc
k-
da
ys
29
6,
13
0
29
6,
13
0
29
6,
13
0
29
6,
13
0
29
6,
13
0
29
6,
13
0
Av
er
ag
e
#
of
st
oc
ks
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
57B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
98 Chapter 3. Intraday Return Predictability
Table
3.6.
Second
stage
regression
(continued)
P
anelB
:E
ﬀect
of
algorithm
ic
trading
on
increm
entalA
djusted
R
2
A
dj
R
2i,t
R
et Ui,t−1
M
O
IB
Ui,t−1
B
id
Inner
Ui,t−1
A
sk
Inner
Ui,t−1
B
id
O
uter
Ui,t−1
A
sk
O
uter
Ui,t−1
AT
B
B
O
i,t
0.211***
0.080***
0.052***
0.025***
0.026***
0.007**
0.006*
(9.11)
(7.93)
(8.20)
(5.64)
(5.26)
(2.17)
(1.76)
ln(M
C
A
P
)i,m−1
0.380***
0.234***
0.004
0.049***
0.079***
0.001
-0.005
(6.31)
(7.88)
(0.24)
(4.05)
(5.72)
(0.09)
(-0.60)
1/P
R
C
i,m−1
-4.410**
-1.681**
-1.461***
-0.692**
-0.550
0.163
0.129
(-2.53)
(-2.19)
(-2.83)
(-2.08)
(-1.41)
(0.68)
(0.50)
T
urno
veri,m−1
1.209***
0.508***
0.260***
0.132***
0.140***
0.047***
0.037**
(10.72)
(9.88)
(8.52)
(5.89)
(5.59)
(3.07)
(2.12)
V
olatilityi,m−1
-27.372***
-11.065***
-4.728***
-3.027***
-3.631***
-1.430***
-1.355***
(-12.40)
(-10.42)
(-7.97)
(-7.12)
(-7.55)
(-4.73)
(-4.34)
Stock
FE
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
D
ay
FE
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
D
ouble
clustering
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
R
2
0.06
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.02
#
ofstock-days
296,130
296,130
296,130
296,130
296,130
296,130
296,130
Average
#
ofstocks
1,180
1,180
1,180
1,180
1,180
1,180
1,180
58A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 3. Intraday Return Predictability 99
(Ask OuterU).12 Put diﬀerently, I ﬁnd evidence consistent with both the eﬃcient
technology (predictive power of limit orders increases) and the competition (pre-
dictive power of market orders increases) hypotheses. However, the eﬀects of the
competition hypothesis may dominate those of the eﬃcient technology hypothesis.
Note that intraday return predictability (total as well as incremental) increases
with the size and turnover, and decreases with the inverse of price and volatility. Size
and turnover could be viewed as a proxies for stocks’ liquidity. Lower transaction
costs allow traders to beneﬁt even from small pieces of information, on which they
would not trade otherwise, which in turn increases the predictive power of limit and
primarily market orders.
Overall, I contribute to the debate on whether algorithmic traders adversely select
other market participants. I provide evidence that the increased degree of algorithmic
trading participation is associated with an increase in the informational content of
not only market orders, but also limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order
book (with outer levels being only marginally aﬀected). In other words, an increase
in algorithmic trading activity leads to an increase in informed trading via both
market (demanding liquidity) and limit orders (providing liquidity), with a relative
shift from informed liquidity provision to informed liquidity consumption.
3.5.3 Realized volatility and informed trader’s choice
I test the realized volatility hypothesis based on the theoretical predictions from
Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), who argue that informed traders tend to use
market orders for high volatility stocks and limit orders for low volatility stocks
(Hypothesis 5). These eﬀects should be mainly observed for the orders posted at the
inner levels of the limit order book as these orders are more likely to be hit.
I estimate predictive regressions of one-minute mid-quote returns (see equation
(3.3)) with one-minute lagged surprises in returns, one-minute lagged surprises in
market order imbalance, and lagged surprises in depth concentration at the inner
and outer levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book as explanatory
variables on a stock-day basis. Then, I sort the stocks into four portfolios based on
12Recall from Section 3.5.1 that an average adjusted R2 for the whole sample period is 1.50%.
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one-day lagged realized volatility (realized volatility is computed from one-minute
mid-quote returns during the day).
Ex ante, I expect a monotonic increase in the absolute coeﬃcient of the surprises
in market order imbalance and adjusted R2 from the low volatility portfolio to the
high volatility portfolio, while I expect the opposite for the surprises in depth con-
centration at the inner levels of the ask and bid sides of the limit order book. Table
3.7 reports the estimation results for the average coeﬃcients and the average Newey-
West t-statistics (Panel A) and adjusted R2 decomposition (Panel B) for the whole
sample period only.
Table 3.7 Panel A shows a monotonic increase for the coeﬃcient of MOIBU from
1.18 to 11.63 while moving from the low realized volatility portfolio to the high
realized volatility portfolio. In other words, coeﬃcient of MOIBU is 9.86 times
greater for high volatility stocks than for low volatility stocks. The coeﬃcients
of Bid InnerU(Ask InnerU) also increase monotonically in absolute sense from the
low volatility portfolio to the high volatility portfolio from 1.64 (-1.71) to 3.78 (-
3.81), but this increase is very moderate compared to MOIBU . The coeﬃcients of
Bid OuterU(Ask Outer U) are not signiﬁcant.13
Table 3.7 Panel B shows adjusted R2 decomposition for each of the explanatory
variables for the four realized volatility portfolios. There is a monotonic increase in
the adjusted R2 attributable to MOIBU while moving from the low realized volatility
portfolio to the high realized volatility portfolio from 0.29% to 0.38% in absolute
terms (19.42% to 22.88% in relative terms). However, there is a slightly U-shaped
pattern for the adjusted R2 attributable to LOB variables in absolute terms and a
monotonically decreasing pattern in relative terms (48.51% to 44.97%). The rest of
predictive power comes from surprises in lagged returns.
All in all, I provide evidence that informed traders may prefer market orders
to limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book for high volatility stocks
and limit orders at the inner levels of the limit order book to market orders for
low volatility stocks. In other words, informed traders are more likely to consume
13The results are robust for the sub-period analysis.
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liquidity for high volatility stocks and to supply liquidity for low volatility stocks.
3.6 Conclusion
The recent public debates regarding algorithmic traders (and their subset — high-
frequency traders) adversely selecting retail investors highlighted the importance of
understanding how the informed trading is taking place and how it was aﬀected by the
emergence of algorithmic trading. Motivated by this, I investigate the intraday return
predictability from informed market orders and informed limit orders to answer the
questions of whether informed traders choose to act as liquidity suppliers or liquidity
demanders and what are the determinants of their choice. In particular, I study
one-minute mid-quote return predictability from the lagged informed market order
ﬂow (measured by surprises in market order imbalances) and lagged informed limit
orders (measured by surprises in depth concentration at the inner and outer levels of
the ask and bid sides of the limit order book).
To the best of my knowledge, I am the ﬁrst to address this question with such a
comprehensive data set, which includes one-minute observations for all NYSE-listed
common stocks for the 2002-2010 period. I show that informed limit orders are
predictive of intraday returns beyond the informed market orders. Moreover, the
majority of informed trading occurs via limit orders (as measured by incremental
adjusted R2 from predictive regressions). This result holds for the whole period
under consideration as well as for the sub-period analysis.
I also examine the eﬀect of algorithmic trading activity on informed trader’s choice
between market and limit orders. Overall, there is a relative shift from informed
liquidity provision (limit orders) to informed liquidity consumption (market orders)
while moving from stocks with a low presence of algorithmic traders to stocks with
a high presence of algorithmic traders.
In conclusion, informed traders actively use both market orders (consume liq-
uidity) and limit orders (provide liquidity) with the largest chunk of the informed
trading happening via limit orders. This fact should not be neglected while analyzing
the adverse selection eﬀects on ﬁnancial markets.
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Chapter 4
Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery without
Trading: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
in the Pre-Opening Period and the Opening Batch
Auction∗
4.1 Introduction
During the past decade, global equity markets have been fundamentally altered due
to the vast improvements in the speed of trading and the consequent fragmentation
of market activity. For example, on January 4, 2010, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE) launched a new trading system named “Arrowhead”, which has reduced the
order submission response time to 2 milliseconds. This increase in trading speed
allows markets to operate far beyond human capabilities, given that the average
time it takes for a human to blink varies from 300 to 400 milliseconds. Among other
changes, traditional market makers have been replaced by high-frequency traders
(HFTs) in most markets.1 This replacement has had a dramatic impact on the
∗This chapter is based on Bellia, Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Uno, and Yuferova (2016)
“Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery without Trading: Evidence from the Tokyo
Stock Exchange in the Pre-Opening Period and the Opening Batch Auction” (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705962). We are grateful to Jonathan Brogaard, Björn Hagströmer,
Frank Hatheway, Mark Van Achter, anonymous high frequency traders, and participants at the
FMA European Conference 2015, the 4th International Conference on the Industrial Organization
of Securities and Derivatives Markets: High Frequency Trading, and the SAFE Microstructure
workshop, Goethe University, for helpful suggestions. We also thank the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
providing anonymous detailed account-level data, which form the basis of the research reported in
this paper. This work was carried out with the generous ﬁnancial support of EUROFIDAI, which
we appreciate. We also thank the Research Center SAFE, funded by the State of Hessen initia-
tive for research LOEWE, for ﬁnancial support. Darya Yuferova also gratefully acknowledges the
Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam for supporting her research visit to NYU
Stern.
1See Brogaard (2010), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), and
Raman and Yadav (2014), for evidence of this.
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behavior of liquidity providers in ﬁnancial markets. The resulting changes have
led to intense debate and scrutiny from investors, market makers, exchanges, and
regulators regarding the advantageous, even unfairly advantageous, status of HFTs
in global markets.2
Regulators in many countries have been debating, and in some cases have imple-
mented, new regulations on HFTs in recent years. A ﬁnancial transaction tax has
been adopted by France, Italy and Canada. Other types of regulations more directly
target the types of behavior displayed by HFTs, such as the minimum display time
for limit orders and the relative frequency of cancellations of trades. Recent theoret-
ical work by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) advocates frequent batch auctions
instead of a continuous auction, while Fricke and Gerig (2015) analyze the optimal
interval of auction cycle. These papers are theoretical justiﬁcations, but need empir-
ical veriﬁcation before any clear conclusion can be drawn about the relative merits
of frequent batch auctions compared to the traditional continuous trading.
The existing empirical literature on HFTs focuses on trader behavior during the
continuous trading session. This paper instead studies whether, in the pre-opening
period without trading, low-latency traders (HFTs) still participate in the equity
market, and how the presence of low-latency traders contributes to price discovery
in the subsequent opening call auction. To our knowledge, there are no other papers
that investigate the role of HFTs in the pre-opening period and shed light on the
potential role of HFTs in periodic batch auctions. In this paper, we aim to contribute
to the literature on low-latency trading, with a clear focus on price discovery in the
opening batch auction period. Our motivation for ﬁlling this void in the literature
is that the pre-opening period has very diﬀerent characteristics to the continuous
session. The opening call auction is the ﬁrst time in the day (after the previous day’s
closing) that market prices can incorporate new information accumulated overnight.
Given the growing presence of low-latency traders in the market, the manner in which
price discovery occurs during the pre-opening period is a crucial issue to investigate.
The main questions we address in this paper are related to the role of low-latency
2See Lewis (2014) for a popular account of this perspective.
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traders (including HFTs) in the pre-opening period and the diﬀerence in trader be-
havior between the opening of the call auction and the continuous trading session
that follows. More speciﬁcally, we investigate whether, in the absence of trading, low-
latency traders (including HFTs) still participate in the market pre-opening period
and, if they do participate, (i) whether they are more or less active in the pre-opening
period than during the continuous session that follows, and (ii) how and precisely
when they participate during the opening batch auction period. Finally, and more
importantly, we investigate how the presence of low-latency traders contributes to
price discovery in the opening batch auction period and the following continuous
session, and compare the behavior of the low-latency traders that do and do not
participate in the opening call auction during the continuous session that ensues. In
order to empirically investigate these questions, we use a unique dataset provided
by the TSE, one of the largest stock markets in the world and the market with the
largest presence of HFT activity: 55.3% compared to 49% in the U.S. market and
35% in the European market, as of 2012 (as documented by Hosaka (2014)).
In the TSE, the execution of orders is not permitted during the pre-opening
period, hence buy/sell schedules can be crossed. In fact, traders cannot seek imme-
diacy in this period; hence, low-latency traders, that have the advantage of moving
more quickly than other traders in reacting to new information or order ﬂow, cannot
employ their superior ability to achieve speedy execution. This may result in a po-
tentially smaller presence of HFTs in the opening batch auction period, although this
warrants empirical scrutiny. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the incentives
and behavior of low-latency traders during these periods.
There are potentially also several ways to settle an opening batch auction. In most
markets, and in the TSE, there is no time priority for limit orders submitted during
the pre-opening period. As long as the limit price is identical to other pending buy (or
sell) orders, the time of order submission does not aﬀect the execution of orders at the
opening call auction. This feature may cause traders to delay order submission until
just before market opening. For example, institutional investors that are interested
in executing large orders at market opening may enter them into the order book
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at the very last moment (perhaps the last millisecond prior to opening). The early
entry of large orders during the pre-opening period has clear disadvantages: large
orders attract other participants and induce other investors to react sooner, causing
a deterioration in the execution price of such orders. Hence, these large orders may
have a signiﬁcant impact on the opening price.3 The issue of whether or not a low-
latency trading environment ampliﬁes this order placement behavior has not been
investigated so far. Nor, indeed, have researchers looked into whether low-latency
traders strategically decide upon the timing of their order submissions during the
pre-opening period and how this might aﬀect price discovery.
Further, the cancellation of existing orders is possible at any time prior to the
opening time and is free of charge, so that a trader with access to a low-latency
trading facility may wait until the very last moment before the opening time, if they
wish to cancel. Some investors may enter “noisy” orders and cancel them right before
execution occurs. The term “noisy” connotes a type of order that uses an aggressive
limit price to send a signal to investors on the opposite side, to induce them to
provide liquidity. Indeed, some investors may have an incentive to enter false orders
with aggressive limit prices to elicit a favorable response from true orders on the
opposite side of the limit order book. While this strategy does not always work to
the advantage of the aggressive investor, it may serve to add noise to the pre-opening
quotes. Since a low-latency environment allows traders to delay their ﬁnal action
until very close to market opening, the noise eﬀects may prevail right until the ﬁnal
seconds of the pre-opening period. If that is so, it will be useful to investigate which
order type causes a deterioration of the pre-opening quotes.
A low-latency trading environment inﬂuences not only the behavior of HFTs but
also other types of low-latency trading, such as algorithmic trading, which motivates
us to develop a more comprehensive classiﬁcation of traders than in the prior litera-
ture, and to investigate the behavior of all the diﬀerent categories of traders, based
on their capability for low-latency trading. This is in contrast to the rapidly growing
3This empirical evidence is documented by Kraus and Stoll (1972), Chan and Lakonishok (1993),
and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004) in earlier studies of the price impact of institu-
tional trades.
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empirical literature on HFTs, which is largely based on HFT datasets4 that provide
limited coverage of HFT activity and rarely provide account-level data; this prevents
researchers from identifying the speciﬁc series of actions taken by individual HFTs.
Even though account-level data have become available more recently, the identiﬁca-
tion of HFTs is, in most cases, based on screening using just a couple of metrics, such
as the order-to-cancellation ratio. It goes without saying that the thresholds for the
metrics used in such classiﬁcations are fairly arbitrary. Indeed, a report by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC (2014)) argues that the current metrics used
to identify HFT activity (as in, e.g., Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015)) can
be too narrow to capture the true range of activity in a low-latency environment. In
particular, the SEC (2014) emphasizes that not all low-latency and high-frequency
trading activity should necessarily be classiﬁed as HFT activity; rather, HFT ac-
tivity is a subset of a more general phenomenon of algorithmic trading, and should
be studied as such. In this study, we take this broad criticism into account and
undertake a more comprehensive analysis of trading strategies employed by various
trading entities, avoiding referring to all of them as HFTs, given that we do not yet
have a commonly accepted framework for deﬁning and identifying HFTs. We adopt
an entirely diﬀerent methodology from those used by prior researchers to identify
low-latency trading activity, based on a novel dataset of virtual server (VS) IDs that
cover all orders entered by traders in the TSE. A VS is a logical device that needs
to be set up between the computer systems of the market participant and the ex-
change, such that they may send/receive data to/from one another. Such detailed
data have not previously been used in the literature, to our knowledge.5 The unique
dataset used in this paper is one of the most comprehensive ones on HFT used in
the literature, thus far. Hence, it oﬀers several advantages for researchers that are
worth highlighting.
First, our data relate to trading information at the disaggregated level of indi-
4HFT datasets are datasets provided by exchanges themselves, e.g. the NASDAQ dataset. Typ-
ically, these datasets include HFT/non-HFT ﬂags for each order submission.
5The study that is closest to ours is by Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan (2015) and
uses subscription data for diﬀerent speeds of co-location services as a screening device for HFTs.
They distinguish between traders based on their usage of the low-latency facility, but do not have
the relevant information on the server conﬁgurations of individual trading desks as we do.
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vidual servers used for trading. Based on server usage, we are, therefore, able to
infer account level trading, without resorting to arbitrary criteria as in prior studies,
which deﬁne classiﬁcations based on arbitrary thresholds of latency of trading and
inventory to identify the type of trader. Hitherto, no study has examined server
conﬁguration, which is a crucial determinant of the horse power of execution capabil-
ity. Consequently, prior studies in the microstructure literature, which did not have
access to such disaggregated data, were forced to rely on either a HFT/non-HFT ﬂag
or, when they did use account level information, or were able to cover only a small
sample of the market and, even then, are typically focused on the continuous session.
Second, given the granularity of our data, one can check whether there are dif-
ferences between trader activity in the pre-opening period, the opening auction and
the continuous trading session that ensues, based on the type of trader. In turn, our
data allow us to measure the impact of diﬀerent types of traders on price discovery
and liquidity provisions. Thus, only with our data can one shed some light on the
consequences of slowing the trading down, from continuous trading to batch auctions,
as suggested by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015).
Third, our data permit a comprehensive classiﬁcation scheme, which applies to
the trading data on the stock-day basis. As we show in our paper, traders tend to
switch their type from one day to another, and from one stock to the next; thus, the
comprehensive nature of our data allows us to move away from the ad hoc assumption
of immutable HFT classiﬁcation: “once a HFT, forever a HFT.”
Fourth, a further advantage of our data set is the availability of account-level
information during the pre-opening period, which allows us to investigate how price
discovery takes place without trading and which trader type is responsible for it.
Using the granular data available to us, we classify traders into twelve subgroups
based on latency and inventory behavior during the continuous session. In terms of
speed, we identify three subgroups, namely FAST, MEDIUM, and SLOW, based
on latency; in terms of inventory, we identify four subgroups, namely LARGE,
MEDIUM, SMALL, and NOTRADE, based on end-of-day inventory. Although these
two characteristics, speed and inventory, are generally used to identify HFTs, it is
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presumed that they are related; in contrast, we show that speed and inventory actu-
ally exhibit low correlation (with a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient equal to 0.12). We
also show that both FAST / SMALL traders (market makers) and FAST / LARGE
traders (position takers) can be FAST traders. Thus, it is important to take both
the speed and the inventory dimensions into account in order to identify low-latency
(high-frequency) trading activity, which justiﬁes our 3 x 4 classiﬁcation into 12 groups
for the detailed analysis.
Our novel database allows us to investigate and compare, in depth, the behavior
of the diﬀerent types of traders. Our analysis shows that traders generally exhibit
diﬀerent types of behavior across stocks and over time. This means that the usual
characterization of a trader acting as an HFT, for all time and for all stocks, is
likely to be invalid. In particular, we observe that, on average, only in 28% of
cases do traders remain in the same group, among the 12 described above, from one
active day to the next, for a particular stock. Moreover, FAST / SMALL and FAST
/ MEDIUM, as well as MEDIUM / SMALL and MEDIUM / MEDIUM, traders
exhibit wide variation in their activity from stock to stock during the pre-opening
period. This pattern is especially strong for FAST / SMALL traders (high-frequency
market makers): their relative representation in the overall sample varies from 4.54%
to 60.05%.
Our empirical results for the TSE show that FAST traders participate in the
pre-opening period to a lesser extent than in the continuous session. Only 27.4% of
FAST / SMALL traders, 33.7% of FAST / MEDIUM traders, and 16.8% of FAST /
LARGE traders participate in the pre-opening period. These percentages are smaller
than those for MEDIUM / SMALL (50.4%), MEDIUM / MEDIUM (50.0%), and
MEDIUM / LARGE traders (18.6%). However, with respect to the total number
of orders in the pre-opening period, FAST traders that participate play a dominant
role in the pre-opening period, submitting 51% of them, while MEDIUM and SLOW
traders submit 42% and 7%, respectively. Furthermore, FAST traders submit 36%
out of their 51% of orders in the ﬁrst 10 minutes of the pre-opening period, and 8% of
their orders in the last 10 minutes. One reason for submitting orders as early as 8 am
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may be that traders, such as index arbitrageurs, seek a higher execution probability
for their orders (time priority matters for orders with limit price equal to the opening
price). In addition, 32.4% of aggressive orders, which inﬂuence the mid-quotes in the
pre-opening period, are submitted by FAST / SMALL traders. This indicates that
their order submission strategy contributes to the price discovery process through
their seeking of a higher probability of order execution.
We quantify price discovery by means of the weighted price contribution (WPC) as
in the previous literature.6 The WPC is the weighted percentage amount by which an
incoming aggressive order moves the prevailing mid-quotes closer to the opening price
over the accumulated price discovery contribution during the pre-opening period.
We analyze the price discovery contribution of the 12 groups described above (i) by
order, (ii) in the cross-sectional analysis, and (iii) with a panel speciﬁcation. We
ﬁnd that, both in the by-order and the cross-section of stocks, FAST / SMALL
traders (high-frequency market makers) and FAST / MEDIUM traders, as well as
MEDIUM / SMALL and MEDIUM / MEDIUM traders, are those that contribute
the most to price discovery. Besides that, we show that these four groups of traders
strategically choose the stocks in which to participate, by taking into account the
stocks’ characteristics, such as market capitalization, liquidity, and volatility. These
results indicate that low-latency traders contribute to price discovery and lead the
price formation process throughout the pre-opening period, in particular after the
ﬁrst 10 minutes. The by-order analysis shows that these 12 groups of traders largely
contribute to price discovery with their intense activity in new limit orders and price
revisions. Cancellation of limit orders deteriorates price discovery, but cancellation
of market orders improves price discovery. These results are conﬁrmed by the panel
analysis in which both the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions are taken into
consideration, in addition to the stock and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The role of low-latency
traders in price discovery is also conﬁrmed by a test for the unbiasedness of the
pre-opening quotes.
Inspired by the active discussion on whether continuous trading or frequent batch
6See Barclay and Warner (1993), Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000), and Barclay and Hender-
shott (2003).
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auctions constitute a better market design in the presence of low-latency traders, as
suggested by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015), we investigate the diﬀerence be-
tween the behavior of low-latency traders that participate in the opening call auction,
and that of those participating only in the continuous session that ensues. We ac-
knowledge that frequent batch auctions are qualitatively diﬀerent from the opening
call auction in important ways, e.g. the degree of information dissemination and the
ability to quickly unwind positions after the auction has taken place. However, the
opening call auction is the closest approximation to the frequent batch auctions one
sees today in developed (major) equity markets. We ﬁnd that low-latency traders
that are active in the call auction do not aid price discovery during the ﬁrst 30 min-
utes of the continuous session but, if anything, slightly deteriorate it. However, they
remain the main liquidity providers. Low-latency traders that are active only during
the continuous session are the main contributors to the price discovery process and
also the main consumers of liquidity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 4.2, we survey the literature on
price discovery and HFTs, particularly relating to the pre-opening period. In Section
4.3, we provide a description of the TSE market architecture and the special features
of our database. In Section 4.4, we present our empirical design and, in particular,
our data-ﬁltering procedures used to identify the 12 trader groups based on activity
during the continuous session. Our empirical analysis and results are presented in
Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
The recent HFT-speciﬁc theoretical literature deals with the speed advantage of
HFTs in terms of information processing and trading. Most of it focuses only on the
continuous trading session. Their greater speed allows HFTs to react more quickly
to public news than other traders (as in Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015), Biais,
Foucault, and Moinas (2015), and Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016)). Cespa and
Foucault (2011) describe a new mechanism whereby dealers use the prices of other
securities as information that generates spillover eﬀects in terms of both price and
liquidity, while Gerig and Michayluk (2014) diﬀerentiate HFTs from other traders in
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terms of their ability to monitor a large number of securities contemporaneously, and
therefore better predict future order ﬂow. Pagnotta and Philippon (2015) analyze
speed and fragmentation in a model in which exchanges invest in trading speed,
ﬁnding that competition among trading venues increases investor participation, but
leads to an excessive level of speed. Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) explain that the
low-latency environment increases the rates of quotation and cancellation on both
sides of the market, and ﬁnd that an increase in volatility reduces HFT activity. Biais,
Foucault, and Moinas (2015) suggest that fast traders increase negative externalities,
and thus adverse selection, crowding out slower traders. Jovanovic and Menkveld
(2015) develop a model in which the ability of HFTs to process and react to new
information more quickly than other market participants can generate both beneﬁcial
and deleterious eﬀects.
The recent theoretical work of Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) advocates fre-
quent batch auctions instead of the continuous auction that is currently predominant
in global ﬁnancial markets, a fairly radical departure from the prevailing regime. Fre-
quent batch auctions coming at an interval of, say, every second, eliminate the arms
race, because they both reduce the value of tiny speed advantages for HFTs and trans-
form competition on speed into competition on price. The authors’ model predicts
narrower spreads, deeper markets, and increased social welfare. Another theoretical
work, by Fricke and Gerig (2015), studies the optimal interval of the auction cycle
based on earlier work by Garbade and Silber (1979). Their model predicts that an
asset will be liquid if it has (1) low price volatility, (2) a large number of public
investors, and (3) a high correlation between its and other assets’ returns. These
papers evoke shades of the debate on the switch from the current continuous auction
to a periodic auction, which may reduce the speed advantage of low-latency traders.
Our paper provides empirical insights on HFT behavior in the batch auction setting.
To our knowledge, there are no papers that investigate the impact of HFT activity
on the price discovery process in the pre-opening period that transitions into the
opening batch auction. This paper aims to ﬁll this void. We are able to shed new
light on this phenomenon by employing a rich, new database to study how HFTs place
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their orders before the market opening, and whether they increase the eﬃciency of
price formation at the market opening.
Our research follows earlier work in two distinct areas of the academic literature.
The ﬁrst relates to ﬁndings regarding the microstructure of trading activity in the
market pre-opening period, while the second relates to the impact of HFTs on price
discovery. The pattern of the market pre-opening trading has been studied in the
earlier literature (e.g., by Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Biais, Hillion, and Spatt
(1999), Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000), Ciccotello and Hatheway (2000), Mad-
havan and Panchapagesan (2000), and Barclay and Hendershott (2003)). However,
much of this literature is dated, and is based on research conducted well before the
rapid growth in the number of HFTs over the course of the past decade or so. It is
therefore necessary to examine trading activity in the pre-opening period once again,
given the dramatic changes that have occurred since the advent of HFT activity.
To cite one example, the seminal work of Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) em-
phasizes the diﬀerence between the price discovery processes in the pre-opening and
continuous sessions. Speciﬁcally, they test whether pre-opening quotes reﬂect noise
(as orders can be revised or cancelled at any time before the opening auction) or true
information. They ﬁnd that, in the earlier period of the pre-opening period, quotes
are likely to be pure noise. However, closer to the opening auction, the evidence is
consistent with quotes reﬂecting information. They argue that there are two possible
reasons for the large component of noise in the early part of the pre-opening period.
First, noise could reﬂect the complexity of the price discovery process, in the absence
of trade execution. Second, the manipulative behavior of traders could be contam-
inating the price discovery process. However, these reasons may no longer apply,
due to the advent of rapid changes in information technology and the creation of a
low-latency trading environment, well known in the literature for encouraging HFT
activity. Moreover, those authors do not distinguish between the diﬀerent types of
traders.
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) analyze price discovery during the after-hours
and pre-opening periods using U.S. stock data. They ﬁnd that a larger degree of
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price discovery occurs during the pre-opening period than during the after-hours
period. However, in the U.S. market, the execution of orders is possible during the
pre-opening period, which is not the case in the TSE. Also, these authors do not
distinguish between the diﬀerent types of traders, and speciﬁcally between HFT and
non-HFT order ﬂow. To our knowledge, the only paper that investigates the speciﬁc
behavior of diﬀerent types of traders during the pre-opening period is that of Cao,
Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000), which concentrates on market maker behavior. They
ﬁnd that non-binding pre-opening quotations of NASDAQ market makers convey
information for price discovery in the absence of trading,7 although there was no
low-latency trading in the period they consider.
The body of empirical studies on HFT trading activities is growing rapidly.8 It
should be noted, however, that the focus of most of the literature is the continu-
ous trading session, rather than the pre-opening period of the trading day. Baron,
Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2012) estimate the proﬁtability of high-frequency trading,
while Hagströmer and Norden (2013) empirically conﬁrm the categorization of HFTs
into those that are engaged in market-making activities and those that are merely
opportunistic traders. Menkveld (2013) analyzes the transactions of a large HFT
ﬁrm that is active on the NYSE-Euronext and Chi-X markets, right after Chi-X
started as an alternative trading venue for European stocks. He shows that, in 80%
of the cases, HFTs provided liquidity on both markets, during the continuous trading
session. In an event study framework, Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan
(2015) show that liquidity providers are willing to pay for higher trading speed (using
a premium co-location service that allows traders to co-locate their servers near to
the exchange’s matching engine with upgraded transmission speed), and that this
is beneﬁcial for overall market liquidity. Finally, Gomber, Arndt, Lutat, and Uhle
(2011), Menkveld (2013), and Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) document
the typical behavior of HFTs during the continuous trading session, starting with
a zero-inventory position at the beginning of the trading day. Some strategies em-
7According to Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000), dealers can trade during the pre-opening
period via the electronic communication network (ECN). However, in practice, this trading activity
is very low.
8For reviews of the burgeoning literature, see Jones (2013) and Biais and Foucault (2014).
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ployed by HFTs can consume liquidity from the market. McInish and Upson (2013)
document an example of the structural strategy employed by HFTs and attempt
to estimate the proﬁts from this strategy, while Hirschey (2013) and Scholtus, van
Dijk, and Frijns (2014) document the strategies of HFTs around news and macro
announcements. Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2015) show that fast arbitrageurs
can undermine liquidity by exploiting arbitrage opportunities in the FX market.
Studies on HFTs and market quality include Hendershott and Moulton (2011),
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), Easley, de Prado, and O’Hara (2012), Hen-
dershott and Riordan (2013), Malinova, Park, and Riordan (2013), Boehmer, Fong,
and Wu (2015), and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014). However, none
of these studies describe how HFTs prepare their positions during the pre-opening
period, in anticipation of the continuous trading session, nor do they investigate the
behavior of HFTs that carry inventories overnight. In contrast to the prior litera-
ture, the particular emphasis of this paper is on HFT behavior in the pre-opening
period: If HFTs indeed have superior information-processing ability then it will be
advantageous for them to place orders in the pre-opening period as well.
In summary, our paper is related to the previous and current literature on HFTs,
but diﬀers in several dimensions. First, it relies on a unique characterization of HFTs
that is derived from the speciﬁcs of the trading technology (as described in detail in
Section 4.4.2 below), rather than relying merely on trading metrics. Second, we use
the whole market sample to identify diﬀerent trader groups on the TSE. Other papers
have relied on reasonably complete information but for a much smaller subset of the
market. Our reliance on the identiﬁcation of server IDs permits us to get around the
problem of limited access to client-speciﬁc trading data, and yet obtain complete data
for the whole market. Third, we focus on the pre-opening period to test hypotheses
regarding the eﬀectiveness of price discovery as a consequence of HFT activity.
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4.3 Institutional structure
4.3.1 Opening Call Auction and Pre-opening order submissions in the
Tokyo Stock Exchange
The opening price of the TSE is determined by a single price auction (“Itayose” in
Japanese) that kicks oﬀ at 9 am, based on buy and sell orders accumulated during
the pre-opening period. There are two types of orders allowed on the TSE: limit
orders and market orders.9
The principle for order matching is based on price and time priority in the con-
tinuous session. In the pre-opening period, however, time priority is ignored. That
is, all orders placed before the determination of the opening price are regarded as
simultaneous orders. The opening auction determines the price at which the largest
amount of executions is possible. There are three conditions to be met: (1) All mar-
ket orders must be executed at the opening price. (2) Orders with sell limit price
higher than the opening price and buy limit price lower than the opening price must
be executed. (3) Buy and sell orders with limit prices equal to the opening price
must be executed for the entire amount of either the buy or the sell side. The third
condition means that, often, orders on either side whose limit price is equal to the
opening price cannot be fully executed. When this happens, the TSE allocates the
available shares to participating member ﬁrms on a pro-rated basis (often based on
time priority).10 When the buy/sell quantities at the best quotes do not satisfy the
above three conditions for the opening price, the TSE disseminates special quotations
immediately after 9 am. Special quotations are where the best ask and best bid are
at the same price, while the amounts at the two quotes are diﬀerent, indicating an
order imbalance between buyers and sellers, inviting further new orders to bridge the
gap. For our paper, cases of the opening price not having been determined at 9 am
are excluded from our sample.
On the one hand, the feature of the opening call auction whereby there is no
9Traders can specify that an order is only eligible for execution at the opening auction. Should
it not be executed at the opening auction, such an order would be cancelled automatically, rather
than being moved to the continuous trading period.
10For further details of pro-rated allocation refer to TSE (2015, pp. 28–20).
68A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery 119
time priority for limit orders submitted during the pre-opening period can cause
delayed order submissions, price revisions, and cancellations, until just before market
opening. On the other hand, a trader engaging in index arbitrage between cash and
index futures contracts may enter a basket of orders as early as 8 am in order to
enhance the execution probability. Member ﬁrms of the exchange often allocate
ﬁlled limit orders, with limit price equal to the opening price, to their customers on
a time-priority basis, which means that placing orders early can improve a trader’s
probability of execution, at least to some extent. Index arbitrageurs and institutional
investors are well aware of this practice, and will take it into account in their order
placement strategy. Thus, in the pre-opening period, preference over order placement
timing diverges to the two extreme points: just after 8 am and just before 9 am.
Each trading day, the TSE starts receiving orders from brokers at 8 am, and
does so until the single price auction for the market opening begins, at 9 am. As
soon as it receives orders, the TSE disseminates the pre-opening quotes, not only
the best ask and best bid, but the 10 quotes above and below the best quotes, to
the market.11 Every time it receives an order, the pre-opening quotes are refreshed.
In Japan, the TSE is the exclusive venue hosting the pre-opening price formation.
Two other private venues start their operations at 9 am. However, the Nikkei Stock
Index Futures traded in Singapore start their trading at 8:45 am, Tokyo time, and
may contribute to price discovery.
4.3.2 Server IDs and data
We use two sources of data for analysis. First, order data covering the complete his-
tory of an order (new entry, execution, revision of quantity or price, and cancellation
in the pre-opening and continuous trading periods) is obtained from the TSE. Each
historic record is time stamped at the millisecond level and includes information on
order type, side (buy or sell), number of shares, limit price, unique order number,
and server ID (VS). Second, tick-by-tick quotes information in the pre-opening pe-
11In the pre-opening period, according to the TSE’s deﬁnition of the best ask and the best bid,
the amount of orders displayed at the best ask (bid) includes all limit sell (buy) orders below the
best ask (above the best bid). A subscriber to the full quotes service can see information (price
and quantity) on the entire book. However, the quantities for the best ask and the best bid are the
same as for the standard service.
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riod is obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database with a
millisecond time stamp.12
The unique feature of this study is that we use the novel data provided by the
TSE, which include the unique IDs of the VSs (Appendix C.1 describes a hypothetical
setup of VSs). We ﬁnd that 5,580 such servers were used in our sample period and
we identify 3,021 groups, which we call traders.13 Figure 4.1 depicts the sizes of the
traders based on the number of VSs they employ. Among 3,021 traders, 329 utilize
between 2 and 41 VSs, while the rest (2,692) use only a single VS.14
To determine the relationship between servers, we investigate the entire universe
of stocks traded on the TSE’s First Section (there were 1,702 stocks listed as of April
1, 2013).15
We also investigate the latency of the diﬀerent traders. We measure latency as the
minimum time that elapsed between two consecutive order submissions for the same
stock. Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of the traders, based on their trading
environment of 1,702 stocks. Traders with just a single server place orders on 605.8
stocks, on average, with a median latency of 2 seconds, and a median inventory
of 100%. These characteristics match those of retail and wholesale brokers, which
typically have several buy-side customers. For traders that use multiple servers,
as the number of servers used by a trader increases from 2 to 41, the number of
stocks placed per server gets smaller, except between 30 and 39 servers. In general,
although the number of stocks per server and the median latency are positively
correlated, the median inventory varies considerably across traders, reﬂecting the
variety of investment horizons among them.
In the TSE, some traders, such as HFTs, use multiple VSs exclusively because of a
limitation on the number of messages submitted per second for each server.16 Using
12We use TRTH only for the unbiasedness analysis (see Section 4.5.4).
13In Appendix C.1, we describe how we identify “traders”.
14In contrast to Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan (2015), who use the grade of the
co-location service as a categorizing device for measuring the speed requirements of traders, we
focus instead on how traders conﬁgure their respective trading environments.
15Stocks listed in the TSE are split into diﬀerent sections based on their market capitalization,
the number of shareholders, and other parameters. The First Section of the TSE includes relatively
large companies.
16The TSE provides three levels of service, with a maximum of 60, 40, and 20 messages per second,
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Figure 4.1. Graphical representation of usage of virtual servers by traders
This graph displays the relation between the number of virtual servers and the number of trading desks,
during the period of April-May 2013, on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, for 1,702 stocks. The total number
of virtual servers is 5,580 (all the dots in the ﬁgure), while the number of trading desks using one or
more virtual servers is 3,021 (the colored groups in the ﬁgure). Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as
virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

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Table 4.1. Traders’ characteristics during the continuous session
This table shows characteristics of the trading infrastructure and behavior of traders on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, where 5,580 unique virtual server IDs are used by traders. We trace the usage of individual
virtual servers and, during the continuous trading session, identify 3,021 trading desks (traders) using
single (or multiple) server(s) for their trading. All traders are sorted into one of the six groups based on
the number of servers they utilize. For each group, we describe the number of traders, average number
of servers used per trade, number of stocks traded (in total and per server), median latency (minimum
time elapsed between two consecutive orders for the same stock), median inventory (the median of the
end-of-the-day inventory), median number of messages (in total and per stock), and average volume share
per day (the proportion of the buy volume plus the sell volume per trading desk). These characteristics
are based on the continuous session activity for the period of April-May 2013, for 1,702 stocks on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the
Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Grouped by number of servers used
1 2-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-41
# of traders 2,692 213 81 19 11 5
Average # of servers 1.00 4.44 13.43 22.42 31.47 40.54
# of stocks traded in total 605.81 376.95 343.75 330.51 515.73 475.59
# of stocks traded per server 605.81 84.96 25.59 14.74 16.39 11.73
Median latency 2.024 0.214 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.001
Median inventory 100.00% 93.87% 64.89% 6.61% 49.09% 43.32%
# of messages per stock-day 8 14 48 163 138 492
Average volume share 98.54% 36.33% 27.92% 15.39% 10.99% 10.73%
multiple servers, each trader optimizes the performance of the trading operations for
their subset of stocks. Some traders operate in a speciﬁc group of stocks every day,
in which case they may ﬁx the allocation of stocks to each server. Other traders may
change part of their allocation on a day-by-day basis. As the table shows, by using
multiple servers, the traders are able to reduce their latency signiﬁcantly.
4.4 Empirical design
4.4.1 Universe of stocks and sample period
We select our universe of stocks from the constituents of the TOPIX100 index, which
is comprised of the stocks on the TSE’s ﬁrst section, with high liquidity and relatively
large market capitalization. Of the TOPIX100 stocks, we exclude three that have
larger trading volumes in exchanges other than the TSE, since the focus of our study
respectively. According to a prominent HFT, for a trader that wishes to be truly anonymous, at
least 20 VSs are necessary in order to implement a strategy of trading 1,500 stocks at once. If the
HFT also needs to cancel several orders immediately after submitting new ones, an additional 20
VSs may be required, making a total of 40 VSs necessary to support intensive HFT activity across
multiple stocks.
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is the trading system on this exchange.17
The sample period we select for our analysis lies between April 1 and May 31,
2013. In this period, the volatility of the stock market rose after the new governor of
the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, announced the bank’s new aggressive quantita-
tive easing (QE) policy. A number of unexpected events occurred during this period,
making the role of the pre-opening quotes more crucial than at any other time. In
our analysis, we exclude stock-days for which special quotes are disseminated before
or during the single price auction, because orders submitted during the pre-opening
period do not meet the normal opening price rules in such cases.
Table 4.2 shows the relative frequencies of order types over the whole period and
the relevant subperiods. In the entire pre-opening period, new limit orders make
up about 85%, new market orders about 6% and cancellations and price revisions
roughly 4% and 5%, respectively. In the last 10 minutes, and particularly the last
minute of the pre-opening period, the share of new limit orders orders drops to less
than 50%, and those of cancellations and price revisions of limit orders and new
market orders increase accordingly.
4.4.2 HFT identiﬁcation strategy
A useful guideline deﬁning the features of HFTs has been presented by the SEC in
the U.S. The SEC (2010), p.45 lists ﬁve characteristics of HFTs:
1. “Use of extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for generating,
routing, and executing orders.”
2. “Use of co-location services and individual data feeds oﬀered by exchanges and
others to minimize network and other latencies.”
3. “Very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions.”
4. “Submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission.”
5. “Ending the trading day in as close to a ﬂat position as possible (that is, not
carrying signiﬁcant, unhedged positions overnight).”
Motivated by this list of characteristics, we use both latency and inventory to classify
17The three excluded stocks are Murata, Nintendo, and Nihon Densan.
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traders. These two metrics are closely related to all ﬁve characteristics listed above:
latency matches characteristics 1, 2, and 4 above, while inventory matches character-
istics 3 and 5. Latency is largely determined by the trading infrastructure in which
each trading desk invests (the number of servers, the software programs used, the
quality of servers installed, etc.) and which is not easily replaceable in the short
run, whereas inventory is closely related to trading styles, such as those exhibited by
buy-side investors, market makers, and arbitrageurs.
With these two characteristics we are able to investigate how the diﬀerent traders’
behavior aﬀects the pre-opening period. One issue we have to address in our classiﬁ-
cation is whether the diﬀerent categories are all the same across time and stocks. To
our knowledge, HFTs engage in a variety of strategies that do not necessarily remain
the same from one day to the next or across stocks. In fact, HFTs implement multiple
algorithms depending on whether they believe the liquidity-taking or the liquidity-
making strategy to oﬀer more proﬁtable opportunities. Therefore, we assume that
traders can engage in diﬀerent types of trading strategies on a stock-by-stock and
day-by-day basis.
To address this concern, we compute our metrics on a per-stock, per-day basis,
for all trading desks. Our aim is to investigate how the behavior of a low-latency
trader aﬀects the pre-opening price. As far as we know, all the empirical studies in
the literature except ASIC (2013) assume that HFTs behave in an identical manner
on every day and for every stock.
4.4.2.1 Latency
We empirically measure the minimum elapsed time between two consecutive order
submissions for the same stock, without any restrictions, for a combination of two
order types (i.e,. any two of new orders, cancellations, and revisions during our
sample period), as a measure of latency.18 A realization of low latency has to be
supported by the appropriate trader’s trading infrastructure. Hence, the number of
servers a trader uses is a crucial determinant of latency. As noted earlier, we observe
18Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) measure low-latency activity by identifying “strategic runs,” which
are linked submissions, cancellations, and executions that are likely to be part of a dynamic strategy.
However, unlike us, their data do not enable them to identify individual traders.
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varying numbers of servers, ranging from 1 to 41, in our sample period. We also ﬁnd
that the number of stocks allocated to an individual server is associated with the
latency of the trader and vice versa. Appendix C.2 provides a detailed analysis of
the relationship between latency and messages per server.
4.4.2.2 Inventory
The other major classiﬁcation variable we employ is the inventory of the trader.
Trader inventory is estimated as the (absolute) ratio of the buy volume minus the
sell volume at the end of day k divided by the total trading volume of the trader on
that day. Many empirical studies report that the key characteristic of HFT liquidity
providers is a ﬂat inventory position at the end of each trading day (Menkveld (2013),
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015), and SEC (2014)). To investigate this
issue further, we compute the end-of-day inventory for each trader and for each stock.
4.4.2.3 Classiﬁcation
We classify all traders according to observed latency and inventory during the contin-
uous trading session for each stock-day. We apply the following classiﬁcation scheme:
We divide all traders, based on their latency, into three groups: FAST, MEDIUM,
and SLOW. For each stock-day, the SLOW group includes traders with a latency
greater than 60 seconds. We then look at the remainder of the latency distribution
and split it relative to the median. Therefore, the FAST group includes traders whose
latency is smaller than the median, and the MEDIUM group includes traders whose
latency is greater than the median but smaller than or equal to 60 seconds. Where
we are unable to compute the latency due to the absence of multiple orders for the
same stock on the same day, we treat the trader as a SLOW trader.
We divide all traders into four groups based on their inventory for each stock-day:
LARGE, MEDIUM, SMALL, and NOTRADE. In particular, if a trader’s inventory
is equal to 100%, we consider the trader to be a LARGE inventory trader. If a
trader’s inventory is not computable, we consider the trader to be a NOTRADE
agent. The rest of the distribution is split on a stock-day basis relative to the median
to form the MEDIUM and SMALL inventory groups. It is important to note that
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Table 4.3. Classiﬁcation of traders
This table shows the traders’ classiﬁcation proposed in this paper. Speciﬁcally, we split all traders into
12 groups on a stock-day basis. To split traders, we use information from the continuous trading session
on the same day. First, we divide all traders into 3 groups based on their latency (minimum time elapsed
between two consecutive orders for the same stock): FAST, MEDIUM, and SLOW. Second, we divide each
speed group into 4 subgroups based on the traders’ inventory (the absolute ratio of cumulative buy minus
cumulative sell volume to cumulative buy plus sell volume at the end of the day): LARGE, MEDIUM,
SMALL, and NOTRADE. The characteristics are given per group on a stock-day basis for the period of
April and May 2013 for the 97 stocks from TOPIX100. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual
server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
SP
E
E
D
FAST Traders with latency below the median
(excluding all trader-stock-days for which the minimum latency is higher than 60 seconds)
MEDIUM Traders with latency above the median
(excluding all trader-stock-days for which the minimum latency is higher than 60 seconds)
SLOW Traders with latency greater than 60 seconds
IN
V
E
N
T
O
R
Y
LARGE Trader’s inventory equals 100%
MEDIUM Trader’s inventory above the median and less than 100%
(excluding all trader-stock-days for which the inventory equals 100%)
SMALL Trader’s inventory below the median and less than 100%
(excluding all trader-stock-days for which the inventory equals 100%)
NOTRADE Trader submits orders that are not ﬁlled (zero trades - only quotes)
we diﬀerentiate a trader who ends the day with a ﬂat inventory as a result of buy
and sell activity throughout a day from a NOTRADE agent. It should also be noted
that NOTRADE agents include traders who submit orders, but whose orders are not
ﬁlled. Table 4.3 brieﬂy summarizes our scheme, while Table 4.4 Panel A shows the
summary statistics for latency and inventory for each group under our classiﬁcation
procedure.
The average latency in the FAST group varies across diﬀerent inventory subgroups
from 0.02 seconds to 0.04 seconds. The MEDIUM speed group exhibits a much higher
latency, ranging from 9.41 to 12.73 seconds. The SLOW group has an average latency
above 2,000 seconds. By construction, the LARGE inventory subgroup always has
a 100% inventory, meaning that, during the day, traders either purely buy or purely
sell the stock. Traders from the MEDIUM inventory subgroup tend to end their
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trading day with an inventory around 66%, while traders from the SMALL inventory
subgroup can end up with inventory as low as 16%.
Based on the speed and inventory classiﬁcations, one can consider FAST / SMALL
traders as HFT market makers, while FAST / MEDIUM traders could be viewed as
HFT position takers. These two groups tend to submit more new orders per stock-
day, on average, than any other group, with the greatest amount of new order traﬃc
coming from HFT market makers (182.42 new orders per stock-day). The highest
cancellation ratios are, however, a distinctive feature of the NOTRADE inventory
subgroups (more than 80% for FAST / NOTRADE and MEDIUM / NOTRADE
traders, and more than 40% for SLOW / NOTRADE traders). As one would intu-
itively expect, these traders are active during both the pre-opening and continuous
trading periods, although they cancel their orders before the opening call auction on
that particular day. (The latter can also be observed from the trade-to-order ratio,
which equals 0%). In order to avoid undesirable execution, these traders have to
cancel their orders more often than any other group of traders. The trade-to-order
ratio is the highest in the SLOW group of traders (above 75%) and the lowest in the
FAST group of traders (around 40%), excluding those in the NOTRADE group.
4.4.2.4 FAST trader participation pattern
Table 4.4 allows us to answer the ﬁrst question we aim to investigate in this pa-
per: Do low-latency traders participate in the pre-opening period? If so, do they do
so with the same intensity as in the continuous session? Table 4.4 Panel A shows
that low-latency traders do indeed participate in the pre-opening period but that the
participation rates of the three FAST trader classes are smaller in the pre-opening
period than in the continuous sessions. For example, of FAST / SMALL traders
that participate in the continuous session, on average only 27.4% also participate in
the pre-opening period. This means that about three quarters of the low-latency
traders do not participate in the pre-opening period, but do participate in the con-
tinuous trading regime. An examination of the stock-level presence ratio at the 95th
percentile shows that 56.4% of FAST / SMALL traders are present, which is more
than double the average. This indicates that these traders select stocks in which to
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participate for the day.
Next, we split traders into three categories: traders who do not participate in the
pre-opening period (Non-Active), traders who participate during the pre-opening
period, but do not trade in the opening call auction (Active-w/o-Trade), and traders
who participate during the pre-opening period and also trade in the call auction
(Active-w-Trade). Panels B, C, and D of Table 4.4 show the traders’ characteristics
for these three categories. We focus our attention on FAST / SMALL traders. First,
the average number of Non-Active traders is higher than the average number of
traders who are active during the pre-opening period. Second, the average latency,
inventory, number of new orders submitted during the continuous session, and trading
activity are comparable between FAST / SMALL Non-Active and FAST / SMALL
Active-w-Trade traders. However, these two groups are diﬀerent in terms of the
trade-to-order and cancellation ratios. In particular, we observe a higher trade-
to-order ratio and a lower cancellation ratio for FAST / SMALL (Active-w-Trade)
traders than for FAST / SMALL (Non-Active) traders. These ﬁndings suggest that
there is a diﬀerence between the trading strategies employed by low-latency traders
who are active and by those who are not active during the pre-opening period.
Besides that, we also compare traders who always participate in the pre-opening
period, traders who sometimes participate in the pre-opening period, and traders
who never participate in the pre-opening period. The results are generally in line
with the previous analysis. Compared to those traders within the same category
who do not participate in the pre-opening period, “always”-participating FAST /
SMALL traders have relatively low cancellation-to-order ratios and higher trade-to-
order ratios. “Never”-participating and “sometimes”-participating FAST / SMALL
traders are lower-latency traders with higher cancellation-to-order and lower trade-
to-order ratios (see Appendix C.3 and in particular Table C.3.1).
We emphasize that we use information from the continuous session on the same
stock-day to describe trader behavior in the pre-opening period. This is motivated
by changes in the traders’ strategies from one day to another (see Table 4.5 for the
transition frequency matrix of trader strategies). In particular, on average, only
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in 28.12% of cases do traders remain in the same group from one active stock-day
to the next. The most persistent group is the SLOW / LARGE group (52.44%).
Among FAST traders, the highest persistence is observed for the FAST / SMALL
group (41.87%). Within the same speed group, ignoring the diﬀerences in inventory
we observe more persistence: on average, traders tend to remain in the same speed
group in 63.44% of the cases. Traders tend to remain in the same inventory group
in 46.96% of the cases, on average, ignoring the speed dimension, with the largest
contribution to this persistence coming from the LARGE inventory group.
For comparison purposes, we also present the results we obtain when we apply a
classiﬁcation scheme following Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan (2015)
(a modiﬁcation of the Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) approach), which
splits traders into two groups, namely HFTs and non-HFTs, based on three criteria:
end-of-day inventory, inventory at the end of each minute, and volume traded. As
shown in Appendix C.4, this classiﬁcation does not identify low-latency traders and
their activity during the pre-opening period.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
4.5.1 Pre-opening and opening batch auction order ﬂow
As explained in Section 4.3.1, the pre-market-opening period of the TSE starts at
8 am. All member ﬁrms begin to send orders from their customers’ and their own
accounts to the exchange. Figure 4.2 Panel A shows all order submissions entered
every second as a percentage of the total number of orders during the pre-opening
period.
The results from the three diﬀerent trading-speed groups are reported in Panel
A. The green line represents orders from FAST traders, who play a dominant role
during the whole pre-opening phase. FAST traders submit 50.5% of the total number
of orders in the pre-opening period, with MEDIUM and SLOW traders submitting
42.5% and 7.0%, respectively. In the ﬁrst 10 minutes of the pre-opening period, 73.7%
of the total number of orders of the entire pre-opening period are submitted. FAST
traders submit 36.0% out of their 50.5% of orders in the ﬁrst 10 minutes, MEDIUM
75A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery 133
Ta
bl
e
4.
5.
Tr
an
si
ti
on
m
at
ri
x
fo
r
tr
ad
er
cl
as
si
ﬁc
at
io
n
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
tr
an
si
ti
on
m
at
ri
x
fo
r
th
e
tr
ad
er
cl
as
si
ﬁc
at
io
n
ba
se
d
on
97
st
oc
ks
fr
om
T
O
P
IX
10
0
fo
r
A
pr
il-
M
ay
20
13
.
W
e
sp
lit
al
lt
ra
de
rs
in
to
12
gr
ou
ps
on
a
st
oc
k-
da
y
ba
si
s,
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
T
ab
le
4.
3,
us
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
sp
ee
d
an
d
in
ve
nt
or
y
fr
om
th
e
sa
m
e
da
y’
s
co
nt
in
uo
us
se
ss
io
n.
A
ft
er
w
ar
ds
,
w
e
re
po
rt
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
tr
ad
er
s
th
at
ei
th
er
re
m
ai
n
in
th
e
sa
m
e
gr
ou
p
or
m
ov
e
fr
om
on
e
gr
ou
p
to
an
ot
he
r
be
tw
ee
n
da
te
t
−
1
(t
he
la
st
da
y
w
he
n
th
e
tr
ad
er
w
as
ac
ti
ve
in
a
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
st
oc
k)
an
d
da
te
t
fo
r
a
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
st
oc
k.
O
rd
er
ﬂo
w
da
ta
,
w
it
h
or
de
r
ID
s
as
w
el
l
as
vi
rt
ua
l
se
rv
er
ID
s,
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
by
th
e
T
ok
yo
St
oc
k
E
xc
ha
ng
e.
D
at
e
t
FA
ST
M
ED
IU
M
SL
O
W
D
at
e
t−
1
LA
RG
E
M
ED
IU
M
SM
A
LL
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
LA
RG
E
M
ED
IU
M
SM
A
LL
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
LA
RG
E
M
ED
IU
M
SM
A
LL
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
FA
ST
LA
RG
E
24
.8
3%
15
.0
4%
10
.1
5%
8.
20
%
12
.9
1%
5.
34
%
3.
60
%
4.
87
%
10
.6
3%
1.
51
%
1.
20
%
1.
73
%
M
ED
IU
M
12
.8
2%
31
.4
7%
23
.8
4%
1.
73
%
6.
75
%
9.
01
%
6.
76
%
1.
25
%
3.
85
%
1.
14
%
0.
89
%
0.
49
%
SM
A
LL
8.
29
%
23
.2
8%
41
.8
7%
1.
56
%
4.
11
%
6.
46
%
8.
69
%
0.
93
%
2.
60
%
0.
89
%
0.
92
%
0.
39
%
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
15
.1
4%
3.
66
%
3.
51
%
35
.8
4%
7.
28
%
1.
45
%
1.
24
%
16
.6
3%
9.
74
%
0.
88
%
0.
84
%
3.
79
%
M
ED
IU
M
LA
RG
E
10
.2
4%
6.
45
%
4.
08
%
3.
18
%
24
.3
3%
9.
80
%
6.
38
%
8.
25
%
18
.7
3%
2.
99
%
2.
32
%
3.
25
%
M
ED
IU
M
4.
96
%
10
.2
6%
7.
52
%
0.
73
%
11
.3
8%
24
.3
3%
20
.4
6%
2.
25
%
7.
96
%
5.
25
%
3.
82
%
1.
08
%
SM
A
LL
3.
68
%
8.
02
%
10
.5
2%
0.
66
%
8.
02
%
21
.7
8%
29
.2
9%
1.
88
%
6.
53
%
4.
26
%
4.
19
%
1.
18
%
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
7.
88
%
2.
34
%
1.
84
%
14
.9
3%
16
.5
5%
3.
80
%
2.
97
%
23
.4
2%
16
.5
2%
1.
41
%
1.
39
%
6.
97
%
SL
O
W
LA
RG
E
4.
11
%
1.
80
%
1.
28
%
1.
82
%
9.
16
%
3.
41
%
2.
58
%
3.
85
%
52
.4
4%
7.
62
%
5.
84
%
6.
08
%
M
ED
IU
M
2.
73
%
2.
57
%
2.
10
%
0.
74
%
6.
99
%
10
.1
6%
7.
66
%
1.
50
%
36
.2
7%
15
.0
6%
10
.7
5%
3.
46
%
SM
A
LL
2.
77
%
2.
46
%
2.
74
%
0.
94
%
6.
78
%
9.
11
%
9.
49
%
1.
86
%
34
.5
5%
13
.3
2%
11
.8
7%
4.
10
%
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
3.
85
%
1.
29
%
1.
03
%
4.
79
%
9.
19
%
2.
61
%
2.
56
%
9.
56
%
34
.2
5%
4.
16
%
4.
00
%
22
.7
0%
75B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
134 Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery
Figure 4.2. Flow of total order submission in the pre-opening period
This ﬁgure depicts the second-by-second order ﬂow for 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 during the sample
period of April-May 2013. The Tokyo Stock Exchange starts receiving orders at 8 am and starts the call
auction at 9 am. The average percentage of the total number of orders is the total number of orders in each
second divided by the total number of orders submitted during the whole pre-opening period (8:00:00.000
- 8:59:59.999). The Y-axis represents the percentage of the total number of new orders in the pre-opening
period, and the X-axis represents the time in seconds between 8 am and 9 am. Panel A depicts the average
percentage of the total number of orders by speed group, as deﬁned in Table 4.3 using information about
speed and inventory from the same day’s continuous session, per second. Panels B, C, and D report, for
each speed group, the average percentage of the total number of orders according to level of inventory, as
deﬁned in Table 4.3. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the
Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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and SLOW traders submit 32.8% and 5.0%, respectively. The order submission
intensity slows down after the ﬁrst 10 minutes, and is reactivated 10 minutes before
the oﬃcial opening time. The high level of order submissions in the ﬁrst 10 minutes
partly reﬂects the accumulation of orders overnight. Early investors also have a desire
to lead price formation for the opening call auction. Figure 2 Panels B, C, and D
present the pattern of order submission activity for the FAST, MEDIUM, and SLOW
traders during the pre-opening period, classiﬁed according to level of inventory for
each group. They clearly show a peak at the very beginning of the period for traders
with SMALL and MEDIUM levels of inventory, and another very close to the opening
time for FAST / SMALL traders, vastly exceeding the number of orders submitted
by slower traders. FAST traders submit 7.5% of the total number of orders in the
last 10 minutes of the pre-opening period, and MEDIUM and SLOW traders submit
4.4% and 1.0%, respectively. Traders with a LARGE inventory and those in the
NOTRADE group submit most of their orders at 8 am. One of the reasons traders
submit more orders at 8 am is to ensure a higher probability of execution of their
orders due to the time-priority-based allocation most brokers employ, as explained
in Section 4.3.1.
Figure 4.3 Panel A shows the new order submissions and cancellations as a per-
centage of all orders submitted by FAST, MEDIUM, and SLOW traders, in the last
10 minutes of the pre-opening period. While the magnitude of the order submis-
sion diﬀers (as the scale of the y-axis diﬀers between FAST, MEDIUM, and SLOW
traders), the pattern is quite similar for all three groups. Traders accentuate their
pattern of order submission during the last three minutes of the pre-opening period.
A rise in order cancellations (indicated by the black line) happens suddenly, one sec-
ond before 9 am, for all trader groups. For instance, the percentage of cancellation
messages increases from less than 0.1% to 0.9% (of the total number of orders in
the pre-opening period) per second for FAST traders, and from less than 0.01% to
around 0.25% for MEDIUM-speed traders.
Figure 4.3 Panel B depicts order submissions and cancellations for the diﬀerent
inventory subgroups within the FAST group. It is interesting to note that cancella-
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Figure 4.3. Flow of new orders and cancellations in the last 10 minutes
of the pre-opening period
This ﬁgure depicts the second-by-second new orders and cancellations for 97 stocks from the TOPIX100
during the sample period of April-May 2013. The Tokyo Stock Exchange starts receiving orders at 8
am and starts the call auction at 9 am. New orders and cancellations are measured as the percentage
of the total number of orders submitted in the last 10 minutes of the pre-opening period (8:50:00.000 -
8:59:59.999). The Y-axis represents the percentage of the total number of orders in the last 10 minutes of
the pre-opening period, and the X-axis represents the time in seconds between 8:50 am and 9 am. Panel
A depicts the average percentage of the total number of orders by speed group, as deﬁned in Table 4.3
using information about speed and inventory from the same day’s continuous session, during the sample
period, per second. Panel B reports, for FAST traders, new orders and cancellations, according to the
level of inventory. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo
Stock Exchange.
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tions from all trader groups reach their peak at the very last second. We investigate
this in detail at the millisecond level and present the results in Figure 4.4 Panel A.
We conﬁrm that the cancellations indeed occur less than one second before 9 am.
As Figure 4.4 Panel B shows, the cancellation phenomenon starts at 500 milliseconds
before 9 am and peaks at 130 milliseconds before 9 am. The peak is particularly
pronounced for FAST traders and is not speciﬁcally related to inventory. The ﬁnal
action of limit price adjustment takes place just milliseconds before the opening time,
which would not be possible in the absence of a low-latency trading environment.
4.5.2 Best quotes during the pre-opening period
4.5.2.1 Mid-quote Calculation
The pre-opening quotes consist of bid and ask prices and their associated quantities.
In the case of the TSE, the best bid and ask prices are determined diﬀerently during
the pre-opening period than during the continuous session. During the continuous
session, the best bid is the highest available bid price, and the best ask is the lowest
available ask price. This means that the bid and ask schedules do not intersect as
the submission of a buy order with a limit price greater than the best available ask
price will cause the immediate execution of that order and it will not join the queue
in the limit order book.
On the contrary, during the pre-opening period no execution is allowed before the
opening auction, when all orders are executed at a single price. Therefore, the best
bid and ask prices reported during the pre-opening period are the respective prices at
which the bid (demand) and ask (supply) schedules intersect. For a detailed example,
see Appendix C.5. The best ask is identiﬁed as the smallest ask price at which the
cumulative depth of the ask schedule is greater than the cumulative depth of the bid
schedule. The best bid is identiﬁed as the largest bid price at which the cumulative
depth of the bid schedule is greater than the cumulative depth of the ask schedule.
The best bid and ask prices during the pre-opening period indicate the range within
which the opening price (auction price) will be determined. Therefore, we use the
average of these two prices (the mid-quote) as a proxy for the single auction price.19
19We use two diﬀerent sources for the best bid and ask prices in the pre-opening period. First,
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Figure 4.4. Order ﬂow during the last second of the pre-opening period
This ﬁgure shows four types of order submission activity: new orders (blue line), cancellations (red line),
quantity revisions (green line), and price revisions (black line), in the last second of the pre-opening period
(8:59:59.000 - 8:59:59.999) at the millisecond level, for all 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 during the sample
period of April and May 2013. Panel A reports traders’ order submission activity. Panel B focuses on
cancellations, distinguishing between the diﬀerent groups of traders. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as
well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Panel A: Order ﬂow for all traders
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4.5.2.2 Deviation of mid-quotes from the opening price
One of the questions we aim to answer with this paper concerns price discovery.
We showed in the previous section that the number of order submissions rises right
before the opening time. To explore how the order submissions by diﬀerent traders
contribute to price discovery, we look into the movements in the pre-opening-period
quotes between 8 and 9 am to determine how quickly pre-opening quotes approach
the opening price for the day. For this purpose, we compute the absolute value of the
relative deviation of the mid-quotes from the opening price for each stock, on each
day:
Deviation j,k,t =




Mj,k,t
O j,k
− 1

× 100 (4.1)
where Mj,k,t is the mid-quote at time t for stock j on day k, and O j,k is the opening
price for stock j on day k. First, we compute equation (4.1) second-by-second per
stock per day. Then, we calculate the second-by-second medians.
Figure 4.5 shows the median of the second-by-second movements of the pre-
opening quotes across the 97 stocks. During the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes, the deviation
declines rapidly from above 2% to between 0.6% and 0.7%. This means that signiﬁ-
cant amounts of order submissions contribute to price discovery during this period.
However, after 8:05 am, the deviation becomes almost ﬂat, with some spikes, and it
then resumes its adjustment toward the opening price after 8:59 am. The deviation
diminishes to 0.22% just before the opening time, which is still a little bit wider than
a half-spread, on average, for the sample stocks during the trading session. This
shows that lower latency does not attenuate the reduction of the deviation between
the pre-opening quotes and the opening price. Hence, the orders submitted after 8:50
we use the TRTH data with a millisecond time stamp. However, there is a time stamp mismatch
between the order ﬂow data provided by the TSE and the TRTH best quotes time stamp. Therefore,
for the analysis that requires exact matching between these two databases, we construct the best bid-
oﬀer ourselves on a tick-by-tick basis. This is a non-trivial task due to the multiple rules employed
by the TSE. We verify the sequence of our best bid and ask estimates using the TRTH database,
and ensure that our estimates are consistent with the TRTH best bid and ask prices time stamped
without a time delay.
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Figure 4.5. Deviation from the opening price
This ﬁgure shows the deviation of the pre-opening mid-quote from the opening price, computed for each
second of the entire pre-opening period (8:00:00.000 - 8:59:59.999) for 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 during
the sample period of April-May 2013. The deviation is deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence between the
mid-quote, Mt,k , at time t on day k, and the opening price, Ok , on day k, as deﬁned in equation (4.1).
The deviation is computed per second per day per stock and then medians are calculated for each second.
Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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am play an important role in price discovery.
4.5.3 Price discovery contribution
During the pre-opening period, the accumulation of orders in general contributes to
the reduction in the absolute deviation of the pre-opening quotes from the oﬃcial
opening price. However, the speed of convergence varies across stocks and throughout
the day. We investigate which trader groups contribute to the price discovery process,
and compare the extent of their contribution using order-by-order data and associated
mid-quote changes. In this manner, we take advantage of our detailed data as we can
pinpoint an order that moves the mid-quote and, thus, we can identify which trader
group submits the order and the type of that order.
4.5.3.1 Aggressive orders
Among the orders submitted during the pre-opening period, we can identify those
orders with the potential to impact the prevailing quotes. We call them “aggressive
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orders” (as in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), Ranaldo (2004), Duong, Kalev, and
Krishnamurti (2009), and Yamamoto (2011)). The TSE uses unique rules for deter-
mining the best pre-opening bid and ask quotes. These rules are diﬀerent from those
applied in the continuous session and are brieﬂy explained in Section 4.3.1. There are
four cases of orders that we categorize as aggressive: ﬁrst, all market orders; second,
a limit buy order with a limit price greater than or equal to the prevailing best bid;
third, a limit sell order with a limit price less than or equal to the prevailing ask;
fourth, any orders submitted at a time when the best bid equals the best ask.20
When an order that satisﬁes one of the abovementioned conditions is newly en-
tered, modiﬁed, or cancelled, it has the potential to impact the prevailing quotes.
Table 4.6 Panel A shows the total number of orders from the 12 trader groups de-
ﬁned earlier. The largest proportion of aggressive orders comes from FAST / SMALL
traders (HFT market makers). On average, they submit 248.4 aggressive orders (76.1
market orders and 172.3 limit orders). The next largest group of aggressive traders
are the MEDIUM / SMALL traders who submit 174.7 aggressive orders (53.0 mar-
ket orders and 121.8 limit orders). Note that our classiﬁcation does not take into
account trading share such as top quartile of volume, and only one quarter of FAST
/ SMALL traders participate in the pre-opening period, but their submission of ag-
gressive orders is signiﬁcantly greater than that of the other groups. The ratios of
aggressive limit orders relative to the total number of limit orders from these two
most aggressive groups of traders are 14.1% and 14.6%, respectively. Their aggres-
siveness ratios for limit orders are low in comparison to those of the other ten groups.
The highest aggressiveness ratio is exhibited by FAST / NOTRADE traders, being
36.4%. This is an interesting contrast because FAST / NOTRADE traders place
orders most aggressively, but their orders are not executed. However, the FAST /
SMALL and MEDIUM / SMALL traders submit the largest portion of aggressive
20Such a situation occurs when the cumulative amount of buy orders equals that of sell orders.
Thus, the next order must cause an imbalance between buy and sell orders and make the best
ask higher than the best bid price. We refer to such orders as “locked orders.” Cao, Ghysels, and
Hatheway (2000) analyze locked/crossed market quotes during the NASDAQ pre-opening period.
In the TSE’s pre-opening period, market best quotes may be locked, which means that the best ask
equals the best bid, but crossed quotes (which means that the best bid is greater than the best ask)
never happen, by rule.
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limit orders.
Table 4.6 Panel B shows similar statistics after the exclusion of the ﬁrst 10 min-
utes of the pre-opening period, because, in the ﬁrst 10 minutes, most of the orders
entered are those waiting for the exchange’s opening at 8 am. After 10 minutes past
8 am, most of the orders are submitted by traders who actively monitor the pre-
opening quotes. In the remaining 50 minutes, the largest proportion of aggressive
orders still comes from FAST / SMALL traders (HFT market makers), who submit
136.7 aggressive orders (46.2 market orders and 90.5 limit orders). The next-most-
aggressive group of traders are the MEDIUM / SMALL traders, who submit 74.7
aggressive orders (30.1 market orders and 44.6 limit orders). The ratios of aggressive
limit orders to total limit orders for the two most aggressive groups of traders rise
to 31.0% and 26.3%, respectively. The highest aggressiveness ratio in this period
is that of the FAST / LARGE traders, at 44.8%. This ratio indicates the trader’s
willingness to execute the order at the opening price. On the other hand, the FAST
/ SMALL group places the most aggressive number of limit orders in terms of the
total number of aggressive orders, which indicates their interest in aﬀecting the price.
None of the NOTRADE traders in any of the three speed groups change their order
aggressiveness during these 50 minutes. Put diﬀerently, they do not adjust their
orders according to the changes in the prevailing quotes. This may be one of the
reasons why their orders are not executed.
4.5.3.2 Price discovery contribution by order
We measure the amount of new information incorporated into stock prices during the
pre-opening period using the weighted price contribution, WPC (e.g., Barclay and
Warner (1993), Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000), and Barclay and Hendershott
(2003)). First, we deﬁne the price discovery contribution as the amount by which
an incoming order moves the prevailing mid-quote closer to the opening price. Thus,
we compute the price discovery contribution (PDC) on an order-by-order basis as
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follows:
PDCi, j,k = Deviationi, j,k − Deviationi−1, j,k (4.2)
Deviationi, j,k is the absolute deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price imme-
diately after order i is entered for stock j on day k (see equation (4.1)). Deviationi−1, j,k
is the absolute deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price immediately be-
fore order i is entered for stock j on day k. The diﬀerence between Deviationi, j,k
and Deviationi−1, j,k is the contribution to price discovery made by order i. When
PDCi, j,k is negative, the deviation is reduced and the mid-quote moves closer to the
opening price. We deﬁne the WPC for stock j on day k and order i as
WPCi, j,k =
PDCj,k∑J
j=1 |PDCj,k |
× PDCi, j,k
PDCj,k
(4.3)
where PDCi, j,k is the price discovery contribution of order i for stock j on day k;
PDCj,k is the accumulated price discovery contribution during the pre-opening period
for stock j on day k. The ﬁrst term of WPC is the weighting factor for the stock on
day k. The second term is the percentage contribution of price discovery made by
order i to the total price discovery during the pre-opening period for stock j on day
k. Since the size of PDC varies for each stock and each day, the relative contribution
adjusts for the scale diﬀerence across stocks as well as across trading days, and the
ﬁrst factor adjusts for the relative importance of price discovery across stocks on day
k. When PDCj,k equals zero, we do not compute WPC for stock j on day k. We
winsorize PDCi, j,k at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels. Our data allow us to measure PDC
by individual order, so that we can aggregate WPC according to the trader group
that submitted the order and show the proportion of the price contribution made by a
particular trading group and order type (similarly to Barclay and Warner (1993) and
Chakravarty (2001)). Table 4.7 shows the WPC for each trading group. It turns out
that MEDIUM / SMALL traders make the largest contribution (WPC =-20.57%).
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This means that, on average, 20.57% of the daily price discovery is contributed by
this group. They are followed by MEDIUM / MEDIUM (-18.79%) and FAST /
SMALL (-16.37%) traders (see Table 4.7 Panel A). Furthermore, if we distinguish
between new limit orders and new market orders, the contribution of the latter is
much smaller than that of the former.
During the ﬁrst 10 minutes, the limit order book accumulates many orders that
were waiting overnight for the beginning of the pre-opening period of the TSE at 8
am. The arrival times of these orders are not directly related to the traders’ actual
submission decisions. Therefore, we focus on the remaining 50 minutes, during which
traders monitor pre-opening quotes and make order submission decisions accordingly.
In this period (see Table 4.7 Panel B), the main contribution comes from the FAST /
MEDIUM (-5.51%) traders, followed by the FAST / SMALL (-3.32%) and MEDIUM
/ MEDIUM (-2.96%) traders. This reﬂects the more intensive activity of FAST
traders after the ﬁrst 10 minutes, especially in the last 10 minutes of the pre-opening
period.
Which types of orders contribute most to price discovery? According to Table 4.7
Panel A, the types of orders contributing most to WPC are new limit orders. Cancel-
lations of market orders and price revisions of limit orders also contribute. Quantity
revisions and cancellations of limit orders increase the mid-quote deviation from the
opening price. Price discovery in the pre-opening period is achieved mainly through
new limit orders and price revisions of limit orders, and the results indicate that the
eﬀects of cancellations are limited. Our overall results indicate that quote setting
during the pre-opening period is conducted by the FAST / SMALL & MEDIUM
and MEDIUM / SMALL & MEDIUM groups. Therefore, traders with low latency
and small inventories are indeed the ones that contribute the most to price discovery
during the pre-opening period, even though there is no trading in this period and
only a fraction of low-latency traders participate in the pre-opening period.
4.5.3.3 Cross-sectional analysis
In this section, we aim to answer the question of whether stocks with a greater
presence of one trader group relative to another trader group tend to exhibit diﬀerent
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patterns of mid-quote convergence to the opening price. We conduct this analysis
in two steps. First, we investigate whether we observe signiﬁcant variation in the
relative activity of diﬀerent types of traders across stocks in terms of the proportion
of aggressive order submissions. In particular, for each stock we estimate the relative
activity of each trader group as the number of aggressive messages (messages that
could potentially have an impact on the mid-quote) from each trader group relative
to the number of aggressive messages from all trader groups during the whole pre-
opening period, and during the pre-opening period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes,
aggregated across stocks and days (see Table 4.8). FAST / SMALL and FAST
/ MEDIUM traders, as well as MEDIUM / SMALL and MEDIUM / MEDIUM
traders, exhibit wide variation in their activity from stock to stock, for both the whole
pre-opening period and for the pre-opening period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes.
This pattern is especially strong for FAST / SMALL traders (high-frequency market
makers): their relative activity varies from 4.54% to 60.05% (5.80% to 58.65%) for the
whole pre-opening period (for the pre-opening period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes).
Second, based on the distribution of the relative activity of the traders, we sepa-
rate the 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 into two groups: stocks for which the activity
of any of the four groups of traders (FAST / SMALL, FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM
/ SMALL, or MEDIUM / MEDIUM) during the whole pre-opening period crosses a
threshold of 30% (18 stocks), and all other stocks (79 stocks). Figure 4.6 presents the
median absolute deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price per second of the
pre-opening period, and separately for the ﬁrst and last 10 minutes of the pre-opening
period. Note that, for stocks that pass the 30% threshold, the median absolute devi-
ation is always smaller than it is for stocks that do not pass the threshold. However,
immediately before the opening auction, the absolute deviation is approximately the
same for both stock groups. The gap between the two series is largest at the be-
ginning of the pre-opening period (with a maximum of 1.08%). During the last 10
minutes of the pre-opening period, the gap size varies around 0.10%, except in the
last couple of seconds, during which the gap closes rapidly due to the convergence
of the absolute deviation to the opening price of the second group of stocks. All in
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Table 4.8. Aggressive orders across stocks
This table provides summary statistics for the aggressive orders across stocks. We divide all traders into
12 groups on a stock-day basis, as described in Table 4.3, using information about speed and inventory
from the same day’s continuous session. For each stock, we compute the proportion of aggressive orders
(orders with the potential to impact the prevailing quotes) submitted by each group of traders relative to
the total number of aggressive orders for a particular stock during the entire pre-opening period (Panel
A) and for the pre-opening period, excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes (Panel B) for April and May 2013 across
97 stocks from TOPIX100. Aggressive orders are deﬁned as follows: (1) all market orders; (2) limit buy
orders with a limit price greater than or equal to the prevailing best bid; (3) limit sell orders with a limit
price less than or equal to the prevailing ask; (4) any orders submitted when best bid equals best ask.
Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Speed Inventory MIN P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 MAX
Panel A: 8:00-8:59
FAST
LARGE 1.03% 1.45% 2.26% 3.40% 4.61% 8.15% 10.29%
MEDIUM 8.90% 11.91% 14.38% 16.64% 19.40% 22.10% 34.52%
SMALL 4.54% 6.53% 12.24% 16.67% 27.99% 44.10% 60.05%
NOTRADE 0.01% 0.03% 0.12% 0.27% 0.51% 1.48% 3.59%
MEDIUM
LARGE 1.08% 1.77% 2.49% 3.67% 4.55% 6.59% 7.70%
MEDIUM 4.62% 10.02% 15.92% 18.84% 21.12% 25.31% 27.51%
SMALL 8.18% 11.40% 17.30% 20.37% 24.55% 28.10% 31.21%
NOTRADE 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.17% 0.30% 0.73% 2.11%
SLOW
LARGE 0.63% 1.36% 2.75% 4.87% 8.02% 15.00% 20.47%
MEDIUM 0.28% 0.83% 2.03% 4.66% 7.07% 9.79% 11.40%
SMALL 0.26% 0.48% 1.35% 3.17% 4.91% 6.62% 8.20%
NOTRADE 0.05% 0.18% 0.48% 1.13% 1.81% 4.56% 7.87%
Panel B: 8:10-8:59
FAST
LARGE 1.57% 2.54% 4.03% 6.40% 8.49% 12.32% 14.85%
MEDIUM 12.27% 14.95% 19.20% 20.83% 23.62% 27.25% 35.76%
SMALL 5.80% 9.94% 14.89% 19.09% 28.74% 43.73% 58.65%
NOTRADE 0.02% 0.04% 0.23% 0.56% 0.99% 2.30% 3.29%
MEDIUM
LARGE 1.33% 2.15% 3.17% 4.42% 5.75% 7.53% 8.49%
MEDIUM 4.53% 7.82% 11.80% 14.02% 16.67% 19.40% 22.45%
SMALL 5.82% 9.38% 12.75% 16.03% 20.08% 24.64% 27.62%
NOTRADE 0.01% 0.04% 0.15% 0.29% 0.53% 1.26% 2.67%
SLOW
LARGE 0.69% 1.60% 3.26% 5.39% 8.07% 11.63% 17.27%
MEDIUM 0.34% 0.89% 1.80% 3.53% 4.55% 6.63% 8.30%
SMALL 0.30% 0.47% 1.26% 2.64% 3.61% 4.63% 6.10%
NOTRADE 0.07% 0.17% 0.48% 1.07% 1.62% 3.30% 5.76%
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all, to sum up, the presence of the FAST / SMALL, FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM /
SMALL, and MEDIUM / MEDIUM traders improves the price discovery process.
Next, we examine whether the same stocks attract the activity of each of the four
trader groups. Table 4.9 shows the correlation coeﬃcients between the relative ac-
tivity levels of diﬀerent trader groups during the whole pre-opening period (Panel A)
and the pre-opening period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes (Panel B). In particular,
Panel A of Table 4.9 shows that the relative activity levels of the FAST / SMALL and
FAST / MEDIUM groups are positively correlated (correlation coeﬃcient 22%), as
are the relative activity levels of the MEDIUM / SMALL and MEDIUM / MEDIUM
groups (correlation coeﬃcient 45%). However, across the speed groups, only FAST
/ SMALL and MEDIUM / SMALL are positively correlated, with the other trader
groups exhibiting strong negative correlation, reaching -66% between the FAST /
SMALL and MEDIUM / MEDIUM trader groups. Results for the pre-opening pe-
riod excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes are qualitatively similar, with one exception of
FAST / SMALL and FAST / MEDIUM activity being negatively correlated. All
in all, diﬀerent stocks attract the activity of the FAST / SMALL & MEDIUM and
MEDIUM / SMALL & MEDIUM traders, who are the main contributors to the price
discovery process, as based on the WPC analysis (see Section 4.5.3.2).
In order to examine which stocks attract more of the activity of the four above-
mentioned groups of traders, we run a cross-sectional regression using the relative
activity of the trader groups as the dependent variable and stock characteristics as
explanatory variables:
Activityj,l = α + β1Deviation j + β2MCAPj + β3PQSPRj+
β4Range j + β5Industryj + β6ADRj +  j
(4.4)
where Activityj,l is the ratio of the aggressive orders of trader group l for stock j to
the total number of aggressive orders for stock j; Deviation j is the median of the
absolute deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price during the ﬁrst second
of the pre-opening period (or of the ﬁrst second of the pre-opening period excluding
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of the deviation from the opening price between
stocks for which low-latency traders have diﬀerent levels of participation
This ﬁgure shows, for two groups of stocks, the percentage deviation of the pre-opening mid-quote from the
opening price, computed at each second of the entire pre-opening period (8:00:00.000 - 8:59:59.999) for 97
stocks from the TOPIX100, during the sample period of April-May 2013. We split stocks into two groups:
the ﬁrst group includes stocks for which aggressive activity of FAST&MEDIUM / SMALL&MEDIUM
traders passes a threshold of 30% (18 stocks). The second group includes all other stocks (79 stocks).
Panel A displays the deviation for the entire pre-opening period for the two groups of stocks, while Panel
B displays deviations for the ﬁrst 10 minutes and last 10 minutes of the pre-opening period. Order ﬂow
data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, while quotes
and trade data are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Tick History Database.
Panel A: Deviation for the entire pre-opening period for the two groups of traders
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the ﬁrst 10 minutes) (see equation (4.1)); MCAPj is the log of the average daily
market capitalization of stock j; PQSPRj is the average of the daily proportional
quoted spread of stock j; Range j is the square root of the daily average high minus
low range for stock j; Industryj is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the stock is in
the Machinery and Business Equipment industry and 0 otherwise; ADRj is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the stock has an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and
0 otherwise. MCAP, PQSPR, and Range are measured over March 2013, which is
before the start of the period for which data are provided by the TSE. Data on stock
characteristics come from Datastream. All the variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% levels. Table 4.10 presents the estimates of the cross-sectional regression for
the whole pre-opening period (Panel A) and for the pre-opening period, excluding
the ﬁrst 10 minutes (Panel B). We consider only those eﬀects that are robust to the
exclusion of the ﬁrst 10 minutes of the pre-opening period.
Speciﬁcally, Table 4.10 shows that large stocks are more attractive for FAST /
SMALL & MEDIUM and MEDIUM & SMALL traders, while the relative activity
of SLOW traders is more pronounced in small stocks. Liquid stocks attract more
activity from MEDIUM / SMALL & MEDIUM traders. FAST and MEDIUM-speed
traders with SMALL inventories are more active in high-volatility stocks, while other
trader groups prefer low-volatility stocks. The smaller the size of the absolute de-
viation of the ﬁrst mid-quote from the opening price, the greater is the activity of
FAST / SMALL traders. On the contrary, FAST / MEDIUM traders prefer stocks
with larger absolute deviation. The activity of the FAST / SMALL traders is also
greater if the stock has an ADR.
To sum up, FAST&MEDIUM / SMALL&MEDIUM traders have preferences for
a certain type of stocks.
4.5.3.4 Panel Analysis
We extend our analysis of price discovery during the pre-opening period using a
panel dataset at 100-millisecond intervals for the 97 stocks of the TOPIX100 index.
We focus our analysis on the relation between a trader’s aggregated aggressiveness
and the change in the absolute deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price
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every 100 milliseconds. To compute the change in the absolute deviation when there
are several mid-quote updates in a particular 100-millisecond interval, we take the
last value of the mid-quote during that interval. Afterwards, we examine how the
aggregated aggressive orders of each group of traders aﬀect the convergence of the
mid-quote to the opening price. We winsorize the change in the absolute deviation
at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels.
In particular, for each group of traders, we aggregate the number of new orders,
cancelled orders, and revised orders, separately for limit and market orders, for each
100-millisecond interval, and scale it by the total number of orders for each stock-day.
We also use the number of shares in each order as the dependent variable. When
we aggregate orders, they must satisfy the conditions for aggressive orders deﬁned
in Section 4.5.3.1. We do not distinguish between buy and sell orders because our
dependent variable does not represent the direction of the price movement. Both
buy and sell orders can equally narrow or widen the deviation. We do not take
into account orders categorized as non-aggressive orders, because these orders do not
aﬀect the prevailing quotes and are not visible to market participants. Therefore,
traders cannot speculate on other traders’ behavior based on non-aggressive order
ﬂow. We employ a stock and time (minute) ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression to conduct
the abovementioned analysis:
Change in Deviation j,k,t = α+
12∑
l=1
(β1,lNew Limit j,k,t,l + β2,lNew Market j,k,t,l+
β3,lCancel Limit j,k,t,l + β4,lCancel Market j,k,t,l+
β5,lQty Rev Limit j,k,t,l + β6,lQty Rev Market j,k,t,l+
β7,lPrice Rev Limit j,k,t,l + β8,lPrice Rev Market j,k,t,l+
β9,lZero Imbalance j,k,t,l) +  j,k,t
(4.5)
where Change in Deviation j,k,t is the change in the deviation of the mid-quote from
the opening price for stock j on date k, t is the 100-millisecond interval, and l refers
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Figure 4.7. Intra-day patterns of pre-opening mid-quotes
This ﬁgure shows the coeﬃcients of time series dummies from the panel regression of the change in the
deviation of the mid-quote from the opening price, per stock, on the trading activity of the 12 trader
groups, for the 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 during the sample period of April-May 2013, as deﬁned in
equation (4.5). Please refer to Table 4.11 for more details. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as
virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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to a particular group of traders. Price Rev Market means the change of the order
from market to limit or vice versa.
We run panel regressions with stock ﬁxed eﬀects because the 97 stocks in our
sample diﬀer by minimum tick size and price level, both of which have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the minimum percentage change in the dependent variable. Time ﬁxed
eﬀects take into account the intra-day pattern in the pre-opening quotes (see Figure
4.7).
We run these regressions for four diﬀerent time periods: the entire period (8:00-
8:59), the period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes (8:10-8:59), the last 10 minutes (8:50-
8:59), and the last minute (8:59:00-8:59:99). We report only the results for the
entire period (8:00-8:59) and the period excluding the ﬁrst 10 minutes (8:10-8:59).
Table 4.11 presents the results of the panel regressions. We discuss each time period
separately below.
Table 4.11 Panel A shows the results for the entire pre-opening period. During
the pre-opening period, we observe statistically signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients for
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new limit and market orders, from all traders, indicating their contribution to price
discovery. However, the coeﬃcients for new limit orders are larger than those for
new market orders except in the case of FAST / NOTRADE traders, indicating the
larger role new limit orders play in price discovery. Quantity revisions from most of
the groups are positive, indicating a deterioration of price discovery. Cancellations
for limit orders are mixed, and mostly insigniﬁcant. After the exclusion of the ﬁrst
10 minutes, new limit and market orders from each group still contribute to the price
discovery (Table 4.11 Panel B). New market orders from FAST / SMALL and FAST
/ LARGE traders show statistically signiﬁcant contributions. The results for the last
10 minutes and the very last minute (unreported results, which are available upon
request from the authors) are similar to those from the analysis excluding the ﬁrst
10 minutes. The most stable contribution comes from new limit and market orders.
Table 4.11 Panel C shows the results obtained by using the number of shares
instead of the number of orders from each group. The negative coeﬃcient for new
limit and market orders remains unchanged. The positive coeﬃcient for new market
orders is only seen for the MEDIUM / LARGE group, and is marginally signiﬁcant.
The sizes of the coeﬃcients for new limit and market orders are more similar across
the groups than are those in the case of the number of orders shown in Panel A.
Overall, the results are consistent with Table 4.7. They conﬁrm that new limit
orders contribute consistently towards price discovery throughout the pre-opening
period and across traders.
4.5.4 Tests of unbiasedness of the pre-opening quotes
We next repeat the test for price eﬃciency on the pre-opening quotes using an un-
biasedness regression that has been widely used in the literature.21 Speciﬁcally, the
ﬁrst to use it are Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999), who use it to characterize the
extent to which there is learning and price discovery in the pre-opening period. They
use the closing price of the day as a proxy for the equilibrium price v. We modify
21Among other papers that use an unbiasedness regression to investigate price discovery are
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999), Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008), Comerton-Forde and Rydge
(2006), and Chakrabarty, Corwin, and Panayides (2011).
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their framework for our purposes and estimate equation (4.6) as follows:
ν − E (ν |I0) = αt + βt [Pt − E (ν |I0)] + Zt (4.6)
where ν is the opening price (instead of the closing price used in Biais, Hillion, and
Spatt (1999)), Pt is the pre-opening mid-quote, and E (ν |I0) is the previous day’s
closing price. The distribution of the change in price, from the previous da ’s close
to the mid-quote, varies over time as the opening time approaches. The amount of
noise in the mid-quote is also likely to vary with time. In this spirit, we estimate
the unbiasedness regression using the speciﬁcation shown in equation (4.6), for each
100-millisecond interval and for each stock in our sample period. If the pre-opening
mid-quote is an unbiased estimator of the opening price, the coeﬃcient βt in the
speciﬁcation should be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. We hypothesize that the
earlier in the pre-opening period the coeﬃcient βt equals 1, the greater is the price
eﬃciency of the pre-opening quote. We analyze the pattern of the value of the t-
statistic, under the null hypothesis that β is equal to 1, over the pre-opening period.
This section is structured as follows. First, we analyze the cross-sectional patterns
in the estimation results of the unbiasedness regression. Second, we compare the
results of the unbiasedness regression for three diﬀerent time periods (November-
December 2009, January-March 2010, and April-May 2013) to exploit a quasi-natural
experiment of the “Arrowhead” introduction.
4.5.4.1 Cross-sectional analysis of the unbiasedness of the pre-opening
quotes
We follow the same approach as for the cross-sectional analysis of the absolute de-
viation of the mid-quote from the opening price (see Section 4.5.3.3). In particular,
we split stocks into two groups based on the activity of FAST / SMALL, FAST /
MEDIUM, MEDIUM / SMALL, and MEDIUM / MEDIUM traders. The activity
of each trader group is measured by the proportion of aggressive messages (messages
that have the potential to change the prevailing mid-quote) for each stock across all
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days. We separate stocks for which the activity of any of the trader groups (FAST /
SMALL, FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM / SMALL, or MEDIUM / MEDIUM) exceeds
30% (18 stocks), from all other stocks (79 stocks).
Figure 4.8 shows the β estimates and t-statistics under the null hypothesis that
β is equal to 1 for every 100-millisecond interval in the last 200 seconds of the
pre-opening period, for these two groups of stocks, for April and May 2013. Re-
markably, the β for stocks subject to high activity from the FAST / MEDIUM and
SMALL/MEDIUM trader groups diﬀers insigniﬁcantly from 1 during the last 200
seconds. On the contrary, the β for stocks subject to low activity from the FAST /
SMALL, FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM / SMALL, and MEDIUM / MEDIUM traders
increases slowly from 0.7 to 1. Even during the last 100 milliseconds, the β for this
group of stocks is still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. Overall, these results are consis-
tent with FAST / SMALL, FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM / SMALL, and MEDIUM
/ MEDIUM traders improving price discovery during the pre-opening period.
4.5.4.2 Unbiasedness of the pre-opening quotes and “Arrowhead” intro-
duction
On January 4, 2010, the TSE introduced the “Arrowhead” system, which substan-
tially reduced the latency in the Japanese stock market. For benchmarking purposes,
we refer to the period from November 2009 through March 2010 as the comparative
(control) period. In particular, the initial three months of January 2010 give us the
opportunity to examine the turning point of the TS ’s platform change and its eﬀect
on order submission behavior, with the other months being used for robustness checks
to capture the eﬀect of the exogenous event — the introduction of the “Arrowhead”
system.
Figure 4.9 shows the average of the coeﬃcients, βt , and the bands of +/−2σ of the
cross-sectional standard errors over time, for three diﬀerent time periods (November-
December 2009, January-March 2010, and April-May 2013). In order to investigate
price discovery at the millisecond level, we run the same regression for the three
diﬀerent periods, every 100 milliseconds of the last 200 seconds (Figure 4.9 Panel A)
and every 10 milliseconds in the last 20 seconds (Figure 4.9 Panel B). The inclusion
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Figure 4.8. Comparison of the test of unbiasedness regressions between
stocks with diﬀerent levels of low-latency trader participation
Using mid-quotes, at each 100-millisecond interval, we estimate equation (4.6) for every 100 milliseconds
of the last 200 seconds of the pre-opening period (8:56:40.000 - 8:59:59.999), for each of the 97 stocks
from the TOPIX100 during the sample period of April-May 2013. We split stocks into two groups: the
ﬁrst group includes stocks for which the aggressive activity of FAST&MEDIUM / SMALL&MEDIUM
traders passes a threshold of 30% (18 stocks). The second group includes all other stocks (79 stocks).
The averages of the β coeﬃcients are shown in Panel A. Panel B shows the t-statistics under the null
hypothesis that β is equal to 1. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided
by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, while quotes and trade data are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Tick
History Database.
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of the two additional periods allows us to test changes in the price discovery process
due to the introduction of the “Arrowhead” low-latency trading platform and the
implementation of several other institutional changes, such as the co-location service
(see Uno and Shibata (2012)).
The implementation of the new trading platform that changed the latency caused
a shift in the behavior of all traders. This structural change created room for the
HFTs to exploit the breakthrough in the latency. Thus, this natural experiment is
ideal for assessing the eﬀect of the latency regime on price informativeness: reducing
the latency potentially increases the speed of order ﬂow, which, in turn, may lead to
more accurate prices, better liquidity, and faster price discovery.
To test these hypotheses, we investigate whether the time when β becomes in-
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 is the same or diﬀerent across the three regimes. This
analysis shows whether there was a structural change due to the introduction of the
“Arrowhead” system.
Figure 4.9 Panel B shows that the β becomes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, at
a time of 550 milliseconds before 9 am, in November-December 2009. However, β
never reaches 1 in either April-May 2013 or November-December 2009: the average
β in April-May 2013 in the last 10 milliseconds before 9 am is around 0.9, while
the corresponding average β in November-December 2009 is only around 0.7. The
comparison between 2013 and 2010 suggests that the introduction of “Arrowhead”
and its increased usage by HFTs delayed price discovery by 550 milliseconds. From
2010 to 2013, the proportion of orders coming through co-location servers more than
tripled, from 10%-15% to more than 50% (Hosaka (2014)). Although the moment at
which the β becomes 1 is delayed in 2013, it does reach 0.9 much earlier than in 2010.
The convergence path for 2010 shows a stepwise trend, a symptom of caution in the
quote submissions from HFTs. The fact that β does not reach 1 at all in 2009 is
indicative of slow price discovery and inaccurate opening prices. This may partially
be due to the fact that 32 stocks out of 97 in our sample experienced a tick-size
change, which became eﬀective in January 2010. The larger tick size may also have
contributed to the ampliﬁcation of the diﬀerence between the opening price and the
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mid-quote.
Overall, the results indicate that price eﬃciency improved in the low-latency
regime following the introduction of “Arrowhead”. The new latency regime created
a diﬀerent trading environment for all players, but the learning process required
for traders to exploit the improved speed eﬃciently will require time and a careful
calibration of the algorithms.
HFTs were not present in the TSE before 2010, because of the three-second match-
ing interval used in the continuous session (see Uno and Shibata (2012)). The natural
experiment that we analyze here shows that the introduction of the “Arrowhead”
system was an exogenous event that triggered several consequences: changed price
accuracy, the need for adaptation by HFTs, a reduction of price dispersion, and an
improvement of liquidity. However, we caution that, given the design of the experi-
ment and the absence of a control group, we cannot say anything conclusive about
causality. We can only conclude that our ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that high-frequency quote updates contribute to price discovery.
4.5.5 Trading activity during the call auction and ﬁrst 30 minutes of the
continuous session
In this section, we discuss the trading patterns of diﬀerent trader groups in the
opening call auction as well as the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session. In
particular, we examine how orders from each trader group are ﬁlled at the opening
call auction and how diﬀerent trader groups behave during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of
the continuous session. We focus on the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous auction as
we want to analyze the diﬀerence in trader behavior, based on the same information,
but in the pre-opening call and continuous trading session settings. If we extended
the sample to the full continuous session, we would contaminate our analysis with
new information arriving in the market later in the trading day. The pre-opening call
auction is the closest approximation in the equity markets to frequent batch auctions,
as suggested by the theoretical analysis of Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015), with
the major diﬀerence between the two being the information dissemination before
the auction takes place: no information in the case of frequent batch auctions versus
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Figure 4.9. Tests of unbiasedness regressions of the pre-opening mid-
quotes
Using mid-quotes, we estimate equation (4.6) for Panel A every 100 milliseconds in the last 200 seconds
of the pre-opening period (8:56:40.000 - 8:59:59.999) and for Panel B every 10 milliseconds in the last 20
seconds (8:59:40.000 - 8:59:59.999), for each of the 97 stocks from the TOPIX100, in three diﬀerent periods
(Nov-Dec 2009, Jan-Mar 2010, and Apr-May 2013). The ﬁgures show the averages of the β coeﬃcients
and the t-statistics under the null hypothesis that β is equal to 1. The tick-by-tick data, time stamped to
the millisecond, are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Tick History Database.
Panel A: Beta coeﬃcient estimated each second of the last 200 seconds
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Be
ta
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
8:56:40.0 8:57:29.9 8:58:19.8 8:59:09.7 8:59:59.6
Time
Beta 2009 Beta 2010 
Beta 2013 95% C.I.
Panel B: Beta coeﬃcient and t-statistic estimated every 10 milliseconds of the last 20
seconds
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Be
ta
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
8:59:40.00 8:59:44.99 8:59:49.99 8:59:54.99 8:59:59.99
Time
Beta 2009 Beta 2010 
Beta 2013 95% C.I.
−
20
0
T−
St
at
ist
ic
8:59:40.00 8:59:44.99 8:59:49.99 8:59:54.99 8:59:59.99
Time
T−stat 2009 T−stat 2010
T−stat 2013 1.96 Crit. value
93B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
170 Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery
dissemination of the pre-opening order ﬂow in the case of the TSE pre-opening period.
An additional argument for our choice of trading periods for our analysis is that a
signiﬁcant fraction of the daily trading volume is executed during the opening call
auction (around 5%) and the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session (around 15%).
4.5.5.1 Liquidity provision
We start by investigating the role of diﬀerent trader groups in the liquidity provision
during the call auction and the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous trading session.
In the case of the opening call auction, trading activity is said to provide (consume)
liquidity if traders trade in the opposite (same) direction to the price movement.
Table 4.12 presents the trading activity during the call auction. We report the
liquidity-demanding and liquidity-supplying trading volumes relative to the total
trading volume during the pre-opening call, averaged across stock-days. The most ac-
tive trader groups during the call auction are FAST&MEDIUM / SMALL&MEDIUM.
These traders are jointly responsible for roughly 70% of the volume executed during
the opening call auction and are present on both sides of the market. We also con-
duct a t-test of whether the imbalances between liquidity demand and liquidity supply
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. We show that the FAST / SMALL, MEDIUM /
SMALL, and MEDIUM / MEDIUM trader groups have negative imbalances between
liquidity demand and liquidity supply, which are signiﬁcant at the 1% level: -0.98%,
-1.22%, and -2.58%, respectively. In other words, these trader groups act as net liq-
uidity providers during the opening call auction. Then, we investigate the behavior
of the traders during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous trading session. In this
case, we refer to orders that initiate the transaction as liquidity-consuming and those
on the opposite side of the transaction as liquidity-providing. Orders that initiate
the transaction are new market orders and new or revised limit orders that either
lock in or cross the prevailing bid-ask spread.22 We discard those transactions of the
continuous trading session for which we cannot identify the initiating order.23
22Locked limit orders are orders with the limit buy (sell) price equal to the best bid (ask) price,
while crossed limit orders are orders with limit buy (sell) price greater (smaller) than the best ask
(bid) price (see Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000)).
23If an order imbalance causes a larger price change than the pre-speciﬁed amount (e.g., the
maximum price change between two trades is 70 Japanese Yen in the price range 3000-5000 Japanese
94A_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery 171
Ta
bl
e
4.
12
.
Li
qu
id
it
y
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
pr
ov
is
io
n
at
th
e
op
en
in
g
ca
ll
au
ct
io
n
an
d
du
ri
ng
th
e
ﬁr
st
30
m
in
ut
es
of
th
e
co
nt
in
uo
us
tr
ad
in
g
se
ss
io
n
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
liq
ui
di
ty
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
an
d
su
pp
ly
fo
r
9
tr
ad
er
gr
ou
ps
(t
he
N
O
T
R
A
D
E
ca
te
go
ry
is
om
it
te
d
as
th
es
e
tr
ad
er
s
do
no
t
tr
ad
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
st
oc
k-
da
y)
an
d
th
e
im
ba
la
nc
e
be
tw
ee
n
liq
ui
di
ty
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
su
pp
ly
fo
r
th
e
op
en
in
g
ca
ll
au
ct
io
n
an
d
du
ri
ng
th
e
ﬁr
st
30
m
in
ut
es
of
th
e
co
nt
in
uo
us
tr
ad
in
g
se
ss
io
n.
T
ra
de
rs
ar
e
cl
as
si
ﬁe
d
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
th
e
sc
he
m
e
pr
op
os
ed
in
T
ab
le
4.
3
us
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
sp
ee
d
an
d
in
ve
nt
or
y
fr
om
th
e
sa
m
e
da
y’
s
co
nt
in
uo
us
se
ss
io
n.
W
e
al
so
sp
lit
tr
ad
er
s
in
to
3
ca
te
go
ri
es
:
tr
ad
er
s
th
at
do
no
t
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e
in
th
e
pr
e-
op
en
in
g
pe
ri
od
(N
on
-A
ct
iv
e)
,
tr
ad
er
s
th
at
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e
in
th
e
pr
e-
op
en
in
g
pe
ri
od
,b
ut
do
no
t
tr
ad
e
at
th
e
op
en
in
g
ca
ll
au
ct
io
n
(A
ct
iv
e-
w
/o
-T
ra
de
),
an
d
tr
ad
er
s
th
at
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e
in
th
e
pr
e-
op
en
in
g
pe
ri
od
an
d
tr
ad
e
at
th
e
ca
ll
au
ct
io
n
(A
ct
iv
e-
w
-T
ra
de
).
In
th
e
ca
se
of
th
e
op
en
in
g
ca
ll
au
ct
io
n,
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
ar
e
co
ns
id
er
ed
to
pr
ov
id
e
liq
ui
di
ty
if
tr
ad
er
s
tr
ad
e
in
th
e
op
po
si
te
di
re
ct
io
n
to
th
e
pr
ic
e
m
ov
em
en
t,
an
d
to
co
ns
um
e
liq
ui
di
ty
if
tr
ad
er
s
tr
ad
e
in
th
e
di
re
ct
io
n
of
th
e
pr
ic
e
m
ov
em
en
t.
In
th
e
ca
se
of
th
e
co
nt
in
uo
us
se
ss
io
n,
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
ar
e
co
ns
id
er
ed
to
co
ns
um
e
liq
ui
di
ty
if
th
e
or
de
r
in
it
ia
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
an
d
to
su
pp
ly
liq
ui
di
ty
ot
he
rw
is
e.
O
rd
er
s
th
at
in
it
ia
te
th
e
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
(t
he
ti
m
e
st
am
p
of
th
e
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
sh
ou
ld
be
eq
ua
lt
o
th
e
ti
m
e
st
am
p
of
th
e
ne
w
or
de
r
en
tr
y
or
th
e
ti
m
e
st
am
p
of
th
e
pr
ic
e
re
vi
si
on
)
sa
ti
sf
y
on
e
of
fo
ur
co
nd
it
io
ns
:
(1
)
ne
w
m
ar
ke
t
or
de
rs
;
(2
)
lim
it
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
or
de
rs
;
(3
)
ne
w
or
re
vi
se
d
bu
y
(s
el
l)
lim
it
or
de
rs
w
it
h
a
lim
it
pr
ic
e
gr
ea
te
r
(s
m
al
le
r)
th
an
th
e
be
st
as
k
(b
id
)
pr
ic
e
("
C
ro
ss
")
;(
4)
ne
w
bu
y
(s
el
l)
lim
it
or
de
rs
w
it
h
a
lim
it
pr
ic
e
eq
ua
lt
o
th
e
be
st
as
k
(b
id
)
pr
ic
e
("
Lo
ck
")
.
W
e
re
po
rt
liq
ui
di
ty
-d
em
an
di
ng
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
-s
up
pl
yi
ng
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
es
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
to
ta
lt
ra
di
ng
vo
lu
m
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
pr
e-
op
en
in
g
ca
ll,
av
er
ag
ed
ac
ro
ss
st
oc
k-
da
ys
.
Fo
r
th
e
im
ba
la
nc
e
be
tw
ee
n
liq
ui
di
ty
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
su
pp
ly
,
w
e
al
so
re
po
rt
th
e
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nc
e
le
ve
ls
of
th
e
t-
te
st
fo
r
w
he
th
er
th
e
im
ba
la
nc
e
is
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nt
ly
di
ﬀe
re
nt
fr
om
0.
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
in
di
ca
te
th
e
1%
,5
%
,a
nd
10
%
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nc
e
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
Li
qu
id
it
y
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
pr
ov
is
io
n
ar
e
pr
es
en
te
d
pe
r
gr
ou
p
fo
r
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
A
pr
il
an
d
M
ay
20
13
,f
or
th
e
97
st
oc
ks
fr
om
T
O
P
IX
10
0.
O
rd
er
ﬂo
w
da
ta
,w
it
h
or
de
r
ID
s
as
w
el
la
s
vi
rt
ua
ls
er
ve
r
ID
s,
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
by
th
e
T
ok
yo
St
oc
k
E
xc
ha
ng
e.
Ca
ll
au
ct
io
n
Fi
rs
t3
0
m
in
ut
es
of
co
nt
in
uo
us
se
ss
io
n
Sp
ee
d
In
ve
nt
or
y
Co
ns
um
e
Su
pp
ly
Im
ba
la
nc
e
Co
ns
um
e
Su
pp
ly
Im
ba
la
nc
e
No
n-
Ac
tiv
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w/
o-
Tr
ad
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w-
Tr
ad
e
No
n-
Ac
tiv
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w/
o-
Tr
ad
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w-
Tr
ad
e
No
n-
Ac
tiv
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w/
o-
Tr
ad
e
Ac
tiv
e-
w-
Tr
ad
e
FA
ST
LA
RG
E
6.
85
%
-5
.1
8%
1.
52
%
**
*
2.
61
%
0.
68
%
1.
41
%
-4
.1
7%
-1
.2
3%
-2
.7
1%
-1
.5
8%
**
*
-0
.7
9%
**
*
-1
.6
4%
**
*
M
ED
IU
M
28
.5
0%
-2
5.
29
%
3.
16
%
**
*
8.
13
%
1.
39
%
7.
78
%
-7
.7
2%
-2
.5
3%
-1
5.
42
%
0.
41
%
**
*
-1
.2
8%
**
*
-7
.7
5%
**
*
SM
AL
L
18
.0
1%
-1
8.
88
%
-0
.9
8%
**
*
29
.6
2%
1.
34
%
7.
60
%
-1
4.
85
%
-3
.8
0%
-1
2.
42
%
14
.7
6%
**
*
-2
.7
9%
**
*
-4
.9
7%
**
*
M
ED
IU
M
LA
RG
E
5.
31
%
-5
.1
7%
0.
04
%
2.
31
%
0.
74
%
0.
75
%
-2
.9
6%
-1
.3
2%
-1
.0
6%
-0
.6
6%
**
*
-0
.6
6%
**
*
-0
.3
4%
**
*
M
ED
IU
M
14
.0
3%
-1
6.
60
%
-2
.5
8%
**
*
5.
02
%
1.
41
%
3.
86
%
-2
.6
5%
-2
.7
1%
-6
.0
3%
2.
39
%
**
*
-1
.3
5%
**
*
-2
.2
3%
**
*
SM
AL
L
12
.4
4%
-1
3.
62
%
-1
.2
2%
**
*
8.
29
%
1.
35
%
4.
72
%
-2
.8
4%
-2
.4
4%
-6
.7
3%
5.
46
%
**
*
-1
.1
3%
**
*
-2
.0
9%
**
*
SL
OW
LA
RG
E
9.
61
%
-9
.1
1%
0.
43
%
*
6.
67
%
0.
61
%
0.
42
%
-1
.8
5%
-1
.3
8%
-0
.5
7%
4.
83
%
**
*
-0
.8
3%
**
*
-0
.1
4%
**
*
M
ED
IU
M
4.
91
%
-4
.9
8%
-0
.1
8%
2.
28
%
0.
63
%
0.
57
%
-0
.6
8%
-1
.1
6%
-0
.8
7%
1.
62
%
**
*
-0
.5
5%
**
*
-0
.3
2%
**
*
SM
AL
L
2.
82
%
-2
.9
3%
-0
.1
8%
**
1.
95
%
0.
45
%
0.
43
%
-0
.8
6%
-0
.8
0%
-0
.5
4%
1.
15
%
**
*
-0
.3
8%
**
*
-0
.1
2%
**
*
94B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
172 Chapter 4. Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery
Table 4.12 presents the trading activity during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the contin-
uous trading session. As the table shows, FAST / SMALL traders that do not partic-
ipate at all during the pre-opening period (Non-Active) show the highest amount of
trading activity, with around 30% of cases consuming liquidity with their trades, and
with roughly 15% of cases supplying liquidity. This group of traders are the main
liquidity consumers in the market, based on the imbalance between liquidity con-
sumption and liquidity provision (14.8%). The main liquidity providers are FAST
/ SMALL & MEDIUM traders that are active during the pre-opening period and
trade at the call auction (Active-w-Trade). In fact, in this case, their imbalances
between liquidity supply (7.6% and 7.8%) and liquidity demand (-12.4% and -15.4%)
are around -5.0% and -7.8%, which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level.
The next most important net liquidity providers are the FAST / SMALL (Active-
w/o-Trade) and MEDIUM / SMALL & MEDIUM (Active-w-Trade) groups, with
imbalances ranging between -2.1% and -2.8%. To sum up, the FAST&MEDIUM /
SMALL&MEDIUM (Active-w-Trade) traders are the main liquidity providers on the
market for both the call auction and the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session.
On the contrary, the FAST / SMALL (Non-Active) traders are the main liquidity
consumers during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session.
4.5.5.2 Price discovery
We now move on to the analysis of the role of diﬀerent trader groups in the price
discovery process during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous trading session. In
order to estimate the price discovery contribution, we follow the methodology de-
veloped for the pre-opening period with slight modiﬁcations. First, we compute the
deviation of the trading prices from the price at 9:30 am:
Deviation930j,k,n =




Pj,k,n
P930j,k
− 1

× 100 (4.7)
Yen), the TSE stops continuous trading and conducts a call auction. The TSE disseminates special
quotes to notify the market about the trading halt. In our sample, less than 1% of the trades fall
into this category.
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where Pj,k,n is the trading price at the time of the n-th transaction for stock j on day
k, and P930j,k is the price at 9:30 am for stock j on day k. In order to determine
return during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous trading, we use the average
trading price between 9:30 and 9:35 to avoid the bid-ask bounce problem. Then we
deﬁne the price discovery contribution as follows:
PDC930j,k,n = Deviation930j,k,n − Deviation930j,k,n−1 (4.8)
Deviation930j,k,n is the absolute deviation of the trading price from the price at
9:30 am at the time of the n-th trade for stock j on day k (see equation (4.7)).
Deviation930j,k,n−1 is the absolute deviation of the trading price from the price at
9:30 am at the time of the (n−1)-th trade for stock j on day k. The diﬀerence between
Deviation930j,k,n and Deviation930j,k,n−1 is the contribution to price discovery made
by the order that initiates the n-th trade. We deﬁne the WPC for stock j on day k
and trade n as
WPCj,k,n =
PDC930j,k∑J
j=1 |PDC930j,k |
× PDC930j,k,n
PDC930j,k
(4.9)
where PDC930j,k,n is the price discovery contribution of the order that initiates the
n-th trade for stock j on day k, and PDC930j,k is the accumulated price discovery
contribution during the pre-opening period for stock j on day k. We winsorize
PDC930j,k,n at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels.
Table 4.13 shows the results of the WPC analysis for the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the
continuous trading session for the continuation and reversal regimes, separately. We
also distinguish between the diﬀerent order types initiating the transaction: new and
revised limit orders that cross or lock in the prevailing bid-ask spread, and new and
revised market orders. The largest contributions to price discovery are made by two
groups of traders: FAST / SMALL (Non-Active) (-39.99%) and FAST / MEDIUM
(Non-Active) (-18.25%). Put diﬀerently, the FAST / SMALL & MEDIUM (Non-
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Table 4.13. Contribution to weighted price discovery by type of order
during ﬁrst 30 minutes of continuous session
This table presents the summary statistics for the weighted price discovery contribution (WPC) during
the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session, the percentage amount by which each new transaction
moves the trading price closer to the trading price at 9:30 am divided by the accumulated price discovery
contribution during the ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session, as deﬁned in equation (4.9). WPC is
attributable to orders that initiate the transaction (the time stamp of the transaction should be equal to
the time stamp of the new order entry or the time stamp of the price revision): (1) new market orders;
(2) limit-to-market orders; (3) new or revised buy (sell) limit orders with a limit price greater (smaller)
than the best ask (bid) price ("Cross"); (4) new buy (sell) limit orders orders with a limit price equal to
the best ask (bid) price ("Lock"). We distinguish between WPC for each of the 6 diﬀerent types of order.
We divide all traders into 12 groups on a stock-day basis, as described in Table 4.3, using information
about speed and inventory from the same day’s continuous session. We also split traders into 3 categories:
traders that do not participate in the pre-opening period (Non-Active), traders that participate in the
pre-opening period but do not trade at the opening call auction (Active-w/o-Trade), and traders that
participate in the pre-opening period and trade at the call auction (Active-w-Trade). Panel A describes
WPC for Non-Active traders, Panel B for Active-w/o-Trade traders, and Panel C for Active-w-Trade
traders, for 97 stocks from the TOPIX100 during the sample period of April-May 2013. Order ﬂow data,
with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Speed Inventory Total New limit orders Revised limit orders Market orders
Cross Lock Cross Lock New Price revision
Panel A: Weighted price discovery contribution of Non-Active traders
FAST
LARGE -5.37% 0.17% -5.12% 0.04% -0.04% -0.29% -0.13%
MEDIUM -18.25% -0.26% -18.68% -0.08% 0.01% 0.77% -0.01%
SMALL -37.99% 1.74% -39.96% 0.00% -0.38% 0.53% 0.08%
MEDIUM
LARGE -2.48% 0.28% -3.93% 0.11% 0.32% 0.60% 0.14%
MEDIUM -8.38% -0.79% -8.94% 0.08% 0.05% 1.16% 0.05%
SMALL -8.05% 0.15% -8.76% -0.03% 0.09% 0.41% 0.08%
SLOW LARGE -7.33% -0.52% -6.30% 0.01% 0.14% -0.75% 0.09%
MEDIUM -1.76% 0.19% -2.10% 0.01% 0.00% 0.10% 0.04%
SMALL -2.61% -0.07% -2.61% 0.00% -0.02% 0.07% 0.01%
Panel B: Weighted price discovery contribution of Active-w/o-Trade traders
FAST
LARGE -0.64% -0.08% -0.90% -0.04% 0.15% 0.21% 0.02%
MEDIUM -4.35% -0.60% -3.69% -0.06% -0.25% 0.17% 0.07%
SMALL -1.33% -0.39% -1.07% -0.02% 0.06% 0.17% -0.08%
MEDIUM
LARGE 1.58% 0.23% -0.01% 0.08% 0.10% 1.06% 0.12%
MEDIUM 1.74% 0.33% -0.34% -0.04% 0.19% 1.18% 0.42%
SMALL -1.63% 0.16% -1.10% -0.03% -0.20% -0.20% -0.25%
SLOW
LARGE 1.04% -0.08% 0.09% 0.10% 0.05% 0.77% 0.10%
MEDIUM -0.88% -0.40% -0.50% -0.03% -0.02% 0.09% -0.01%
SMALL -1.23% -0.24% -0.26% -0.09% -0.12% -0.60% 0.08%
Panel C: Weighted price discovery contribution of Active-w-Trade traders
FAST
LARGE -1.87% 1.01% -1.30% 0.03% -0.56% -0.94% -0.12%
MEDIUM -10.53% -0.59% -14.46% 0.39% -1.16% 5.06% 0.23%
SMALL 3.85% 2.10% 2.63% 0.38% -1.53% 0.11% 0.17%
MEDIUM
LARGE 0.82% 0.40% 0.04% -0.07% -0.24% 0.98% -0.30%
MEDIUM 7.77% -0.28% 0.93% 0.09% 0.35% 6.14% 0.54%
SMALL -3.08% -0.91% -2.60% 0.27% -0.73% 0.75% 0.14%
SLOW
LARGE 0.11% 0.22% -0.02% -0.01% -0.06% 0.02% -0.03%
MEDIUM 0.89% 0.12% -0.06% -0.04% 0.06% 0.72% 0.10%
SMALL -0.02% -0.19% 0.17% 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% -0.03%
TOTAL -100.00% 1.71% -118.85% 1.04% -3.74% 18.33% 1.52%
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Active) traders that are the main consumers of liquidity are, at the same time,
responsible for more than 50% of the price discovery process. On the contrary,
among the traders that are actively supplying liquidity, that is, FAST&MEDIUM
/ SMALL&MEDIUM (Active-w-Trade), only FAST / MEDIUM traders contribute
toward improving the price discovery (-10.53%, the third largest contribution), while
the other traders deteriorate price discovery. Breaking down the WPC by order
type, we show that the majority of the price discovery occurs via locked limit orders (-
118.85%), while the majority of the price deterioration occurs via new market orders.
Based on the analysis of liquidity provision and weighted price discovery contri-
bution, we show that FAST&MEDIUM / SMALL&MEDIUM traders that are active
during the pre-opening period (Active-w-Trade) are diﬀerent from the FAST&MEDIUM
/ SMALL&MEDIUM traders that are active only during the continuous session (Non-
Active). The trading behavior of the former group is very close to the behavior of
low-latency market makers, while the behavior of the latter group represents the
behavior of low-latency informed traders.
The price formation process between the opening call auction and the following
continuous session has been studied extensively in the literature. In particular, it
has been shown that stock prices exhibit non-trivial reversals in the ﬁrst half hour of
the continuous trading session relative to the overnight price movement (e.g., Stoll
and Whaley (1990) and Amihud and Mendelson (1991)). Therefore, as a robustness
check, we separate stock-days into two regimes (following Brogaard, Riordan, Shkilko,
and Sokolov (2015)). The continuation (reversal) regime represents cases in which
the overnight return is of the same (opposite) sign as the return during the ﬁrst
30 minutes of continuous trading. We ﬁnd that the results are qualitatively similar
to the results obtained without such separation (the results are available from the
authors upon request).
4.6 Conclusion
The market pre-opening period and the batch auction are important features of many
stock markets today. They are an ideal laboratory for investigating the potential role
of HFTs in periodic batch auctions, when immediate execution is not possible. Our
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study examines activity in this trading period in the context of HFT activity that
has come to dominate global equity markets. Key questions we ask in this research
are whether, in the absence of trading, low-latency traders (including HFTs) still
participate in the market, and how the presence of low-latency traders contributes to
price discovery in the pre-opening period, and later on in the opening batch auction.
In order to empirically investigate these questions, we use a unique dataset provided
by the TSE, which allows us to develop a more comprehensive classiﬁcation of traders
than in the prior literature and to investigate the behavior of diﬀerent categories of
traders, based on their capability for low-latency trading.
We classify traders into three speed and four inventory groups (a total of 12
groups) on a stock-day basis. We observe that, on average, in only 28% of cases do
traders remain in the same speed/inventory group from one day to the next. We also
show that FAST traders can act as both market makers (SMALL inventory) and
position takers (LARGE inventory). It is therefore not appropriate to assume that
HFTs always trade all stocks in the same manner, every day. Hence, our classiﬁcation
of traders based on both speed of trading and inventory, and varying across stocks
and across days, is likely to throw additional light on the eﬀect of HFT activity.
Our empirical results for the TSE show that FAST traders participate in the
pre-opening period and in the opening batch auction to a lesser extent than in the
continuous session. With respect to the total number of orders, however, FAST
traders play a dominant role in the pre-opening period. They submit 51% of the
total number of orders, while MEDIUM and SLOW traders submit 42% and 7%, re-
spectively. We ﬁnd that FAST / SMALL traders, which we identify as high-frequency
market makers, and FAST / MEDIUM traders, contribute the most to price discov-
ery. These results indicate that low-latency traders contribute to price discovery and
lead the price formation process throughout the pre-opening period, through their
intense activity in relation to new limit orders and price revisions. Cancellation of
limit orders deteriorates price discovery, but cancellation of market orders improves
it.
It is important to note that, due to the lack of immediacy in execution, the
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presence of FAST traders in the pre-opening period is smaller than in the continuous
session. However, we ﬁnd that a larger presence of FAST traders in the trading of
a stock improves the price discovery process. Moreover, we show that FAST traders
tend to strategically select stocks in which they are more active, based on the stocks’
characteristics.
Our results suggest that three quarters of FAST / SMALL traders do not partic-
ipate in the opening call auction. These traders are the most active players in the
ﬁrst 30 minutes of the continuous session (they are responsible for initiating around
30% of the trades). This suggests that the majority of low-latency traders prefer
an environment in which immediate execution is possible. Our ﬁndings also sug-
gest that FAST / SMALL traders who are active only during the continuous session
(Non-Active) are responsible for the majority of the price discovery process and the
majority of liquidity consumption. On the contrary, FAST / SMALL traders that
are active during the pre-opening period and execute their orders at the opening call
auction (Active-w-Trade) are among the main liquidity suppliers. Based on these
results, we conclude that low-latency traders that are active only during the con-
tinuous session may be viewed as informed low-latency traders, while low-latency
traders that are active both at the opening call auction and the continuous session
are low-latency market makers.
However, our results cannot be considered as direct evidence concerning trader
behavior in the periodic batch auction. The opening call auction and the periodic
batch (call) auction diﬀer from each other in two important ways. First, the opening
call auction is not a sealed auction, while frequent batch auctions are (as suggested
by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015)). Put diﬀerently, information about the pre-
opening order ﬂow is disseminated to the market in the case of the opening call
auction, while there is no information dissemination in the case of the frequent batch
auctions proposed by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015). Second, although im-
mediate execution is not possible in either auction type, the opening call auction
is followed by the continuous trading session, which allows market participants to
unwind the positions taken during the opening call auction almost immediately, if
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necessary. However, in the case of frequent batch auctions, additional waiting time
is introduced in between auctions, therefore increasing the risk of holding undesired
inventory (see, e.g., Garbade and Silber (1979) and Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen
(2001)). These two key diﬀerences may lead to diﬀerent participation rates being ex-
hibited by low-latency traders in the opening call auction versus the frequent batch
auction.
To sum up, our results suggest that HFTs that participate in the pre-opening
session are diﬀerent from those that only participate in the continuous session. We
emphasize the need for further research on how a switch to a periodic auction from
the current continuous auction may impact the behavior of low-latency traders. Our
ﬁndings oﬀer some preliminary evidence in the context of the debate on the relative
merits of periodic batch versus continuous auctions.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This dissertation consists of three empirical papers in the ﬁeld of market microstruc-
ture. These papers investigate the impact of increased interconnectedness of the
ﬁnancial markets and the vast trading speed improvements on two important func-
tions of ﬁnancial markets: price discovery and liquidity provision.
Chapter 2 examines the role of liquidity and trading activity in the origination
and propagation of shocks to prices across international equity markets. The ﬁndings
show that equity markets are strongly interconnected with respect to the transmission
of shocks to prices and trading activity, while liquidity dry-ups seem to be isolated
events. The ﬁndings suggest that shocks to prices are the result of information rather
than liquidity as prices do not revert after the occurrence of shock and are strongly
associated with macroeconomic news announcements. For investors, the ﬁndings have
implications with respect to international portfolio diversiﬁcation. From a regulatory
perspective, the ﬁndings suggest that in order to reduce the vulnerability of ﬁnancial
system cross-country policies have to be implemented that address shock transmission
at the intraday level.
Chapter 3 analyzes the choice that an informed trader makes between market
(consuming liquidity) and limit (supplying liquidity) orders and how this choice is
aﬀected by the rise of algorithmic trading. Contrary to the traditional view in the
literature, the ﬁndings show that the majority of informed trading takes place via
limit (not market) orders. Moreover, informed algorithmic traders actively use limit
orders for informed trading. Combined together, these ﬁndings suggest that price
informativeness does not necessarily come at the expense of low liquidity, even in
the presence of algorithmic traders. The ﬁndings suggest that measures of informed
trading activity should be re-evaluated in order to incorporate informed trading via
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limit orders. Furthermore, I show that there is a large cross-sectional variation in
the order types used for informed trading. Therefore, investors may want to adjust
their strategies to decrease the likelihood of having an informed counterparty. The
ﬁndings also suggest that regulators should distinguish between diﬀerent types of
algorithmic traders when imposing restrictions/taxes on their activity.
Chapter 4 examines whether low-latency traders are improving or deteriorat-
ing price discovery in the pre-opening period. The ﬁndings show that low-latency
traders actively participate in the pre-opening period despite the absence of immedi-
ate execution, although to a lesser extent than during the continuous trading session.
Furthermore, low-latency traders lead price discovery during the pre-opening period.
The ﬁndings contribute to the ongoing debate on whether continuous trading or fre-
quent batch auctions are an appropriate market design in the presence of low-latency
traders. In other words, whether continuous trading leads to an endless arms race
between traders in terms of speed, while the speed advantage of the low-latency
traders is negligible in the call auction setup. The ﬁndings also show that if the
pre-opening order ﬂow is disseminated to the public, then low-latency traders still
can take advantage of their speed by delaying their actions to the very last moment
before the call auction takes place.
Overall, my current and future research agenda is related to the design of the well-
functioning ﬁnancial market with speciﬁc focus on the regulation of the low-latency
traders.
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit drie empirische artikelen binnen de literatuur die zich be-
zig houdt met de microstructuur van de markt. Deze artikelen onderzoeken het eﬀect
van de toegenomen verwevenheid van ﬁnanciële markten en de grote handelssnelheid-
verbeteringen op twee belangrijke functies van ﬁnanciële markten: prijsontdekking
en liquiditeitsvoorziening.
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de rol van liquiditeit en handelsactiviteit in het ont-
staan en verspreiden van prijsschokken over internationale aandelenmarkten. We
vinden dat aandelenmarkten inderdaad sterk verweven zijn met betrekking tot de
overbrenging van prijsschokken en handelsactiviteit, terwijl liquiditeitsopdrogingen
geïsoleerde gebeurtenissen lijken te zijn. Onze bevindingen suggereren dat prijs-
schokken voortvloeien uit informatie in plaats van liquiditeit omdat prijzen zich niet
herstellen na een schok en ze sterk geassocieerd zijn met macro-economisch nieuws.
Vanuit het oogpunt van een investeerder hebben onze bevindingen implicaties met
betrekking tot internationale portfolio diversiﬁcatie. Vanuit het perspectief van de
autoriteiten suggereren onze bevindingen dat cross-country beleid dat zich richt op
het reduceren van de intraday transmissie van schokken geïmplementeerd dient te
worden met het doel de kwetsbaarheid van het ﬁnanciële systeem te verminderen.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de keuze die een geïnformeerde handelaar maakt tussen
market orders (die liquiditeit consumeren) en limit orders (die liquiditeit aanbieden)
en hoe deze wordt beïnvloed door de opkomst van algoritmisch handelsverkeer. In
contrast met het perspectief vanuit de literatuur toon ik aan dat het grootste deel
van de geïnformeerde handel plaats vindt via limit (geen market) orders. Daarnaast
gebruiken handelaren die algoritmisch handelen limit orders regelmatig voor geïnfor-
meerde handel. Samen suggereren deze bevindingen dat het informatiegehalte van
de prijs niet noodzakelijkerwijs ten koste gaat van liquiditeit, zelfs in het bijzijn van
handelaren die algoritmisch handelen. Mijn bevindingen impliceren dat het nodig is
99B_Erim Yuferova Stand.job
182 Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
om maatstaven van geïnformeerde handel opnieuw te bekijken en ervoor te zorgen dat
ze geïnformeerde handel via limit orders ook meenemen. Daarnaast laat ik zien dat
er grote variatie is in de cross-sectie van order types die gebruikt worden in geïnfor-
meerde handel. Daarom zouden investeerders hun strategieën kunnen aanpassen om
de waarschijnlijkheid te verminderen met een geïnformeerde tegenpartij te handelen.
Mijn bevindingen suggereren ook dat autoriteiten onderscheid zouden moeten maken
tussen verschillende types van handelaren die algoritmisch handelen bij het opleggen
van belastingen of beperkingen aan de activiteiten van dergelijke handelaren.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt of snelle handelaren prijsontdekking bevorderen of te-
genwerken in de periode voor het opengaan van de beurs. Wij laten zien dat snelle
handelaren zich actief bezighouden in deze periode ondanks dat orders niet onmid-
dellijk worden uitgevoerd, hoewel in mindere mate dan gedurende de continue sessie.
Daarnaast tonen wij aan dat snelle handelaren het proces van prijsontdekking leiden
tijdens de periode voor het opengaan van de beurs. Onze bevindingen dragen bij
aan het huidige debat of continue handel of frequente veilingen een passend markt
ontwerp zijn in het bijzijn van snelle handelaren. Met andere woorden, of continue
handel leidt tot een eindeloze wapenwedloop tussen handelaren met betrekking tot
snelheid, terwijl het snelheidsvoordeel voor een snelle handelaar verwaarloosbaar is in
de veiling set-up. We laten zien dat de snelle handelaren nog steeds gebruik kunnen
maken van hun snelheid door hun acties uit te stellen tot het allerlaatste moment
voordat de veiling plaats vindt, als de orders die ingediend zijn voor het opengaan
van de beurs openbaar zijn.
Globaal gezien zijn mijn huidige en toekomstige onderzoeksagenda’s gerelateerd
aan het ontwerp van goed functionerende ﬁnanciële markten met een speciﬁeke focus
op de regulering van snelle handelaren.
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Appendix A
The Propagation of Shocks Across International Eq-
uity Markets: A Microstructure Perspective
A.1 Sample selection and data screens
This appendix describes the sample and data ﬁlters used in the paper. We start
with a detailed description of the data sources and sample selection, subsequently
discuss our data screens, and conclude with a discussion of potential limitations in
our sample construction.
A.1.1 Data sources and sample selection
We use two databases to build our sample: Datastream and Thomson Reuters Tick
History (TRTH). From the former, we obtain Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) for
all common stocks that are traded on 12 exchanges around the world. Then, we
identify common stocks that were ever part of the major local equity index for each
of these exchanges from 1996 till 2011 through the TRTH Speedguide. We obtain
tick-by-tick data on trades and quotes for these stocks from TRTH. The exchanges
in our sample can be classiﬁed into three regions based on time zones: America,
Asia, and Europe/Africa. The American region includes the following countries (the
major equity index used is in parentheses): Brazil (BOVESPA), Canada (TSX COM-
POSITE), Mexico (IPC), and the U.S. (S&P100). The Asian region includes Hong
Kong (HSI), India (NIFTY50), Japan (NIKKEI225), and Malaysia (KLCI). The
European/African region includes France (CAC40), Germany (DAX), South Africa
(JALSH), and the U.K. (FTSE100). Data for these exchanges are generally available
over 1996-2011, with a few exceptions. In particular, data availability for Germany
and South Africa starts in 1997, for Mexico in 1998, for India in 2000, and for Brazil
in 2004.
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We obtain the historical opening hours for each of the exchanges from several
sources: the TRTH Speedguide, Skeete (2004), exchanges’ websites, and the Fed-
eration of European Securities Exchanges. We cross-check these opening hours by
examining the trading activity patterns observed in the data and select the shortest
opening hours when in doubt. Since we cannot clearly distinguish between auctions
and continuous trading sessions, we disregard the ﬁrst and the last 15 minutes of
each trading day.
A.1.2 Data screens
We ﬁlter the data following Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015). We use
two sets of screens: one set for trade data and another set for quote data. We discard
trades when they occur outside the opening hours of the exchange; the trade price
is not positive; the trade size is more than 10,000 shares (to exclude block trades
from our sample); the trade price diﬀers from the prices of the 10 surrounding ticks
by more than 10% since these are likely to be erroneous entries. We discard quotes
when quotes occur outside the opening hours of the exchange; the bid and ask prices
are not positive; the bid price is higher than the ask price; the bid or ask price diﬀers
from the bid or ask price of the 10 surrounding ticks by more than 10% since these
are likely to be erroneous entries; the proportional bid-ask spread exceeds 25%. In
addition, we discard stock-days if a stock is traded fewer than ten 5-minute intervals
per day. When aggregating stock level data to the market-level, we discard 5-minute
intervals in which fewer than 10 stocks are traded.
A.1.3 Sample construction limitations
There are several potential limitations in our sample construction. First, we use
RICs that ever refer to the stock that was part of the index during our sample
period (1996-2011). However, RICs can change through time and TRTH does not
provide information on re-used RICs. Therefore, some of the data in our sample
could stem from diﬀerent stocks than the index constituents. Second, for the same
reason linking TRTH data to data on the market capitalization of individual stocks
(for example, from Datastream) is challenging. All of our analyses are therefore
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based on equally-weighted averages of the variables across stocks only. We believe
that these limitations are not severe due to the trading activity ﬁlters we apply:
stocks should trade at least ten 5-minute intervals per day. Hereby, we avoid many
small and illiquid stocks that could deﬁnitely not be part of the index in the time
interval under consideration. Because the stocks in our sample are relatively large
and liquid, analyzing equally-weighted averages seems an appropriate choice. Using
an equally-weighted average also reduces the problem of one stock dominating the
whole market (e.g., Nokia in Finland).
A.2 Jump measure (BNS)
This appendix describes the BNS jump measure (Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard
(2006)) computation together with the algorithm that we use to determine the exact
5-minute interval during which a jump occurs. Following Pukthuanthong and Roll
(2015), we use jump measures to identify extreme events on ﬁnancial markets. A
jump measure is a statistical non-parametric way to test for jumps in a time-series.
In this paper, we use the BNS ratio measure:
Ht =
√
T
(
π
2
Bt
St
− 1
)
√
υQt
B2t
(A.2.1)
St = ΣTk=2(Vk,t )
2 (A.2.2)
Bt = ΣTk=2 |Vk,t | |Vk−1,t | (A.2.3)
Qt = T · ΣTk=4 |Vk,t | |Vk−1,t | |Vk−2,t | |Vk−3,t | (A.2.4)
υ =
(
π
2
)2
+ π − 5 (A.2.5)
where Ht is the BNS ratio measure on day t, St is the squared variation on day
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t based on 5-minute observations within the day, Bt is the bipower variation on
day t based on 5-minute observations within the day, Qt is the “quarticity” of the
process (which is part of the scaling factor for statistics to follow a standard normal
distribution), Vkt is the variable of interest (returns, changes in proportional quoted
or eﬀective spreads, turnover, or order imbalance) at k-th 5-minute interval during
day t, T is the total number of valid 5-minute intervals within day t. Under the null
hypothesis of no jumps, Ht follows a standard normal distribution.
The BNS jump statistic is based on the assumption that Vkt follows a Brownian
motion with zero drift and some diﬀusion plus a Poisson jump process. The bipower
variation is the variation of the continuous part of process (the Brownian motion
itself) that is free of any jumps, while the squared variation is the variation of the
process including the jumps. Thus, without jumps, the squared variation should
be approximately the same as the scaled bipower variation. But in case there is a
jump, the squared variation exceeds the bipower variation. Hence, the ratio of these
two variables gives an indication of whether a jump occurred. If there is a jump on
day t, then Ht should be negative and large in absolute terms. In addition to the
assumption that our variables follow a Brownian motion with zero drift plus a Poisson
jump process, there are several other important assumptions underlying the formulas
above. First, we assume that variation is constant over day t. We acknowledge that
volatility exhibits intraday patterns, but we circumvent this issue to a large extent
by discarding the ﬁrst and last 15 minutes of the trading session. Second, we also
assume that T is large enough (T ∼ T − 1 ∼ T − 3).
The BNS measure indicates whether there was a jump on a given trading day, but
does not pinpoint the exact 5-minute interval when the jump occurs. To determine
the exact time of the jump, we propose the following algorithm. We ﬁrst compute
Ht for any day with at least 25 5-minute observations within the day. Then, we
check whether we can reject the null hypothesis of no jumps (based on a threshold
of the 0.1% percentile of the standard normal distribution). If the null hypothesis is
rejected, we search for the most inﬂuential observation within day t. In other words,
we identify the observation that has the maximum eﬀect on the jump measure and
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is greater in absolute terms than 1.96 jump-free standard deviations (that is, the
square root of the scaled bipower variation). We mark this 5-minute interval as a
jump interval. We repeat the procedure (temporarily discarding 5-minute intervals
that have been identiﬁed as jump observations) until we no longer reject the null
hypothesis of no jumps or until there are fewer than 10 observations left. In our
sample, the latter of these two conditions never becomes binding.
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Appendix B
Intraday Return Predictability, Informed Limit Or-
ders, and Algorithmic Trading
B.1 Sample selection
In this paper, I use two databases to construct my sample: TRTH and CRSP.
From the TRTH database, I obtain trade data, best bid-oﬀer data, and limit or-
der book data for the U.S. consolidated limit order book for NYSE-listed securi-
ties. I use Reuters Instrumental Codes (RICs), which are identical to TICKERs,
to obtain data on common stocks and primary exchange code from CRSP database
(PRIMEXCH=N, and SHRCD=10 or 11, EXCHCD =1 or 31). Thus, I focus on all
NYSE-listed common stocks that have NYSE as their primary exchange from 2002
untill 2010. These ﬁlters leave me with 2,047 unique TICKERs in total.
B.2 Data Screens
I ﬁlter the data following Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015). First, I
discard trades, quotes, and limit order book data that are not part of the continuous
trading session. Continuous trading session hours for NYSE are 9:30-16:00 ET and
they remain unchanged during the sample period.
Second, I discard block trades, i.e., trades with a trade size greater than 10,000
shares, as these trades are likely to receive a special treatment.
Third, I discard data entries that are likely to be faulty. Faulty entries include
entries with negative or zero prices or quotes, entries with negative bid-ask spread,
entries with proportional bid-ask spread bigger than 25%, entries that have trade
price, bid price, or ask price which deviates from the 10 surrounding ticks by more
than 10%.
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In addition, I require that at least ﬁve levels of the limit order book are available
in the end of each one-minute interval. For a stock-day to enter my sample, at least
100 valid one-minute intervals with at least one trade are required.
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Appendix C
Low-Latency Trading and Price Discovery without
Trading: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
in the Pre-Opening Period and the Opening Batch
Auction
C.1 Conﬁguration of multiple virtual servers (VSs) used by
one trader
On January 4, 2010, the TSE launched a new trading system named “Arrowhead”,
which reduced the order submission response time to 2 milliseconds. The main fea-
tures of this system are (i) accelerated computer-processing speeds, (ii) a co-location
service that reduces the physical distance between market participants (investors as
well as brokerage ﬁrms), eliminating the former transmission time of around 3 to 9
milliseconds between the TSE’s “Arrowhead” and the customer’s computer, and (iii)
the removal of the three-second delay in intra-day matching. Thus, January 2010
can be viewed as the month of introduction of a new trading paradigm in Japan.
VSs are used in order to send/receive data to/from the TSE. There are 5,580
servers in existence during our sample period. Most of them (2,692) are used as
single servers and the rest as part of multiple-server conﬁgurations. When using
multiple servers, each trader optimizes the conﬁguration of servers so that she can
maximize the performance of her trading activity. Some traders trade a speciﬁc group
of stocks every day, in which case they may ﬁx the allocation of stocks to each server.
Other traders may change part of their allocation on a day-by-day basis. As Table
4.1 shows, by optimizing the number of stocks per server she can reduce her latency
signiﬁcantly. Figure C.1.1 illustrates one example of a server conﬁguration.
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Figure C.1.1. Illustration of a possible VS conﬁguration for mimicking
the TSE’s matching engine
This ﬁgure shows an example of a potential server conﬁguration. One trading desk (trader) uses four VSs
to handle her order ﬂow. The optimizing technique illustrated involves allocating stocks to individual
servers with the aim of mimicking the allocation of stocks in the TSE’s matching engine. This enables the
trader to avoid conjecturing about the order submission task for a large number of stocks at a particular
VS.
TSE Matching Engines
Trading Desk
Stocks 
 F to M 
Stocks 
 A to E 
Stocks 
W to Z 
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N to V 
Stocks 
 A to E 
Stocks  
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C.2 Latency model estimation
Due to the limitation on the number of messages per second per server, the coverage
of stocks and intensity of messages of a trader determines the size of their operation.
Our novel data server ID allows us to estimate the relation between latency, server
conﬁguration, and message intensity with the following equation:
Latencyj,k,l = a + b ln(Message j,k,l)+
c ln(Nstockk,l/Nserverl) + d ln(MaxMessagek,l) +  j,k,l
(C.2.1)
Latencyj,k,l is the latency measure for stock j, day k, and trader l. Message j,k,l is
the number of messages for stock j, day k, and trader l. Nstockk,l is the number
of stocks traded on day k by trader l. Nserverl is the number of servers used by
trader l (a ﬁxed number during our sample period). MaxMessagek,l is the maximum
number of messages per second sent by trader l on day k.
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Table C.2.1. Latency model estimation
Estimation, using Tobit regression, of the model in equation (C.2.1). Latencyj,k, l is the latency measure
for stock j, day k, and trader l. Message j,k, l is the number of messages for stock j, day k, and trader l.
Nstockk, l is the number of stocks traded on day k by trader l. Nserverl is the number of servers used by
trader l (a ﬁxed number during our sample period). MaxMessagek, l is the maximum number of messages
per second sent by trader l on day k. Our sample consists of 97 stocks from TOPIX100 during April and
May 2013. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.
Dependent variable: Latency j,t,k
Coef t-stat
Constant 5.44 571.65
ln(Messagej,t,k ) -2.08 -1555.60
ln(Nstockt,k/Nserverk ) 0.41 263.60
ln(MaxMessaget,k ) -1.35 -489.31
Left-censored obs 73,011
Right-censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 3,120,836
Total obs 3,193,847
The daily number of stocks per server indicates the trader’s speed requirement.
The number of messages is used by other HFT studies to identify HFTs who engage
in market making. The maximum number of messages per second is another aspect of
trading style; for example, an index arbitrager might execute a basket of 225 Nikkei
Index constituents simultaneously. Our empirical measure of latency is limited by
the time stamp unit of one millisecond, meaning that the distribution of observed
elapsed time is clustered at one millisecond. Taking into account the censored nature
of the dependent variable, we use a Tobit model to estimate equation (C.2.1).
Table C.2.1 shows a strong relation between the number of stocks per server,
the total number of messages, and the maximum number of messages per second.
The smaller the number of stocks per server, and the larger the number of messages
(maximum number of messages per second), the lower is the latency. This result
suggests that latency-based classiﬁcation is equivalent to classiﬁcation based on the
total number of messages.
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C.3 Comparative summary statistics for active and non-active
trader groups
In order to understand how our four most active groups of traders (FAST / SMALL,
FAST / MEDIUM, MEDIUM / SMALL, and MEDIUM / MEDIUM) participate
during the pre-opening period, we split traders belonging to each group into three
subgroups: those who are always, sometimes, and never active in the pre-opening
period, respectively. In Table C.3.1, Panel A shows the results for FAST / SMALL
traders, Panel B for FAST / MEDIUM traders, Panel C for MEDIUM / SMALL
traders, and Panel D for MEDIUM / MEDIUM traders. We report the total number
of observations, the average latency and inventory, the average number of new orders,
cancellations, and trades per stock-day, the average trade-to-order and cancellation
ratios, the number of messages during the pre-opening period and the continuous
session.
C.4 Comparison with an alternative classiﬁcation scheme
For comparison purposes, we present the results we obtain when we apply a clas-
siﬁcation scheme following Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden, and Riordan (2015) (a
modiﬁcation of the Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) approach), which
splits traders into two groups: HFTs and non-HFTs. In particular, in this classiﬁca-
tion, a trader is deﬁned as an HFT in a particular stock if and only if, on at least
50% of the active days, a trader satisﬁes the following criteria. First, the trader’s
end-of-day inventory is no greater than 10% of her trading volume for that stock on
that day. Second, the trader’s inventory at the end of each minute is no greater than
15% of her trading volume for that stock on that day. Third, the trader’s trading
volume in that stock, on that day, is in the top quartile of the total trading volume
for all traders in that stock on that day. This classiﬁcation scheme is applied to April
2013 only, as there was a change in the deﬁnition of server IDs at the beginning of
May 2013.
Table C.4.1 presents a summary of trader characteristics based on this classiﬁ-
cation scheme. In particular, HFTs are characterized by a 4% net inventory at the
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end of the day, in contrast to the 16% net inventory of our FAST / SMALL traders.
Trade-to-order and cancellation ratios are around 50% and 30% respectively for both
the HFT and non-HFT groups. The average latency for HFTs is 2.34 seconds, which
is not that diﬀerent to the typical human reaction time. Based on this classiﬁcation
scheme, we identify 59 traders as HFTs. Each of these traders is active in 10 stocks
on average (with a maximum coverage of 73 stocks and a minimum coverage of just
1 stock). However, these HFTs are responsible for only 12% of the total activity dur-
ing the continuous session, and for 1.5% of the total activity during the pre-opening
period. Note that most of the observations are marked as non-HFT, suggesting that
the Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) scheme is a stricter (narrower) clas-
siﬁcation of HFTs than the classiﬁcation proposed in our paper. We believe that
the diversity of market participants in the TSE better suits our more comprehensive
approach than the narrower alternative scheme. The low participation rate of HFTs
in the case of the Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) scheme suggests that
there are other active traders who do not meet the three conditions above.1
The Table C.4.2 shows how the two classiﬁcation schemes compare to one another.
In particular, we show that traders classiﬁed as HFTs under the Kirilenko, Kyle,
Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) scheme are most likely to fall into the FAST / SMALL or
MEDIUM / SMALL groups. Clearly, the Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015)
scheme has a narrowly speciﬁed deﬁnition of HFTs, and fails to capture the subtle
diﬀerences in the activities of other groups. Overall, we believe that the Kirilenko,
Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) scheme is not appropriate for the TSE market,
at least with the current thresholds in place, as it does not properly capture the
distinctive features of HFTs as discussed in the SEC (2014) report.
C.5 Best bid and best ask price during pre-opening period
This appendix illustrates how the best bid price and the best ask price are determined
during the pre-opening period. First of all, the TSE computes the cumulative amount
1In the case of the TSE, the number of listed stocks (1,702 stocks as of April 1, 2013) is much
larger than the number in the NASDAQ OMX market studied by Brogaard, Hagströmer, Norden,
and Riordan (2015). Moreover, the activity of foreign investors, including some foreign-based HFTs,
accounts for about 60% of the total trading volume, according to TSE statistics.
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Table C.4.2. Comparison of classiﬁcations
This table shows the summary comparison of the classiﬁcation of traders proposed in this paper versus
that based on Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) for 97 stocks from TOPIX100 during April 2013.
The classiﬁcation proposed in this paper splits traders into 12 groups on a stock-day basis, as reported in
Table 4.3. The classiﬁcation of traders based on Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2015) splits traders
into two groups (HFTs and non-HFTs). A trader is deﬁned as an HFT in a particular stock if and only if,
on at least 50% of the active days, she satisﬁes the following three criteria: (1) Her end-of-day inventory
is no greater than 10% of her trading volume for that stock on that day. (2) Her inventory at the end
of each minute is no greater than 15% of her trading volume for that stock on that day. (3) Her trading
volume in that stock on that day is in the top quartile of total trading volume for all traders in that stock
on that day. In addition, we require HFTs to be active in that stock for at least 10 of the days in our
sample period. We report the number of trader-stock-days in each group. Order ﬂow data, with order IDs
as well as virtual server IDs, are provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Speed Inventory HFT Non-HFT
FAST
LARGE 13 149,609
MEDIUM 82 171,029
SMALL 9,695 166,734
NOTRADE 1 80,901
MEDIUM
LARGE 4 186,921
MEDIUM 28 151,315
SMALL 1,726 141,448
NOTRADE 6 94,061
SLOW
LARGE 17 409,866
MEDIUM 0 80,372
SMALL 17 65,482
NOTRADE 4 77,205
of eligible buy and sell orders at each price (depth). Usually, more buy orders are
accumulated around lower prices and more sell orders are accumulated around higher
prices so that there is a point at which the situation of “cumulative buy orders” being
greater than “cumulative sells” turns into “cumulative buys” being less than or equal
to “cumulative sells”. The best bid is the highest bid price at which the cumulative
bid depth is greater than the cumulative ask depth and the best ask is the lowest ask
price at which the cumulative ask depth is greater than the cumulative bid depth.
Therefore, the best bid and ask prices reported during the pre-opening period are
the respective prices at which the bid (demand) and ask (supply) schedules (two step-
functions with cumulative volume on the X-axis and price on the Y -axis) intersect.
Either the best ask or the best bid price is the opening price, as a result of the
single price auction explained in Section 4.3.1. In the pre-opening period, however,
the cumulative amounts of buy and sell orders can be the same, particularly at the
beginning of the pre-opening period when just a few orders have been entered. In
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Figure C.5.1. Determination of best bid and ask prices during the pre-
opening period
scriptsize
This ﬁgure shows a hypothetical example of how the best bid price and the best
ask price are determined during the pre-opening period. We plot bid (demand) and
ask (supply) schedules with cumulative volume on the X-axis and price on the Y -
axis. The blue line represents the ask schedule, while the red line represents the bid
schedule. The best bid is the highest bid price at which the cumulative bid depth is
greater than the cumulative ask depth. The best ask is the lowest ask price at which
the cumulative ask depth is greater than the cumulative bid depth.
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these special situations, the TSE has another rule to determine the best bid and ask
in the pre-opening period, which is based on yesterday’s closing price, and the upper
or lower limit on the price of a stock. Refer to TSE (2015) for details.
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This dissertation consists of three empirical papers in the field of market microstructure.
These papers investigate the impact of increased interconnectedness of the financial markets
and the vast trading speed improvements on two important functions of financial markets:
price discovery and liquidity provision. 
Chapter 2 examines the role of liquidity and trading activity in the origination and propa -
ga tion of shocks to prices across international equity markets. The findings show that equity
markets are strongly interconnected with respect to the transmission of shocks to prices and
trading activity, while liquidity dry-ups seem to be isolated events. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the choice that an informed trader makes between market (consuming
liquidity) and limit (supplying liquidity) orders and how this choice is affected by the rise of
algorithmic trading. My findings suggest that price informativeness does not necessarily
come at the expense of low liquidity, even in the presence of algorithmic traders. 
Chapter 4 examines whether low-latency traders are improving or deteriorating price dis -
covery in the pre-opening period. The findings show that low-latency traders actively parti -
ci pate in the pre-opening period despite the absence of immediate execution, although to a
lesser extent than during the continuous trading session. Furthermore, low-latency traders
lead price discovery during the pre-opening period. Overall, my current and future research
agenda is related to the design of the well-functioning financial market with specific focus
on the regulation of the low-latency traders. 
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